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NA'/AL POSTGRADUATE SCHOO 
-~. CiLIF. 93940 
The Sovie t 1-a vy has trad itiona lly b ee n tre a t ed in 
Sovie t str a te g ic thought as a kin~ of seawa rd extension of 
Ru ss ia ' s l a n d forces . In one of hi s ':'' orld i.'Jar II d e cla ra -
t ion s , S t a lin described the So v i et F J. ee i:: as " the true h e l p -
e r of t he Red Ar my . ,l ':L'h i s So v i et c oncept of the Na vy a s a 
kind of floa tin g Z\.rrl'.y ,; u x iJ.iary U ') ncled unti 1 ve ry r e cent-
l y to k ee9 Sovie t n a va l sur(ac0 forces close to Ru ss i a n 
shore s ~nd cle a r of the h i gh seas . In the c e riod of the 
1 950 ' s , 3 ovie t n a va J. stra t e :;r.1 ~.,m s cle a rly defen s ive , and 
the overriding c oncern of Sovie t naval l ead e rs was t he p ro -
t e c tio n of the Soviet Un ion fro~ poss i b l e nuc l ea r at t a c k 
by Ame rica n C3 r ri e r t a sk forces . 
In r e c e nt y ec>,rs , Soviet naval ve sse l s have been app12ar -
in g mor e frequently i n t h e wor l d ' s sea · l anes , mos t not i c e -
ab l y in t he Med ite rra n e a n Sea . Last y e ar , f or the fir st 
time , Sovie t nava l warships we r e dep loyed i n a hi ;hly visi-
ble ma nn e r in an attempt to i nf lue n ce e v e nts i n the Mi dd l e 
East durin g the Ar ab-Israe li war. Mo r e rece ntly , So v i e t 
na v a l uni ts were dispa tched to the vicini ty o f the u. s . n a -
v a l ta sk force o f f the coas t o f Ko r ea dur i n g the Pueb lo c r i-
sis. These and o the r deve lopments h a v e l ed s o me observe r s 
to con clude tha t t h e Sovie t Na vy h as b ee n g iven t he mi ss ion 
1. Raymond L . Ga rthoff , §_ovic> t .!'1 ili_:l:?.l_ry Doctrine (Gl encoe , 
Illinois : Th e Free P r es s , 1 953 ) , p . 362 . 
- i-
-i i -
o f pro j ecting Soviet pmre r abroad into areas not cont i g -
• u ou s ·t o the So'li e t Union , i n a Co mmun i st v e rs i on o f " gu n -
b oaJc d i ploma c y " . 
• 
• 
In a stateme nt r epr esentative o f t he journ a li s tic 
r ea c t ion t o t he g r e ate r vi s i b ility o f So v i e t n ava l power , 
T i me magaz i ne c o rnmen·ted : 
The n e\v S ovie t e:-nph o.s is o n seapoHe r r epr esen t s a 
major s 'cra teg ic deci s ion . ··:7 i th i ts arsena l o f 
7 20 ICB;,;s .more ·tha n offse t by a 1r1. r ger U . S . de-
t errent , ,.,Ti th its h ;;re l and o.Pny rm~ s cle -boqncJ. 
and de_;_-;ri ved o f: g l oba l r:10!J ili ty i n Jchc mi dd le 
o f t he ~Trea t ~uras ia.n l cmd :7\i::lSS , nuss i a has 
t ux-n ed t.o ·the sea. to brea]( out of i ts o>¥n geo-
grap hic c onfi9es and attempt to wi e l d tru ly 
g lobc't l p o >.•!e r e -
In genera l , thi s evaluation see~s to c orrespond to th~ fears 
3 
of many nC'1.va.l obse :cve rE> :i.n the Unit.ecl. States ~ 
I'c i s i:hc purpose of 'chi s pa.pe r to exv.-rr:inc the mi s -
s i on s of the Soviet Na vy as the y apyea r ·to be unfo1cl.in g 
i n t he 1 960 ' s , \·Ji t i1 particula r e m?hasis on tho c apab ilities 
a n d l i mi ta.tion::; of Soviet n a v a l poHe r f o r u se in limi ted 
app lications of for c e or i nf l u e nce abroad . Thi s ana l ysis 
i s b a sed on an e:.::ami n a t i on o f the publi c statements o f So viet. 
l eac18rs r egard i ng the potent :i_a li t i es o f seo. po'~Te r a n d mili tary 
fo r c e i n ge nera l , an e/arnina i: ion of t he phys i c a l c apabili -
ties c:md l i rni t a. tions o f t h e Sovi e·t nava l forces as t hey ex i st , 
-------- - - --- - -
2. Time , F e brua ry 23 , 1 968 , p . 23 . 
3. " Navy 1 Seeking Funds , No·te s Sovi e ·t Ga ins " , Ne1·1 Yo rk 






and a n exami nation of the actua l uses whi ch have b een made 
of the Soviet Navy in r e cent y ea r s • 
• p r _ r erac e : •• • e o • e • e o o • o ~ • o • • c • • e o o c o o o o • e • • c • • • ~ • 0 • • 0 • • 
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C:f-lAPTER ONE : \'7ARS HI PS OF T HE SOVIE'r NAVf 
In t.he: Na vy , th'::! submarin e ga i ns in i mp o rtance , 
whe r ea s surface s hips can no longe r p l a y the role 
the y p l a y e d in the pa s t. 1 
- N. s. Khrushchev 
I t i s a trui sm tha t a nation's mili·tary strate gy i s r e -
fl e eted in the we apons it procure s . This is p~rhaps e ve n more 
t rue i n the case of naval s tra t egy than in othe r branche s be-
c ause o f the gre a t expen se o f nava l con s truction a nd the long 
u seful l if e o f nava l vesse l s. Eve n thouqh combatan'c s h i p s t end 
to b e multi-purpose weapon s , they are not i nf inite ly s o~ The 
i nhe r e nt capabilitic~ s and limi ta·t :Lon s of na va l ve ss e ls pro-
cure d i n the prese nt will t e nd to d e t e r mine t ho op tions_opan 
to ne:.va l s ·tra t n g i s ts fo r a.t l east a d e c o.de in t o t h e futuro , a nd 
• p e rha ps longe r 0 For thi s r ea son , any e:Xa mi na ·t ion of So v i e t na -
va l s t rategy mu s t take i nto account th2 nava l shipbuild i ng pro-
• 
Khru shc h e v op e ne d t .hc d e cade o f the 1 96 0 ' s Hi th a ma j or 
speech on the milit ary ba l a nce , j_n vlhich h e d e pre cated the r o l e 
of the surfa c e ship and ind ica t e d that priori·ty v;ras to b e give n 
to subma rine construction. Sovic t .naval approva l of thi s c ourse 
o f action was officia lly expressed by Admira l v. A_. Kasaton ov , 
the n commande r of the Black Sea Flee t , and a forme r s ubmar ine 
2 commande r. Actua lly , Khru s hche v ' s ave rsion to ma j or surfa c e 
1. Report t o the Su p r eme Sovie t , "D i sa rmamc~ nt - the way to 
s e c ure peace and fri e nds hip .be t•:~ee n .n a tions " 1 Pravda , Janua.ry 
15, 1 960 . 






warships had long b een known . Af t er A4mi ral Se r ge i Gorsh kov 
r e lieved Ad~ira l Nikola i G. Kuznctsov as h ead of the Sovie t 
..__)~~ s<a 
Navy i n 1 95--£, construction HC"l.S ha ltc~d on the Sve rdlov-c l a.ss 
crui s e r program initiate d under Sta lin ' s regim2 , with on ly 15 
out o f a pro j c c ·ted 24 cruisers comp l eted . 3 Thi s postv.Ja r crui s e r 
construction prog ram represented a ma jor allocation of r esources 
to t .h e Sovi c·t surface Navy , and the c an c a lla tion of the pro-
gram i ndicate d a ma jor change in Soviet thinking on the role 
o f the Navy in futur e \·Tarfan~ .. 
The posbva r So v :i_ e t crui ser construc'cion I)rogra.m is .a ra.-
the r cu r iou s d e ve lopmen t in many r espects o The Svc rd lov class 
cruise r i s a modern des i gn , co~parable to c ruiser des i gns de ~ : 
v e loped in the Unite d Sta t es dur ing Wo r ld War II , such a s the 
Fargo class of ligh-t c ru i se r s .. Itc u sefulness i s severely l i-
mitc d , h o·_,.rcvcr , by c e rtain des i g n f ca·tures ., In the fir s t pla c e , 
t h e ant.i-a. irc:caft a.rmamen·t of the Sve rdlov class i s \•lea k ; eve n 
by the s t andards of \"lorld liar II , and in any . c ase wou l d have 
b een o f dou bt.ful u sefu lne ss aga in s t t he high-speed j e t aircraft 
· o f the 1 950 ' s . 'rhe exper i e nce of 'd orld '>Jar II nava l ope ra t ion s / 
poi .. ·ted Ol)t the ext:cernc vulnerability of sur face v e sse ls to air 
power in t he abse nce of a ir superiority . This me ant that the 
Sve rdlov class c ru i ser could not b e effectiv e ly utilize d b e yond 
the r ange of Soviet interc eptor a ircraft o p e rating from Soviet 
airbascs . Tht:) cla ss v;as ft1 rtf1e r l i mite d· by an opr~ ra Jcing r ad ius 
o f 4 , 000 to 5 , 000 miles . S in c e the Soviet Navt.f in ·the 1 950 ' s did 
3 .. Actua lly , 20 Sve rd lov class h u ll s were l a u nche d , a n d 15 
comp l eted . In 1 962 , o n e o f the s e was transfe rre d to Ind ones i a. 
J ane ' s Fight ing ?1~___!96 2-§.l. ( London , Sams on Lovl & Co G, 1 962 ) 
·• 
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not h ave the capability of r efue ling nava l u n i ts at s e a , thi s 
• charact e r i st. ic a lone r es tri cte d the op~rations of this type 
cruise r in time s o f \·Jar to an are a within a short dista nce of 
the Sovie t coas tline . The s e cha racteristics , coup l e d with the 
Sovie t vi ev-7 of the Navy as a floating auxi l i a ry of the Re d Army, 
sugges t tha t the Sve rdlov class cruise r wa s d e s i gne d for a d e -
f e n sivc role aga in s t Ame rican c a rrie r strike forces and am-
phib ious assa ult t ask fo r c es dire cte d at the Sb v i c t Union . 
Give n the tr~mcndous a i r p owe r of a ca r r i er t ask f o rce and t h e 
f a c t tha t D . S., d o c tr i ne doc s n o t contcmp l a t;:; a tternptin g an am-
p h ibious assault wi thou t fir s t establishin g loca l a i r superiority , 
it i s di f ficu.l t t o c onte mpl a t e the circumstances unde r 1-·1h i ch a 
Svc r d lov c la ss cru i s e r wo u l d b e a ble to approach a n Ame rica n 
• tasl< forc<'~ c.lo sc enou<Jh Jco t a k e it und e r fi r e \vith its six -
in c h guns ( i~ c . , l e ss t ha n 15 miles )., 
•• 
·' 
The intrigu ing q ues tion h e r o. is not why the c ru i se r o ro-
gram was t c r mi na t e d , but r a thc r 'dhy it: 1·-Ta s e ve r begun in t he: firs t 
pla c e . If Sovie t p r o duction cos t s are in any wa y compa r a ble to 
Ame rica n cos t s for similar equipme nt , the Sv e r d lov p r ogram r e-
pre s e nte d a n inve stme nt on the o r de r of three bi l lion dollars 
ove r a p e riod of six y ears. This exp e nse wa s underta k e n at a 
time '"h e n the Sovie t e conomy Ha s b e ing sore ly taxed · in an e f-
fort to r e con s truct the t e rrible d a mage of ':'jorld ~'ia r II , to 
d e v e lop the r monuclea r weapons , and to de v e lop inte rcontine ntal 
ballistic mi s sile s for the ir d e live ry. The answe r is proba bly 
to b e fou nd within t h e fra mework of bureaucra tic politics i n 
the Sovie t Union • 
The r e is r e a s on to sus p e ct tha t a strong factor supporting 
-4-
t ha c ru i ser construct i on program was the factor o f prest i g e . 
• . If grea t nava l po',·7r. r s have cruisers and the So viet Un ion p l anned 
to become a grea t na val p owe r, the n the Sov i e t Union must h ave 
crui se r s . Thi s was hin t e d by Admira l Kasa.tonov in his s t ateme nt 
on Khrushchev's ,January 1 96 0 spe e c h ., Kasa tonov sa i d , "the classe s 
o f ma jor surfac e ships , with which i deas of the might of the fl ee t 
were conne c t e d u nti l r e cent_time s,, h ave los t t he ir forme r sign ifi-
cance . "
4 
It i s a l so inte r e st i ng to note tha t the cruise r program 
coincide s aJ most c xac'c l y ,,:7i th the p n riod 'ir7hc n the Sovie t Navy 
l ast op8 ra t e d autonomously under i t:s o·,-m mini s try o I n 1 950 , the 
Navy v1as p l ace d unde r the .fl linistry of the Navy- , h e aded b y 
Flee t Admi ral N il<.ola. i G .. Kuzne tsov , a. vra.rtimc na va 1 l eade r 1 and 
• o n e o f the f mv top·-ranking participants i n the miss ion t o assist the Spanish Republic \•.rho survive d 'en~ purge s of 1938 . The c ru ise r 
con s truction program b e gan i n 1 95 1., Follov;ing t h e death of 
Stalin in 1 953 , t he c'aV'.J '''as aga in p l ace d unde r the _t.-1 ini t'> try o f 
Defence . Ku z n c t sov continu~d t.o fight f o r a l arge Navy 1 but . 
wa s r e lie ved of hi s command in l ate 1 955 or early 1 956. The 
fc.c t tha t the c ruiser pro~rra.m wc.s t e rmina.tc d a l mos'c i mmcc1ia t f?. ly 
following hi s r e lief i ndica t es tha t t he program was d epende nt 
u p o n Kuznets ov' s s upp ort for its continua tion . It seems like ly 
that this i s one of the disputes tha t l ed to hi s dm-mfa ll. The 
submarine progr am , hm;ev c r 1 which viClS also b e gun unde r Kuzncts o v ' s 
ministry , obvious l y had support from othe r quarte rs , s in c e i t . 
• 
4 . Pravda , J a nuary 16 , 1 96 0 ( emphasis mine ) . 
• 
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was not termi nated . 
Sergei Georgievich Gorshl<:ov, the y oun g Sovie t Admiral 
Hho rep l aced Kuznetsov as Commander-in-Chie f of the Soviet Navy 
in 1956 at the age ·of 46, probably ovTes much of his success to 
. the good fortune of serving \<lith the Black Sea Fleet during· 
World ;_.7 ar II. During the course of the \va r, he had occasion to 
work with senior military and civilian officials of the Stalin-
grad front during various suppor·ting o pera tions. This is the 
famous "Stalingrad g roup" Hhich Khru s hche v eventually appointed 
to high positions in the military hierarchy, and which enjoys its 
preeminent pos ition to this day .. 5 Khrushchev apparently tool<· the 
opp ortun ity provided by Kuzne tsov's dispute with the Army to place 
one of his mm proteges in the com.manding· position in the Navy. 
This is the last time tha t Soviet politics had such an 
obvious rela tions hip with naval appropriations. · Gorshl<ov a ppar- / 
ently approved of the emphasis on the submarine prog·ram as Hell 
as the e nphas i s on missiles, both under Khrushchev and Khrushchev's 
successors . Soviet naval l eader shi p h as remo.ined remarkably sta-
ble since 1 956 . The only upHard mobility into the hierarchy vJas 
occas ioned by the death of Admira l Arsen ii Golovk o , the First 
Deputy Co't\Tf\ander-in-Chief (~,vho accompanied Gorshlcov into off ice 
in 1956 ) in !~ay, 1 962 , and the dea th of hi s successors , Admiral 
Vi~alii Fokin, in Janua ry, 1964 and Admiral F. V. Zozulya in 
April, 1 964 . The current First Deputy, Vladimi r Afanasiev:Lch : 
Kasatonov, was promoted to Fleet Ad.mira l, the highest rank in the 
5~ A good a ccount of the Stalingrad Group is to be found in 
Roman !Zolk mlicz. , The Soviet Military and the Co:nrnun i s t P9-rty 
(Princeton, Ne\v J ersey : Princeton Unive r s ity Press , 196 7 ). 
-6-
Soviet Navy, in 1 96 5. The d e ath of e a ch First Deputy, of course, 
. , brought about a reshuffling of the Naval hierarchy, bu·t from the 
data ava ila ble , no conclusions can b e dra'>vn as to the effect of 
• 
• 
such reass i g n men ·t s of Sov iet Naval doctrine . 
The Sovie t emphas is on the submarine is not new in Russian 
naval thought. The Tsarist .Nav'.f showe d mor e in'ce re s t in the sub-
marine tha n did the large naval pmver s . The 1912 building pro-
gram planne d for the construction of 3 6 submarines by 1930 for 
the Baltic Flee t alo~e . This was eve n b e fore the Germa n u~e of 
the submarine vJith StJ.ch d e va sta ting effect in \'Jorld War I h a d de-
mon s trated t he pote ntia lities of t he submarine . With the first 
five .;..yea r pla n of 1 9 2 8 , the Sovie t Na vy emb a r ked on a massive sub -
marine construct ion pro g ra.m, and b y the b eginning of the wa r j_n 
1941 h a d 2 50 s ubma rines in o pe r a tion, of v7hich 24 5 h a d been b u ilt 
since 1928 . 'J'hi s r api d expan s ion of the s ub marine force let to 
certa in unde r standabl e shortcomings in tra ining and r eadiness , 
hov.re v e r, a n d the Sovie t sub marine force n e v e r p e rformed v e ry v.re ll 
aga in s t the German s du ring viorld 'l~ ar II. 
The submarine cons truction prog r am of the 1 950's conce n-
tra t ed on the r·J -class submarine , a conve ntiona l ocean-going s ub-
6 
ma rine roughl y compa r a.b l e to the America n Gu ppy-II subma rine . 
The R-class 1 o f v.1hich 1 2 "''e r e b u ilt b elt;,vee n 1 95 9 and 196 2, is 
an i mproved v e r s ion of t he ':J -class , a ppa r e ntly with an expan ded 
anti submarine v.ra.r fa r e (AS\'/) capability . 'rhe Z-clas s, a large r 
6. The d a t a se t forth in thi s Chapt e r on Sovie t warships i s 
derived p rimarily from the Ge r ma n na va l a n nua l, 'Vv eve r s F1 o tten-
t aschenblJch , Jane ' s F i qhtin::r Sh i ps , a n d t he Institu t e for S t ra -
t egic S t u dies a nnua l r epor t , The Str atecr ic Ba l a nce . This da t a 






boat. tha n the \·'7 , ,,, i ·th a grea t e r r a n ge and more torpedo tubes , vJas 
b u ilt in more limi 'ced n umbers 0 The F-cla ss , b egun in 1 959 , is 
an i mproved ve r s ion o f the Z-cla ss , aga in with \vh a t appea rs to 1)e 
an i mproved l\ S'.·I capc\bili ty. All of these classes a r e ve r sa. tile 
su.b ma rines , c o.pab le of b e ing utili :0ed tn an l\S:;-7 role as He ll as 
for comme r ce - d e stroying a nd an ti-·tasl< force o pe r a tion s o The ir 
usefulnes s unde r modern cond itions of wa rfa r e i s limite d by the 
f a c t ·that t hey are armed s ole l y ~t7 i th tor~;ec o es -a nd mines , and by 
t he n e ce ss t ty to per i o d i ca l ly operate t he i r diesel engin - s to re ~ 
ch~rge batterte s . 
Somet i me i n 1 958 , / i n rea c tion to the Ame r i can Po l a ri s p ro -
gram, ·the Soviet Navy b e .:;an to d eve l op subrna rines ~.-J i th an en'cire -
ly n eH r o l e : t he ba l l i st i c-;ni ss ile subma rine o 
classes i nvo l ved i n t he o ri g i nc. l b c. l l i s ·t i c mi ss:Ll e submc>cr i ne ef -
fo rt.: t he G class , Hhich '\'la s n m·-!ly constructed fro 'TI the Jcee l u p , 
and a conve r s i on o f the Z class subma r i ne . Bo th are c onventiona l ly 
po\·!8red subma rines . The Z c onve rsion ca r r i es t 'i.\7 0 Sarl< ba llist i c 
mi ss iles i n t h e s a il , and the G clas s i s equ i p ped wi t h thr ee Sa r k 
::1 i ss ilcs wi tl1 a r <J.nge esti :n& t ec1 c:::_ t 8 70 na1_;_t ica l mi l es . !~bou t 1 96 1 , 
con s tru ctio n of a n u clear-prnqe r ed clas s of b a lli s tic mi ss ile sub -
marines , t he H class , -vm s undcrt2l<e n. Th e I-1 cla s s i s s i mila r in 
a ppea r a n ce to the G class , a nd c a rrie s t h r ee ba lli s tic missiles in 
the s a il. Orig ina lly t hese \,re r e Sa r k mi s siles , but some time in 
196 2 a program of b a ckf i ·tting the Se rb mi ss ile into the H clas s 
vJas b egun. The Se rb mi s sile i s es tima t e d to h a ve a slightly 
grea t e r r ange a n d i s capable of submerg~d firin g . Accord ing to 




ing of a ballistic missile, probably a Serb missile, during his 
visit to the Northe rn Flee t in July, 196 2. 7 
Having set out on a prog ram of emulation of the Polaris 
submarine, the next step was to attempt to find some means of 
counte ring it. The problem of antisubmarine vJarfare was discuss-
ed extensively in the press, and here again the emphas is seemed to 
be on the submarine. One Soviet Nava l office r, Captain(lst Rank) 
Kvitnitskii, commented : "In the opinion of western naval special-
ists, unde r contemporo.ry conditions of v.Jarfare at s ea , the most ef-
fective means for s e arch and destruction of subma rines is the 
hunter-kille r submarine". 8 The tenor of Kvitnitskii's article 
left no doubt tha t h e agreed with this "western " op inion. Other 
articles on i\S.·J ivr i'cte n about t he same time t e nded to support the 
idea of r e lying on the subma rine for A.s~·T purposes . 
Once the p rob l em of antisubma rine wa rfa r e began to be 
associated 1tJi th ballisi::ic mis s ile submarines, the i dea of o.nti-
anti-submar ine warfo.re began to appear . Although · the i dea v;as 
publically attributed to "American military authorities", it 
seems that t he idea of prov iding b a llistic missile subma rines 
9 
with an AS\'" screen of nuclear p owe red submo.rines was discussed. 
Two n e',v · classes of subma rine, bot,. with appa rently improve d 
sono. r installations , proba bly designed for AS~·} work, made 
7. Krasnava Zvezda , Septembe r 2 8 , 1962 . 
8. Captain (lst Ranl-c )i; . Kvitnitskii , "In Conditions of a Mili-
t ary Psychos if; : Anti submarine Measu r es in t he Ameri c a n Navy ", 
Krasnava Zvezda , -Septembe r 26 , 1 9G l. 
9. Captain(lst Rank)I. Potapov , "Doctr i ne and t he Fleet ", 





their appearance in 1 959 . These were the R and F classes, 
previously described. The following year saw the intra-
duction of the prototype of a nuclea.r-p01iJered hunter-ldller 
subma rine , i.:he N class. An early submarine of this class, the 
. Leninsk:i:L Ko'll_s o:nolets, made a cruise under the Arctic ice cap 
to the North pole in the summer of 196 2. The submarine \vas 
met by Khrushchev on its return, and the comrnanding officer, 
engineering off icer , and the Admi r a l in cha rge ,.,..,e re avm rded 
the ranl~ o f "hero of the Soviet Union" for the feat, although 
Captain (2nd RanJ<:) Zhil 'tsov, the comma nding officer of the 
10 
Leninsk:ii Koms o molets described the feat as an everyday affa'ir. 
1'his class of submarine is probably armed Hi th nuclear-tipped 
11 
homing torpedoso 
A some\vha t different line of subma rine development ·was 
undertake n in 1 959 , \vhe n a number of \·v class submarine s were 
converte d to fire Shaddock: surface-to-surface ( SSM) air breath- / 
ing or "cru ise" missiles. These missiles , vlith a ran ge of 
about 300 miles and a speed o n the order of mach 2.5 , are de-
scribed in the So v i et press as homing ( samonavocUashchi i or "se lf 
guiding") missiles. . / They are probably inte nded as a stand-off 
weapon aga inst c a rrier task: forces. In 1962 a conventiona lly-
pm ... Tered submarine, the J class , first appeared, which was cl.e -
signed from the k ee l up to carry ShaddocJ<: mis s iles . The same 
y ear sa''' the introduc'cion of a nuclea r-pm-.Je red submarine , the · E 
10. "Slava Sove tsl<:im P odvodnil<am ", Krasnaya Zvezc1a , Ja_n.20,1 963 . 
ll. Boevo i Pu t ' So vesl<:o qo Voe nno-Z'lorskocro Flota ( rvlosco-vn 
Voe nizda t, 1 964 ), p. 3 98 . 
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class , d es i gned for the s ame pu r pose . The l atte r t ype has 
• 
appe a r ed in two v e rsion s • Th e orig inal " E - 1" class carries 
six miss iles and t wo torpedo tub e s , while the "E - 2" c l ass which 
first appea red in 1 964 i s equippe d with e ight mis s i l es and six 
tube s~ 
An examination of the sub~arinc con s truction program of 
the l as t d e cade t hus sugge sts the expe c ted role of the Soviet 
subr'larine . Th e G 1 H 1 and Z-conversion clas ses h ave a s t rate gic 
b a lli stic mi ss ile capabi lity a nd a role similar to tha t of the 
·-rh~ R, E' , ancl. ~.J cla. ssc~s 1 althou.gh the y 
are c e rtainly c apab l 0 of a com\1 _rcc -ret i cUng role 1 appe 21.r to b r; 
i nte nded · _primclrily for ant i s ubma rine ·warfa r e 1 Hi th an emphas i s 
o n coun ter i ng the Po lar i s sub:.nar i nc . The ~ ·I -conve rsio.n 1 ,J , and 
• E cla ss ~ s 1 a l though probably capab l e of bringing shore targe ts 
unde r fir0 l,:i th the ir c ruis missiles , appea r to h ave the 
prima ry roL..c o f c oun·ter i ng .'\ m r:.~ ricc. n c a rrie r t a sk forces . As we 
shall s ec 1 thi s f i ts in ""e ll with t 11e Sovie t p r eoccupation "1·7i th 
the i nitial p e riod o f a t h e r mo nuclear war . The antisubma rine 
subma rine s and the c ruise -mi ss ile submarines can the n be thought 
o f as having what i s ess e ntia lly a " countc rforce " role in 
nucler.t r war . 
In this conne ction , a n e xaminat ion o f the numbe r s of 
subma. rines constructe d since 1958 shou l d g i v~ s ome in d ica tion 
o f the r e l ative i mporta nce attache d to the coun t c rforce rol e 
by the Sovie t nava l l e ade r sh ip. Out of 118 submarines con s tructe d 
i n t h e So vie t Union i n t h e past d e c a d e , 26 arc o f tha W-convc r -
• 
sion , J , and E classes vr i th a countcrfor c e role aga inst carrie r 
-11 -
t ask forces ; 4 7 are of the R , F , and ~ classes , with an ASW 
~ role ; a nd 4 5 arc Z-conv c r s ion , G, and H class b a lli s tic-
mi ss ile sub:narincs 5 Of the se , about t e n subma. rines of e ach 
group arc nucJ.0.a r - powe r e d. Thus , in the submarine program , 
about bro-thirds of the e ff o rt h as b een d ed ica ted to build ing 
a c ountc rforce capability. Su c h a priOrity r e c e ive s fur-
tho r c o nf i r ma tion from a 1 962 spee ch of Sovie t De f e nse 
Ministe r , R. Ya . Ma linovsky : "Th e Sovie t l'i" avy 1 t h e b a sic 
arm<:1.mc nt of vihich i s the sub:-narine 1 equ i ppe d ,_,ri th atomi c nn-
g in a s , mi s s i l c s 1 a nd ho-:ning torpedoe s with nucle a r "t·.;arhe acls 1 
has r e c e i v e d the capability of wa q i ng effe ct i ve battle wi th ~ 
the fl e e t o f the enemy at the dista.nt a pproa ches to our shore s ... 1 2 
In view of the c ounte rforcc prob l em pre sente d by the 
~ d i ffic1 .1 ltic s of cle t c:ction a nd d~s t:ruction of b a llist1c mis s i l e 
~ 
subma rine s 1 it i s j_nte r(~s ting to c ompa re the Polar i s progra.-:n 
with t ha Sovie t p r ogram. S i nce each Pola ris subma rine carr i es 
16 missile s , the u . s . program e n joys a com;ua~cl.in g l ead i n 
t e r ms o f mi ss ile s ~ep loycd : 656 to 1 2 5c S i n c e the Ru ssian 
submar i nes carry e ithe r t\-To o r thre e miss iles ea ch, on the 
oth e r h and , the y have t h e l ead i n the nu nber · of subma.rin e s 
d e ploye d , 45 to 41 5 Th e Un ite d S t ates program h as undoubte dly 
a chieve d l a rge economics of s c a l e by concentratin g so many 
missi l e s in ea ch submar ine . The Sovie t Un ion , howe ve r , has 
achieved grea t e r di spe r sa. l by d e p l oying a mu ch sma lle r numbe r 
o f mis s iles in ea ch hull. Thus , in t e r ms of striking powe r , 
each Polaris subma rin e i s >-JOrth a t l e as t five . Sovie t mi ss ile 
12 • . F l ee t Admi ra l I. s . Isakov 1 ·~merican Falsifie rs o f Nava l 
Hi story " 1 Kra snaya Zvez da , Au gus t 11, 1 96 2. 
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submarine s, but Unite d States antisubmarine force s must locate 
• . and d e stroy five Soviet submarine s to accomplish the same r e -
sults that the Soviets -vmuld achieve by locating and destroying 
. b . 13 
one Pola rJ.s su. marJ.ne . 
Although Khrushche v d e clare d in 1960 that large surface 
ships had lost the ir forme r · significa nce, this did not me an 
that construction of surface ships >-ms to c e ase entirely. Be-
ginning about 1957, however, the character of Soviet surface 
ships changed significantly. About the same time that 
the Sverdlov clas s of cruisers -v;as b e ing constructed, Soviet 
shipya rds v.Je r e also turning out large numbe rs of mode rn d e stroy-
ers. The standa rd post·1:1a r design v.Jas the Skory class, built 
from 1949 to 1954. The se ships, of which about 75 we re complet-
• . ed, He re of fairly standa rd d e sign, corresponding roughly to the 
British Daring class and the Ame rica n ~orrest She rma n class 
of the same vintage . The se destroye rs all differed little 
from the standard d e signs of World \'7ar II. In 1954, the Russians 
shifte d to product i on of · the Kotlin class, somewha t large r 
than the Skory, and with slightly improve d AS~v armame nt. 
In 1957, the r e a ppear e d the first Soviet de stroyer 
equipped to fire mi s sile s. This wa s the Kildin class, v1hich 
was e quippe d with a single l a unche r ~f t for the Strela surface 
to surface mis s ile ( SS!1) with a range of about 50 miles. This 
cla ss vms s e riously deficie nt in anti-aircraft armame nt, as it 
had only 45 mm quns for this purpose. The Kildin class v1as con-
13. This is not me ant to imp ly tha t one conc ept is n e c e ssar-
ily b e tte r tha n the o t h e r, but it is illustra tive of the 
problems of compa ring relative nava l power. 
. . 
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structed on the same hull as the Kotlin class . About four 
• of the s e v c ssc l s wore construc·tcd. The folloHing year, o ne 
Kotlin class d e stroyer h a d i ts after gun batte ry r ep l a c e d with 
• 
• 
a single l a uncher for t he Goa surface-to-air missile ( SArli ) , but 
thi s type was n e v e r pla c e d into ser i a l production. 
"rhc first guided missile des troye r d e signe d from the 
ke e l u p a.·ppea r ed in 1 958 . This class , the Krupny class , was 
somev7ha t l arge r t han the Kild i n a n d Kotl in classe s , and carr i ed 
t v.io Strc la SSi'i launche rs , one fon,Ta rd and one aft. This cla s s , 
too , . Ha s highly d e fici e nt in antiaircraft d e f e nse . Th e Krupny 
clas s c:mcl. a ll classe s of Sovie t d e stroye r type s hips built ./ 
s i nce tha t time~ arc r e f0..r.r e d to in _the Sovie t pre ss as "mis-
silc crui s e rs ", a l ·though the y arc in f ac ·t somm·iha t sma lle r tha n 
tho Ame rica n guided mi ssi l e d e stroy e r l oad c rs( DLG). It i s e st i-
ma t e d th:::t ·t 8-10 l\ rup ny class d e stroye rs ha ve b ee n bu il t to date = 
In June of 1 960 , 1 .ss thansix months af t e r Khrushche v ' s 
disa.r ma mc nt spee ch , the k e e l was l aid for the prototype of y e t 
anothe r c l a ss of "lniss ilc cruise r s " , the Kynda class . The Kynda 
class \vas the first Soviet surface v e sse l to b e arme d vTith the 
300-milc Shaddo ck mis s ile , which h ad previous l y appe ared o n 
submarine s . The Kynda carr i es 8 Sh addock missi l es . in tvro four-
tub e l a.unche r s , nnd i s equipped wi th one Go a SAt·1 launche r for-
ward , in addition to four 75·-mm guns o This gave the Kynda the 
mo s t formidab l e a ntiaircraft c apabi lity o f any Soviet d estroye r 
y et buil t , in addition to a formidab l e surfa c e -tc-surface 
mis s ile battery a nd a r espectabl e As:'l capability . 








sma ller tha n the Kynda class , the Kashin's main armament con-
sists of t wo Goa SAM launchers (on e forward and one aft), two 
t\vin-75mm guns(one forward and one aft), and four 1-\.S't-i rocket 
launche r s ( t vJ'O more tha n Kynda). This type ship, in contras t 
to the Ky nda , Krupny, and Kildin, had almost no surface-to-surface 
capability , but a much i mproved AA~·v capability . This cla s s , of 
which about s i x have b een con s tructed , could b e d e scribed as a 
dua l-purpose destroye r, des igned for AA.'I-7 and ASV.l . 
The most r e c e nt destroyer type , the Kresta clas s , which 
appeared in 1965 , is similar in many r epects to the Kynda 
class, but has an improved AJ.>.','l c apability. It i s equipped \vi th 
two Shaddock SSM l aunche rs, t >,vo Goa SAI1 laun che r s ,, four 57 - rn.m 
antiair craft gun s , four ASW launche rs, and a h e licopte r, which 
is p robab ly equipped for AS'\'! purposes . Thi s s hip design , judg ing 
from the in s talled armament, i s inte nded to b e a truly multiple- v"' 
purpose destroye r. 
All o f the approx i mate ly 30 Soviet des troye rs built since 
1957 ha v e b een equipped with guided missiles, and only about 
six have not been equ ipped with surface-to-surface ~i ss ile s . Al-
though these SS!v1 ' s are probably capab l e of b e ing used against 
shore t arge ts, they are prima r1ly designed as anti-shipping mis-
silcs . The evi dence suggests t 1lat , j~s ·t as in the case of J, W-
conversion , and E class s ubmarines , the primary intended function 
of these destroyers \vas to counte r an attack by America n carr i e r 
ta sk forces . The fir s t b Jo o f these classes we r e prac t ically 
d e void of a ntia ircraft defens e . Thi~ was initially dictated b y 





Sov i e t des i gn e r s a fter t h e ir i nitia l e f f ort s i n th i s fie l d tha t 
• t h ese shi ps He r e extreme ly vu l n e r a ble to c a rr i e r avi ation , t h e 
main a r mame nt of the class of s hip the y we r e d e s i g n e d to atta c k. . 
Thi s s ituat ion ,,,as l a r ge ly r e me died v7i t h t h e con s t r u c t ion o f the 
Kynda c l ass , a n d the purp o se of the Ka shin class may v e ry 'i:Je ll 
h a v e b e en t o p rovide AL\\17 prote ction for t h e p r e vious l y c on s t r uct-
e d mi s s ile s h i ps . The Krc sta class i s e v e n mo r e h eavi l y prote ct-
e d tha n the Kynda cla ss . 
'.I'h c destroye r construct i on p:r:-ograrn , t hen , seems to confirm 
the c ounte r:forcc o r ien tatio n o f Sovi et n a val t hought . I t must 
b e con c eded t hat t hese s hies wou l d b e capab l e o f i nfl i cting c on -
s i d c rab l c damage on c a rr i er attac k. f o r c e s in t he event of an a ll -
o u t n ucl0ar wa r i n wh i c h Ame rican and NATO ai r ~raf t carrie rs at -
• t crnptcc'l_ to p l a y a s-tra t cg· i c role . The y cou l d a t l eas t r a i se the 
ent.ry price of S"Ll_ch a u ti lizat ion of Amer i can sea. p o'-''c r ~ 
I n t e r ms of limite d wa~fa rc , h owev e r , the newe r So v i e t 
d es troye r s wo u l d b '--' c on s ide r a b l y l es s u E;c fu l _ tha n t he old e r 
Sk.o r y class a nd Ko t lin clas s d e stroye r s f or such -app l ica t i ons 
as gun f i re support for t r oops ashore , intc rdic t~on of s u ppl y 
lin es CJ_s h o r e 1 and o the r similar app l ic'.:l. tions of na v a l gunne r y .. 
For suc h a p p lica t ions , the Krc sta c lass , fo r • .1.. l nsc..a nce , i s 
a bout as we ll a r me d a s t h e 1 , 0 00 ton destroy e r e s c orts of 
the Mi rka a nd Ri ga classes . S i nce 1 96 2 , the Sovi e t c a pab ili ty 
for such ope r at ions h as a ctua lly d e c line d , d u e to the break i ng 
u p f o r s c r ap a n d sa l e to o t h e r navi e s o f about 20 Skory cla s s 
d es troye r s • 
• 
Th e c ou ntc r f o rce c a pab j_l ity o f t h e Sov i e t sur f a c e Na v-y 
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has b een e n ha nced s ince 1 96 1 by the add-ition o f a bout 100 
• guidc d - mj_ ss ilc gunboa t s of t he Osa and· Ko m::J. r classes a rme d 
• 
• 
with Styx sur face -tb-surface guide d mi ss ile s . These boa ts 
appe a r to b e d e s i gned for op~rations close to shore , probably 
to counte r any pos sible a mphib iou s assau lt. The ir ef f e ctive n e ss 
was drama tica lly d e monstrate d l ast Octob e r whe n the Egypt i an 
Navy u sed one of the ir Komar class boa ts to sink the Israe li 
d es troyer E l a th from a distance o f about 13 mi l es . 
The Sovie t Union has n e v e r had an a Jrcra.ft carri e r o . The 
Rus s i a n ~rmia s did c a pture the scutt l e d hulk of the partia lly 
compl c ·tcd Germa n a i r c raf t c a r r i e r Gra.f Zeoo .~ lin a·t S t e tt i n on 
the Ba ltic i n Apri l , 1 945 . 1 4 Th e sh i D l a t e r struck a mine at 
s ea. ~,7hilc bc~ in g· to"<'lcd to the Sovie t Union and ~~ias e i the r lost 
at s e a or broke n up for s c rap at Le ningrad . In c.ny event the 
Genrra n carr i e r v7ou lc1 not have s e rvccJ. as a sa tisfactory prototype 
for a Sovie t c a rrie r pro gram , even i f i t h a d arrived in Lenin-
grad intact. The Ge r man d e s i gners had no expe r i e nce with air -
c r a ft carr i e rs a n d had b ased the ir des i g n on ext er ior d e t a il s 
of con -t e mpo rary nava l des i gns as d e scribe d in nava l manua l s such 
a s Janc ' s Fiq!1t i nq Ships . Th e Gra:C Zeppe lin n e v e r b e c ame o pe r a - . 
tiona l . 
Al though t h e r e arc i ndic a tion s from time to time of Sovie t 
inte r est in a ircraft c a rrie r s , the cost of ~uch a program 
h as apparently a cted to move the ir na val construction effort i n 
othe r d i r e c t ions . So v i e t Nava l avi a·tion i s e ntire ly l and-base d , 
14. Clark G. Reyno l ds , "Hitle r ' s F l a ttop - The' Snd of t h e 
Be~rinning " , Uni t.cd Stu. tes Nava J, In s ti tutc Procecd i nqs , v. 93 , 





\•7it.h the exc eption o f a f eH h e licopte rs o pe r a ting from variou s 
, . 
snlps . 'I'h e ma i n force o f Sovie t n a va l avi a tion ha s c ons i s ·tc d 
o f Tu -16 Badger aircraf t , ma ny of ·v1hich are equ i pped with 
Kenne l a ir-to-s urfa c e mi ss iles "tt7 ith a r ange of abou t 90 miles. 
The y h ave more r e cently a c q uired a n umbe r of Tu.- 95 Bear tu. rbo-
prop long r ange aircraft modi f i ed for r c connu.issance pu r p o ses . 
Tho s e p l a n e s cvidcn·tly h a v e a mission of counte ring carr ier t a sk 
Another l cl_ r ge p o r tion of S o v i e t na.va l via tion i s d edica t e d 
to anti s ubmarine '•va r f are . In ~he pas t , the wor k h orse in thi s 
area was the frlad ~je fly i ng boa t , b u t Jchi s <>.i rcraft has r e c e n t l y 
b e e n s uppl c:nentecl. by a s hore - ba s e d fixed 1·1in g a ircr2.ft similo.r 
to ou r P - 3l\ Or i on , a nd by I-Io u.n d a nti subGR r i ne h e licopte r s c Some 
o f the se h o Ji ~op'ce :c s ha v e o pe r ated from t he Kr cs t a and c e rta j_n 
Kr upny clc:.ss v1hich h a ve b een fi ttcd \·rith h c licop ·t er 
p l a t fo r m ·::m the ste rn. 
The mo st rece nt devo lop~ent i n Sovie t na val avia tion i s 
15 
t h e r e c c n ·t c onstruct.ion of t Ho h e l icopte r aircr aft carrie rs c 
It i s not y e t known for ~hat purp ose the se v e sse l s were construct-
ed . In th:~ p as t , So v i e t write rs h a v e s h m·m s o me i nte r e st i n the 
16 
u sc o f h e li c op t e r carrie r s for anti subma rine purposes . At t he 
same time , t h e y hav _ a l so fo1lo\·7e d the d·2.ve lop mcnt o f helicopter 
15. Ne w York T i mes, Octobe r 23 , l g6 7 . 
16 . Sec , for c x arnp l c , Captin (1st Rank ) P o t a pov , "1\vi a n o s tsy 
ili Po dloc1J(y " ("Aircraft Carriers or Submarines"' ) , Krasna v a 
Zvc z c'l.a 1 ,July 6 1 1 960 . In this a rticle. Ca p tain P o "b:=l.p ov erro-
n e ou s ly a ·ttribut~d the Unite d State s Navy with h a vins:r 21 As ;·~· 
h e lico~) i:e r c <:'l. .-rr j_cr s . Al so , see G. f'l . 'l'ru s ov , Podvoc'l nvc.....l:ocl.Jd. 
v Russk.om i Sovc ts}:om F J.ote ( Su bmarine s in the Ru ss ian and 
SovlCU~Iavy ), ( Leningrad , Sudp romizdat 1 1 96 3 ), p . 4.l 6 . Trus o v 
propos es c arrying ASA h e l i copters o n special h~ li copter carrie r s 
or "ordina.ry tran s p orts ". 
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carrie r s in the Unite d States and oth~ r weste rn countrie s 
• for amphibiou s assa.ult purpose s . 17 rrhe us e of such a carrie r 
• 
• 
for antisubmarine 'ilc:trfare would fit in \vell with the appa rent 
counterfo rce orientat ion o f the Sovi e t fle e t. If these vessels 
t urn out to b e inte nde d for amp hibious ·v1ar_farc , it would indeed 
signify a drama tic c hang·c in S ov i e t thin};:ing on the role of the 
Na.v y Q 
Since ~"7 or ld ·:·Tar I I , the Sovie t Na vy ha s ma intaine d a 
mo dGst capo.bili ty f o r t he conduct o f amphibious -iarfa r e . 'I'h e 
So v i e t army r e c e ives regu l a r tra ining in amphibious v.rarfare , 
l arge ly or i e nted towa.rd ri v e r and l C1.ke - cro ss i ng e ffor ts . Th e 
Na vy h e1.s ma in ta ined. a. sma ll numbe r of amphibious land ing ships P 
similc<. r in appe a r a nce to the Un:Lt ed St a t es LST , but mu ch sma ller ~ 
By t he mo s t r e c e nt accou nt , the So v i e t Union has about 24 of 
h V c-. co s -, 1 s 18 ''a c h o·c t .esc ~o ~ - , c. L which ·can c a rry from eight to t e n_ 
t anks ( co:npa r c d to abou t 40 for the l a t es t u . s. LST ' s ) o The 
Sovie t Navy h a s no l a r ge a mphib ious tran s por-ts or a s sau l t cargo / 
ships , no l anding ship doclc~> o r as sa'l.J.l t h e licopte r carrie rs ( un -
less the mos t rece nt a cl.ditions t.o the fleet t urn out to h ave 
thi s purpose ), such as arc ma in·tained by the Unite d States . The _ 
So vie t a mphibj_ous lift c apability , the n , wou l d ha v e to be rate d 
as v e ry modest . In the summer of 1 96 7 , a fc·v! Sovie t l a nd in cr 
' J 
ships of a n m,T cla s s (Nl\TO_ dcsig·na tion : Alligator ) appea r e d for 
t he fir st time in the Hedite rra n c an . The se ships are much large r 
17e Ibid. , also Cap tain (3 rd Rank ) Dudko , ''Zaryas ' na Chuzhie 
Bcrcga ", Kra sna y a Zvczd a , Sep temb e r 10, 1 96 1 , and Capta in(2nd 
Rank) Bcla s hchenko , "Pod F l ago m Ra zboya i Agres s ii" , I<ras~ 
Zvczda , January 28 , 1962. 
18. L. \'j • !-1artin , 'I'he Sea in I1odc rn Str0 tcqy ( London: 





than the previous l a n d ing ships , and compare f a vora bly wi th 
It i s not kno~·m hm·T ma ny of these arc in commi s-
s ian .. 
In 1 964 , before the replace me nt of Khr ushchev , the Soviet 
Navy rea ctivated a small marine force , o r "Nava l l nfan ·try". 
This force h a s s i n c e grovm to about 6 , 000 troops divi d e d among 
the f ou r fl ee t s o f the Sovie t l'Javy .. In o r ganiza tion and train-
i ng , they wou l d a ppear to b e close r in patte rn to t he F r ench 
Nava l Infan t ry than to t he Uni ted States Mar i ne Corps. S~ch a 
sma ll force 1 in any event , \vo u l d be su i table o n ly f o r c o::nmando · 
t ype operat i on s .. :'Ju.r i n ; · W "J.r l d --iar II 1 t he So v i et Na.val Infantry 
t.o oJ( part in severa l amphi b ious operations .. In t he l arger ones , 
they operated as the spea.rhead fo r es'cab l ishi ng· a beachhead , 
an d 'chen i·.Jc~ rc r ep l a.ced b y l a r g e r ..:"\ r my fo r c es .. Thi s experie nce 
p r oba b l y forms th2 bas i s f or t heir p r esent t ra ining and o rgani --
zation ., 
No Na vy c a n ope r a t e av..ray from its Oi.vn / shores for e xte n s i ve 
p e riods o f time without moa n s for r ep l e nishing fue l , p r ovision s , 
and ammu n ition , obta ining n e c e ssa ry s p a r e p a rts , and having 
acces s to r epa ir f a cilit i es in t ho e ve nt o f an emerge ncy . The 
United State s Navy has the u. s e of an extens i v e g lob a l n e tl.•7o r l< 
o f b ases wi t h l a r ge supp l i es o f stores and s pare parts and com-
ple t e r epair facili tics . In a dd i i:.ion to this , the highly d e ve lop -
ed art of u nder-r.·ia y rep l e nishrr.e nt o f fue l and pro v isions , b a s ed 
o n a we ll-des i g ned and we ll-tra ined fl e et o f auxil i ary vesse ls 
ena bles t he United States to s u ppor t l a r ge ta s k f o rces u.t s ea 
• i nclcpcn clcn t o f shore b ases for months a t a time . F rom the time 
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tha t the Sovie t Un i o n f i r s t sta r ted granting economic a n d mili-
• 
t a ry a i d t o c ountr i es outs i de the "socia li s t c a mp " , t h e r e ha v e 
b een p c r s i s·t e n t r umors o f t he i rmnine n t c reatio n o f s uch a sys -
t ern o f l a n d b ase s fo r t h e So v i e t Navy. To da t e ; t h e se rumo r s 
h a v e pro v e n u nfounde d . Th e c urre n t usc o f Al exandria and othe r 
Egyptia n p o r.t s b y So v i e t na va l v es se l s i s as close to the es t a -
bli shment o f a base as the Russ i a n s have eve r come . 'l'h e f a ci-
l i t i cs en joy e d b y t he Ru. ss i ans i n Egypt , h o'-w ve r , are far f rom 
e qu i va l ent t.o ·t h o se e njoyed b y the United S'ca t es in Japan and 
t , ,.,.. ~ h .• J -j . ·i . '"',... . ll<~ .t' 1 1. ---.PP _ n. c..;.~ I by the Bri t i sh in S i ngapore , o r b y the F ren ch 
in Al ger i a o 
The · Russians h ave r e l i ed for l o~.:ri s t i ca l support l a r ge l y 
o n a fl ee t o f 'cc :1C1e rs >:Thich t h e y c a.ll "f l oa t i ng bases " ( D l a Vld-
• 
The a r 'c o f undenray rcpleni s h.rm:~ n t 
at s e a i s not v c. ry '>ic ll c'l.evc lopcd j_n the Soviet NaV'J . I n t l1e 
f.1ed i t c r ranean ; 'chc t an}ccr s. and t .cnde r s ho.VC made U SC Of ancho:c<::.-JC 
areas l o ca t ed in i ntc rna tionc.. l v7a t ers . - In t hese a nch o rages , 
So v i et n 3. Va l v essel s n eedin g r el:J l c ni shmcn t moor a l o ngs ide the 
t e n de r s or a nchor a n d transfe r pro v i s -i ons by sma ll b ea t . 
a proccdtu-c wo u.l d r ende r the f !C'~e t h i ghly vulne r abl e i n time o f 
wa r . About 1 96 1 , a few t anke r s were equipped with the equ ipment 
n e c o s s c:try for undcr;-J<J.y rc~p len i shrnc n t a l ongs i de , ancl. t he Navy has 
b egun t o d e v e lop expe rienc e in su c h o pe r a tions . These n ew r e -
p l cn i shmcn t ri -:Js a r c s i mi l a r to th<2 " c lose -in " rig s :.Js c d by s ome 
Amc r i c .:'l.n c a r r i e r s t o .refu e l destroye r s , a n d a r e not sa t i s f a. ctory 
fo r u se in h eavy v.Jec-. t hc r c ond i t ions . All i n a ll , t h e Sovie t "N·avy 
• 





bi li ty o f t he Ame r i c a n i·Ja Vy • 
I n h i s s peech b~forc t h e "l'iventy -T h ird C ·;:,ngress of t h e 
ComJnu ni s t P a r t y o f t he Sovie t Union i n Ap ril , 1 96 6 , Sovie t 
Def e n se I-lin i s t e r R . Ya . t-'la l:i_nov s Y.y gav e a n u n u s ua lly l a rge 
a moun ·t o f a t 'cention to the d e v e lopme n t of the So v i c ·t Na "\;y . In 
o n e s e c t i on of t he speech d e vo t e d to t h e d e f e n s ive n a ture o f t h e 
Sovi e t 0. rmc~d f o rces , h e c o lll.me n 'tE-;d c; n i gma t i c c;. lJ.y , " ~J c c a. l ml y and 
c onfide n tly s tand i n def e n s e o f t he pea c efu l l abor o f o u r peop l e , 
the mo!"c so n ow , ':ih e n the c:ccu. t i on o f 'ch c B l u e Be l t f or Def ens e 
o f o u.:c. c o u n ·try has l)c c n l 9 c o m:;> l c t ·::;d " . - S o m-2 li g h t on t h i s " i3 l ue 
Be l t " vla s s h cc1 i n I·!uy 11h c n ~;: ast Ge r mo. n :J e f e n sc T·!in i s t c r Ge n era l 
He inz Eoffma n s p o J(e t o ·the East Berl in borde r guards of · " ·the 
a -tomic subrrlar i n c s o f t h e B l u e :'J c f c:: nsc 3 e l t , ' ·rhich c a.n ope r a t e 
in e v e j_:y s ea in 'chc \·io r l d " . I'c s e e ms cle a r fro~n t h i s t h a t 
t h e " B l u c Be l t ." i s <:.\ s s ocia t ed wi th nuclca r --po',-JC~ j.:- ed s ub::-nar i n ..:.S . 
I t i s poss i bl e: that t h e "B lue Be l t for D<=>fcns c " i s a 
euphi mi s tic r e fe r e nce to t h r; f l ec: t o f n u clcar-p m Jc r e d b a ll i s tic 
· mi ss i l e S'LJ.b ma :r:- i n c s . Malinovs ky ' s s t a t e me nt tha t the Be lt i s 
"co mp l e t ed " ( z a v e r she n ) ma y m<-'a n simp l y tha t it i s o p e ration a l. 
The:: mo st r e c e nt csti~a tcs of bot h t he Insti tute fo r S tr~tcgic 
St ud i e s and Jan e ' s P i ~htinJ Ship~ indi~a ta t h a t c o n s truction o f 
nu c l e a r b a l li s Jcic mi s s ile s ubmar i n es vias h a l t e d i n 1 956 . Th e I SS 
es tima te i nd i cate s tha t n e w con s truction has c bns i s t e d of N class 
sub ma rin e s , ,,The r e J a n e ' s e s t i ma tc i nd icates t h a t it ha s g o ne 
1 9 . XXIII S ' czd Kommuni. s t i c 'l)c s koi Pa.r t ii Sove t s ko :::ro Soiu?.a 
( S t cno .:::r r uf ich c:ski i Otc h c t ) , (L o s covr: Iz.da t e l ' stvo Poli-
tic11cs l<oi L i t c r a t\.1 ry , 1 9G5 , vG 1) , P o 11 14 . 
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i nto the cons truct ion o f E -:2 class submarines . I n e i the r eve nt , 
• Jch e most r c c e nJc Soviet atornic subm?.rh1c s •.·Io u l d f a ll into the 
b r oad category of countc rforcc capability. It is also possibl e 
tha t i·1alinovs ky "'das r e f e rrin g ·to some such d e f e n sive nctv10rk 
b u ilt around submarine s. This aue s tion r eauircs furthe r exami-,_ ~ 
na tion. 
IJc c a n b e seen from c:m examin·"- t ion o f tlw So v i et s'hip -
build i ng effort o f the~ l ast t e n y e a r s that: the ma in (-)mphas i s 
has been p l a c ed u pon d e fens- . The great ma j ority of the ships 
c onstructed i n the past de cade (with the exc e p tion only o f the 
b a lli s tic miss i l e su}.:>E'.a rines ) appear to have b cm1 designed for 
the p~rpose o f c rn1nte r i ng a tta cks by fa st carr i e r str i ke force s 
o r by Polc.r i s mi ss ile s ubmar ines dur i ng the i nit.ia l p e riod o f 
• a nuc l ea r 'dar . .i\s these v e sse l s h0. vc b e come o oe ra.·tj_ona 1 in -the 
fl e e t , old e r vesse l s Fith an applic a ·tion i n limit.e d 't!a :c situa -
tions , such as the Skory class d e stroy e r , hav e b een r e tired 
fro::n s e r v ice f as t e r tha n the y h a v e b een r ep l aced by ne•r1 c on-
stru cJcion . Eve n t he subn1a rine fl ee t has d e clined in s i ze by 
about one hundred since 1 96 0 as older conve ntiona lly-powered 
boa t s , espe cid.lly the coasta l defense type , h a ve b een :re tired 
from se rvice or s old to o the r na tion s . As the fl ee t de clined 
in size , its n ew armament drastica lly increased its r a n ge of 
effec t ive ness and its c apability fo r d e f e n se a ga inst carrie r 
forces and b a llistic missile s ub ma rine s . The ships o f the j 
nc.H Sovie t Na vy arc ove r Hh c l min g ly des i g-ned for utilization 





CHAPTER T>iO: THE SOVIET NAVY AND THE .STRATEGIC DEBATE 
The d e cis ion to unilaterally reduce the siz e of the Soviet 
arme d forces by 1,200,000, which was announced by Chairman 
Khrushche v in hi s important spee ch of Janua ry 14, 1960, touche d 
off an extensive strategic d ebate in the Soviet Union. Khrushche v 
justified the move as a demonstration of the good will of the 
Sovie t Union vrhich was made possible by the vastly increased 
fire power of Sovie t arms . This l atte r d e ve lopme nt, h e conte nded, 
made it possible to r educe the Soviet armed force s 'l.vithout ad-
ve r se ly affccJcing the defense of the nation. He admitte d that 
the move also v~Tould ho.ve favorable economic consequ e nces, but 
d e nied tha t this ~,Jas the motivatin g conside r a tion. 
Comrne ntin g on the incre ased firepO'tJe r of the Soviet armed 
forces. Khrushch e v said : 
Our state possess~s pm.rerful rocJ<e try . r;7j_ th the pre -
sent de ve lopment of military techn ique s, military avia -
tion a nd the N c..vy ha ve los t the ir forme r i mportance . 
These arms are .not r educed , but r eplace d. Military 
avia tion i s almos t entirely b e ing r ep l a c e d by rockets . 
No>tl vvc ha ve s ha rply cut dmvn and will, it seems , r e -
duce still furthe r or even e ntire ly end the produc -
tion of bombers and othe r obs ole t e e qu i pment. In the 
Navy , the submar ine ga ins in i mportance , wh e r ea s s ur-
face ships c a n no longer pla y the role the y p l a y ed 
in the pust. Our arme d fo r c es ha ve b een to a consi~er­
able degr ee r egeared to rocke t and nuclear weapons. 
Althou :jh the military l eade rs present at the mee ting of the 
Supreme Soviet d u tifu lly announced the ir support for the move , 
the r e were hints o f unrest from the b eginning . Def e n se Ministe r 




Me. linovsky cominc nte d t!1a t ·the r cMa i ni!lg 2 , 423 , 000 me n in t he 
• Soviet. armed forces 1 "unde r t he ir con s tant r ead i ness and high 
vigila nce , Hil l doubt.lcss se c ure for us th2 fu ll capability 
. ~ l h . b f f " 2 171} at any t 1me to oea_ a smas. 1ng r e u -- to a ny aggressor~ .'. 1e 
tone of thi s comment i ndicates t ha.t he felt the a.rmed forces . 
v.10u l d h ave a d i ff icu l t time achi eving· t his state of r ead i ness 1 
and 'cha t perhaps there '.-Tas s ome doubt as to the ir a.bil i'cy to 
do s o. The navu. l r C)_::>rcsen'cativc , ,r>-dmiral Ka.sa.tonov , Cormna n dcr 
o f the Bl c:tck Sea F l e e t , assure d the Su:prcme Soviet that " \•7c 
Corl s j_c1er i t COITlJ?l c. tc~ ly fE~as iblc to significantly r c: d\J.C G t11o 
n,_unbe r o f pe r s onne l of the Soviet Ha.v-y , i nclucl.ing t .1C Bl ack 
Sea Flec ·t ." 3 He d i d no·t 1 h o1vc v e r 1 go so far.as to sta. t c that i t 
wa s desirable , and i nd i cate d t ha.t t h e NaVi_; ' s enthus i asm was con -
• tin~ent on the p ros p e c t t ha 'c the re would be no l oHe ring o f the 
:Na V"J ' s f i:r. c pm.re :r. . H e further vra.rnccl. the: body not ·to forge·~ 
t hat in ce.p ita list c ountries.there are people interested not 
in lowe ring , but i n i ncreasing i nternationa l tension and c ontin-
uing the arms r a ce . 
Under these concH t ions o f s c a rce ly con cealed oppo s ition 
by the :nili tary establi s h ment , especia lly by t he more trad i t i ona l 
armed s e rvices , i t i s ne c e ssary t o examin e in more deta il the 
r ca.s ons v-Thich compe l l ed Khrush c h e v to announce thi s move . 
\-'ihilc deny ing t ha .. c the r eduction "~da.s d i ctated exclusive l y by 
c on s i dera tion s o f e conomy , Khru s hche v did admit tha t , 
2. Ibiq • 
• 





As you knm·l , the ques tion of e .cono!'P.y i s ah1a.ys 
time l y and of qr0a. t i mportance . The lo~vcr the ex-
p e nditu r e o n nonp roductive ob j ective s , the more 
funds will g o for r e p r oduction o f the me a n s of 
produc·tion , for developing the e conomy , a nd thus 
incre a s ing the output and satisfying the peopl e ' s 
ma t e ria l and spiritua l r equ irements more fully . 4 
He estima t ed t hat the r e duc t ion wo u ld save the Sovie t p e o p l e 
about 17 billion rubles annually ( L 7 billion rubles since the~ 
r e eva lu<:t t :Lon o f 1 96 1 ) e 
The financia l s a v i ngs told o n ly p a rt of the storye The 
t errib l e deva.s t .a tion u.ndcrgone by t he Soviet Union du ring ·;~l orl d. 
1!'!ar II ha d r e sulte d i n a l arge drop in i:hc birth rate . As the 
you ths b o rn d.urinsr t hos e y~a. r s b egan to r e ach mil i t a ry a ge , 
the nuJ'11>':) e r of mo.l c s of mili!cary a:::;-e b e ga n to d e cline . In 1 960 , 
t h e nurr.bc r o f ma l e s of miJ.j_ ·tary a ge \vas c s tirnc:l.'t::_ed at about. 32 
million. By 1 96 7 , the m unbe r >·.ras d01m ~co about 29 million , and 
5 
vould no t a ttain the 1 96 0 l e v e l a.qa in 'L~ntil He ll a.ftc r l 970_o 
The military s e rvices \·Jere not the o n ly priority c l a i mcmt for 
the s e p e rsonne l.. A l ar:::re numbe r o f them 1.ve re r equ ired to b e 
t ra:ne d as scie ntists at i nstitutions o f highe r educatio n i an~ 
still more "iJe r e required as inpu ts of sk illed l abor for the 
gro'.·ling So v i e t indus tria.l compl ex . A r e d u ction in t!1e n umbe r 
of p 8 rsonn c l in the armed force s would a lle viate the pressure 
on the i ndustrial establishme nt. 
'I'his ve.ry diffic u lt man p o-... w r dilenuna had b e e n complicated 
4. Ibi~. , January 15, 1 960. 
5. u.s. Congr e ss , ,Joint Economic Committe e , Dimen s ions o f 





by the pro~rram initia t ed vTith the seven-yea r p lan of 1 959 of 
gradua lly r e ducing the work \vcek from six cl.ays to five days. 
'I'o a c compli s h this fea. t without loHe ring o v e rall production , 
in fac 'c vihile continuing a v e ry substcmt i a l ra.te of econo mic 
g r m ,7th at a time \·The n t he n e'i•7 inp uts to t he industr i a l manpower 
pool we r e d e clining , r equired a r ead justme nt of priorities . 
A t hird c onsideration l ead i ng to the reduction o f arme d 
forces \·Jas r e l ated to ths agr icultura l sector of the e conomy . 
Begi n n ing about 1958 , the Soviet r a t e o f economic growt h ~egan 
to d e cline . 'I'hi s d e cline in t h e growth rate was a l mo st entire ly 
du e to fai l u r e s of produc t ion i n t he agricu l tura l s e ctor of the 
e conomy . Siner: i:he b egi nn i ng of collc cti viza tion in 1 9 28 , t he 
So viet l c a. c""l.crshi p had con c e n trate d ·the i r i nvestme nt in t h e a r ea 
o f h e avy indu s try. Agr iculture r e c eiv ed some inve s'cment in oche 
form o f ma chine ry , but such deve lopmc n 'c s ·a s chemica l fer·ti li -
zers , h e rbicides , pesticides , and a ll of t he contributions to 
agriculture ma.de by the scie nce o f chemi stry , had no t b e en ap -
p l i ed to Sovie t a g r j_c ul ·turc . By 1 960 it \·Ja s apparent that a 
r eordering of priorities was n e c e ssary . Substantial investme nt 
was r equired i n the agr icul tur2 l se c 'cor of the economy . Sa v -
ings in the military sector c ould be util i zed to this end. 
'I'h e l e ngths t o 'i,7hich Khrushchev may h ave b e en forc ed to 
g o in orde r to ~Jet t he So v i e t ri i g h Comma nd "on boa rd" for thi s 
force r educt ion c a n o n l y b e· sur mise d . It docs appear from the 
r e c ord , ho,,wvcr , that a part of t h e a r g-ument used in support 
o f the measure ':las t he lik e lihood that t h e Uni'ced States mi ght 





the l a..,,! for the r eduction o f the arme d forces 1 a.ccompan ied it 
with an · ~ppca l to the Parliame nts and Governments o f All 
Countries of the 1:1orld ". Th i s appea l expressed "the hope that 
the So vie t Union ' s n ew and un~latera l r eduction of its armed 
force s will s erve as an exo.mple to othe r states 1 especia lly 
6 
t h o se possessing the g rca test military pm·rer". It seems v ery 
like ly tha t the Sovie t l eadershi p expected some sort o f Amer i -
can r esponse to be a greed to at the time o f the forthcomin g 
Paris sum.t"l1.it conferen c e b e 'c\·-7e e n Eise nho<::e r and Khrushche v and 
Eise nhowe r ' s planned visit to the Sovie t Union$ 
Ac tuu lly , Khrushch e v had been l a ying t he grounfr 1ork since 
1958 for an i ncreas ing ly con s u mer--oric ni:ccl. po l icy at home 1 
whi ch would b e fina nced l argely oJt of s a vings from mi litary 
expcndj_ i:ures . Th e seven- year - p l a n i ntro c'J uce d at the cxt.ra-
o rdinctry cl\·.'cn·ty-?irst Congress of the CPSU in January I 1959 
l a i d the foundo.tion s for the ·dome stic PC?licy . .:~, cu t in rnili tary 
expenditu r e s r equire d a d e t e nte with the Unite d States . Khrush-
c h c v ass i duous l y att:.empt.cd to lay the founda tion for sue!! a 
d e t e nte dur ing hi s visit to ~re Unite d States in the fal l 
o f 1 959 . It '.-.ra s in connection 'r7i th this visit tha t h e tried 
to present a picture to the Sovie t poep l e that the re was no 
i nr-r,cd i a t o cJ.ango. r of an a t'ca ck from tho Unite d · States . It was 
at thi s same time tho. t the Soviet Union b e ga n to d issoc i ate 
i t sc l f from the b e llig·crent ac ·tivi tics of Communi s t China 1 
mo s t notab ly by assuming a n e utra l ~tance in the Chinese border 
6 . Pr::fcvc1a , January 16 1 1 960 ., 
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d i spute with Ind i a . I·t '\vas also in Juno of 1 959 tha t the So v i e·t 
• Union h i:l ltc d its p:r:ogram o f m.1clear a sf? istance to the Chinese . 
It vras on the bas i s . of this founda tion of a n c'tl detente that 
Khru s hche v made his def e nse p olicy announ c ement o f January , 1 960. 
Wh en Secretary of Defense Gates t es tified b e fore t he House 
Ar med Services Subco mmittee in closed sess ion · in F' e b:cuary , the 
Russians pay ed c lose attention. Ma linovsky publicly deplored 
the fact that Ga t es contended that the r e Has nothing to suggest 
a poss i bility of a trea ty or o the r agreement with the Sovie t 
Ha linovsky c ha.rgcd tho.'c Gates had i gn ore d the Janu2).ry ckci s ion 
for a unilateral r eduction of the Soviet armbd .forces . The U -2 
i ncide nt o n May Day , 1 962 , and the subsequent collapse o f the 
• summit confe r ence mu s t 11avc C.isa;~pointcd the dove s in the; 
• 
Kremlin eve n mo re d c cpJ.y than did Ga t.cs ' _testimony , ~vh:i_l c~ a ·t 
the same time boosting the cas e of the h a\..rks . 
Neverthe l ess , Khrushchev continued to push his consumer-
o rie nted prograTn eve n after the U-2 incide nt , a lthou gh h e made 
7 
it knmvn that " some comrades " opposed hi s program . 'I'he o ppo-
si tion eventua lly manifested i tse l f in a shaJ<:cup in the organi -
zation of the po.rty Se crctar i a t i n J·une , which s ome,-Tha t r c -
ducod Khrushche v ' s influence . Oppos i tion \'lithin t he military 
made i tself fcl·t in muffled refere nce s to t he ... combined arms " 
conce pt o f op e rat ions ; r athe r than r e lian c e u pon a s ing le a r m. 
Khrushche v v.;en'c to extraordi nary l e n g·ths in order to pursue his 
- ·-- ------ --------------- -





policy of d e t e nte abroad and econo'nic - r e form at home . At 
t he Third Congre ss o f the Ruma nian 7,·7orl<.e r s ' Party in Buc hares t 
in June , 1 960 , Khrushch~v took the occa s ion to sharply atta ck 
t h e Chi ne se Commun ists whose public pronouncements arg ued 
again s t the policy of detente . 
This Buchare st meet i ng· planne d t he meeting of 8 1 fra-
t c rno. l pa r t i es h e l d in f·1 o s c ov·I in N ovcm}x~r , 1960 . During the 
Novembe r meet ing, a dec l aration o f the 8 1 Cominunist parties v1as 
dra'\·m up i n a n a ttempt to r eshape some semb l ance o f i nternat iona l 
Commun i s -t unity e Dur i ng t .h c prepa r at ion o f the c1o c u :ncm ·t I accord-
i ng to l ater Chinese r e ve l at ions , the So vie t de l e gat ion proposed 
t he follm7ing theses •.-7hich v1ere r e j ccted :.8 
l. 'T'h a t J?caccful coe:x i s·t e ncc an cl. econ.o mic comp.e ti tion 
fo rm t he general line of the forei gn p olicy of the socialist 
c ountr i e s; 
2. Tha t t he emer:;en c e ·of a n c1.v s ~age in t he gene r a l c ris i s 
o f c api'calism i s the rcsul'c o f peaceful coexi s t enc e o.nd peace -
ful compet ition; 
3. Tha t t h e r e is a gr~7ing p o ss ibility of pea c e ful tran s -
i tion to c ommunism .. 
Again a ccord in g 'co the Chine se r eport , which s e ems to 
correspond f a irly close l y to the facts , at Chinese i nsistenc e 
the f ollo\·7ing these s \vere i nc luded in the sta t emcnt : 
1. On the una lte r ed na t u re of i mpe riali sm ; 
2. On u.s . i mperia li sm as the e n 0.my o f the peopl e of the 





'i·7ho l c ,,.,orld ; 
3 . On the n<.l. tiona l-libe ration movcme n'c as a s i gnificant 
fo r c e in preve nti ng Hor l d wa r ; 
4 . On supp ort by the s o cia l ist. countries and the i nter-
n a tiona l worki n g - c l a s s movement f o r the nat i ona l-l ibe ratio n 
9 
s t rugg l e .. 
Khru s hche v signed t he stateme nt De c e mbe r 1 , 1 960 , and a l -
mo s t_ i mrf\cd ia te ly b e ga n to d ilute t he. sign ificance o f the con-
c ess ions made to t he Chin e s Do i n-t o£ v :L e H . Th ·- l o g ic of the 
Chines~ p o s i t ion t e nded to s u pport t he milita nt c r itics of 
Khrushchev , includin ~ the military , and to o ppose his economic 
me asures . 




. ; I 
i s in light of t h i s that Khrushche v ' s famou s speech 
1 9 6 1 mu. st b e understooo . 
A great d ea l o f atte n t ion h as b ccn _g i ven to Kh r u s hche v ' s 
s peech , cs9e cial l y those portions o o a ling with wa r s of na tion~ l 
1ib c r ation o One studen t o f Sovi et affa i rs r e ferred to i t as 
10 
"Khrushchev ' s J-icin Kamof" in Sana t o Jccst i mo ny . i\ c)cua lly , t.hc 
s p ccc:1 'i·Jas no·thing of t he kind., The De c embe r d e claration of 
8 1 Co rnmun i s t pe>.rties v.7as a c o mpromise d •cumcn·t a t ·t empting t o 
r e concile the d ive r gent views o f t he Sovie t l eade r s hip and t h e 
Chinese l eade r shi p o n such fundame n t a l questions as t he "incvi ta-
bility of war " and "pea c e ful coexi s t e nce " . Each side cou l d 
draH fro:n the docu ::-nc nt t hQore tica l s t o t c :ncnts t o bu t·trc::ss its 
0 1.-Jn pos ition G Khrushche v ' s cpccch 'd2.S C'l per sona l rc~port of the 
9 . Ib i d • 
10 . u . s . Congres~~ , Sen a te , Committee 0:1 the Jud i cia r y , i\na l v -
c., l· ~ of t11~ K"l_1 ~_l l ~ '.n. c 'l_~0 v ._s ~~n_. C.l1 Oc.L_ Jan•lar,, 6 1 9. 61 ( ·.~ a~hl" n q•ton 
- - · J . -- · , _ -' "-'- ' '- · ' I . I ' -' - I 
D. C. : USGPO , 1 96 1 ) I p. 2. 
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c onfereficc in which he attempted t6 extract from the Declara -
• 'cion o n i y t h o se ste>."cements '.·ihi c h suppo;ctcd his m m policies a nd 
• 
• 
t.o e l aborate on the ir corrcc·tness . He put pc::t rti cu l a r emph as i s 
o n the poss i b ility of "peaceful coe xis·tc ncc ". 
The :key to Khrushchev ' s c. j:-gumeni: f o r a. g·re ate r expendi-
turc o f funds o n consume r industries was the d e fens ive stre n g th 
o f t he Sovie t mili tary. He a sse rte d : 
F o r t.he firs·t ti:11c i n hi story , the present b <:". l o.n c e 
o f powe r i n the wor l d are na enab l es the Socia li s t 
ca~p and othe r peace - lov in g for ces t o p ur sue the 
c o:·:rp l ei: c l y r ea li s tic t:ask of cocGpe l l i nq ·the imp(~ r ia l­
i sts 1 u nder the t 'hr e a t of the do'{~ f a ll of the ir sys -
t em , not. ·to u n l eash a i:7or l d wa r c ·-
Be c aus e of t his stre ngth , and tho d eve l op ing s ten g th of Sovie t 
i ndustry , h e con t ended tha t o t'i1cr airr.s n eed no . l onge r b e sa.c -
r i f iccd , to me et the needs o f defense . " :'ihy " 1 h e aslG~d , " shou J. d 
vic deny ou.rs ~~ l vcs ~che thing·s '\vh:i.c h ;?cop l e c o. n e n joy \·rithout 
j e o parcU z i ng t he furthe r d e v e lop ment of our social i st state ? " 12 
In the most u i dc ly d i scu s sed port i on o f the speech , 
Khru shche v c ondemned '\·iorlo. w2.rs because o f the ir trP-fuencJ.on s 
d estru ctive n es s , and oppos.cd "loca l v·mrs " o n t he g rounds tha t 
t h e y mi ght easily es c a l a t e into wor l d ':Tars . '/l i th r ega. r d to 
\·!hat h e c a lled "na tiona l-liber ation " ":Tars , ho1·rev e r , h e sa i d , 
" Communis t s fu lly su_9por ~c such j ust 1·1ars and march in the f ront 
r ank wi th peop l e wagin g liberation 13 stru ggJ. 0.s ". Inte r e sting l y 
11. Kornmun i st , January , 1 96 1. 
1 2 . I bid • 
13. Ibid . 
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enou~rh , · h e gave a.s example s of s u ch v.1a r-s the Vic ·tname se war 
• vihi c h via s sett l ed i n 1 954 at Ge n e v a l c:trqc l y thr oug h Sovie t 
• 
• 
pressure on the Democratic Repub lic of Vietnam to acce pt a 
comprorrdse s olu·tion , and the A l gerian Ha r , in \•Thich the So v i e t 
g·overn:-ncnt d i d not eve n r e cogn i z e the FI.N a t the time of the 
s peech , nor d i d t hey d o s o until after France did . If communis ts 
>·lere marchin g in the f ront r anks o f · t hese s tru ~:rg l es , t hey '1.rcrc 
notab l y not Russio.n comDunis ts .. 
All of i:his su}qes·t s t ha t the p u r p o s e of t h i s portion of 
Khn1shchcv ' s so2c c h wa s not to o u tline a me thod wh c r c bv t h e . ~ 
Ru ss ian s Hou ld fo s t e r r c v o l u tionc.ry u pr i s ings c.r ound 'che v!Orld , 
but rathe r to j ustif y ina ction . Th e justifica tion for p e a c e ful 
c oexis t c ncc in t e r ms of the i ntc r nr.:t tiona 1 Cornrnu.n i st movc!nent 
was tha t i t would c reate the kind of e n vi ronme nt i n which n a -
tiona l-libcra ·tion mo ve!nen ts coulO. achie v e su.cccs s v1hi l e the 
Russ i ans es sentia l ly staye d o n the side lin e s and c h e ered . 
"Peac e ful coe xis'ce ncc " , he s<1i d ,· 
h e l ps to deve l op the forces of pro g res s , the f orce s 
struggling for socia li sm , a n d in capita list coun-
t r i es i t fac:Lli ·ta tc s the activi·tie s of Commun ist 
Partie s and o ther prog r es s i ve organiz at ion s of the 
working class . It fa c~.li . ~ ? ~2 s t h e s truggl e the 
p e op l e wage aga inst agg-re s sive mili t a ry blOC$1 a -
g~ inst ~orc ign mil~tary b~s e s . I t ho lp~4thc nat iona l l1bcrat1on movemc nl- to ga :Ln s uc c e sse s . 
He even ~.·le nt so far a s to c l a i m that port ions o f the b ourgcoi-
sic cou l d be r e c ru i tee\ in th~ str ugg l e for pea c eful coc xi s -





The s i gnif icance o f t he n a t iona l-lib e r a t ion quest ion for 
the~ role o f the Navy i s clc u. r. If the So v i e t g o v e rnme nt 
we r e pla nning for the contingency of ~upporting n a tional-libe r a -
tion moveme nts milita rily at various pla c e s around the v"lorld , 
the n t hey ,,;auld h a v e to d e v e lop a correspond ing Nava l sea l ift 
and logis ·tic s c apa bility o Khrushchev \vas buying none of this. 
Khru.sh chcv ' s who l e str ategy r ested o n the thin r eed of a n 
a ssume d supe r i or i ty i n nucle a r dete rre nt capab ili ty . He was a l-
:no s t c e rta i n ly as o.vm r c a s h i s miJ.j_ t a ry advi se r s t ha t such a 
s u p e rior ity d i d not i n f ac t e x i s t. 7 h c ques t i on p r obab l y was 
\ \
7h e t hcr tho .:"\rr!er i cans !<.:ne:? thi s o r not.o 'l'he U- 2 i ncident mu st 
have g i ve n t J1c Ru ss i a:n mil i ta r y g ood r ea s on t:o b e l:i.ev e t h a t 
U.1c:: United St a t es govc r nnEm Jc 'hi'cts 'V-ic ll i:l':ia r e t ha t no " mi ss i l e 
gap " exi s t e d . Bu t pub l i c deb a t·e in t:h e Uni i.: t.'! d S t a t es dur i n g the 
l 9S O p r cs i dcn 'c.i<:>. l c ampQ i g n ·tenc.cd 'co s u ppo rt Kh:>..-'..J. shchc~v ' s c on -
tcntion fo r t h e purp o se s o f p ubli c O.c b a tc in the USSR . The 
3 o v i c t narsha l s cou l d ha r d l y sta n d u p i n public and de ny 
tha t t h e So v i e t Union was in a superior p o s ition . 
Early actions of the Ke nne dy r e g i me tended to pull this 
p r op out from under Khrus h che v ' s p o s i t i on . On Barch 28 , l9Gl , 
Ke nne dy de live r ed a spe cia l me ssage to Congres s calling fo r 
increa s e d r:tili t a r y c xpon d i tur c 'co b u ild u p both the convc ntiona 1 
and the nuc l e a r s tra t e g ic capabilitie s o f the United S t a t e s . 
Late r in the y e ar ass i stan t - Se c r e tary of Def e n se Ro swe ll 
Gilp a t r ic r e vea l ed p ublicly tha t the United S t a t es was awa r e 
1 5 
t ha t no "mi s s ile ga.p " cx i ste cL I n July 1 in c o n n e ction •·Jith 
15. N c vT York T i me s , Octobe r 2 2 , l 96 lo 
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the deve l op i ng Berlin cri s i s , Khrushchev announ c ed a three 
• bi llion ruble increase i n the So v i e t Defe n se b~1dge t a n d simu l-
. ~ ~ ~ . .,__ . 1 . . l SF h ' b . t aneou sLy suspenaea aerno~l l Za tlon . or t e tlme e lng , 
Khrushc hev ' s program of defen se economy h ad f a iled . 
On the o the r h a nd , the military o ppone nts o f Khrushche v 
d i d not ye t f ee l t hey h ad v.ron a victory . Th e question of al -
loca t i o n of r esource s aga i n appea r ed p romine ntly in the s pee c h c ;:; 
and c,cclarations o f the '.I\venty - Second Party Congress , h e l d in 
October , l 95 1. One of t he mo s ·t i n1portant qucs·t ions cons i de r od 
a·t ·the congress was t he C.l.pp:('o va l of a n c\,T pro gram of Jche Com-
mu n i st. Pa rty o"!.: ·the Sovi et Union ( Ci?SU ) • 0~ o program had bee n 
developed s ince Len i n had d r a fted o ne in 1 9 1 9 . Na tur a lly , 
t he nc~T-T pro~sram provi ded an o pportu nity f or variou s groups in 
• the So v i e t Union to p l ead the i r c a s e . As soon c>. s the drc.ft 
• 
~.ppcared , even b e fore the Congrcs::; me t , the military ma.nagcd 
to pub l icize i t.s vc l.-sio n of the s i ; -n ifica nce of t he pro.;r am 
as i t r e lated to the military . Ai r Force Gene r a l A . P odo l ski, 
Hr i ting in t he mili tary n C'!7spape r ~co. Star , obse r ved : 
All p e r s onne l o f the Ar my and NaV\_f , liJce the \'7hole 
Soviet p e op l e , '.-la rml y appro,ie t he ind ica ~cion s in-
cluded in ·t he draft progra::n o f the pa rty that the 
CPSU cons i ders it n e c essary 'co rna in ·ta i n t h e de -
fcn s i v e mi ght o f the Sovie t Union , the cornba t r eao.i-
n css of its armed f orc es , at a l eve l in s uring tho 
d ec i s i v e a n d comp le ~ca d e f ea t o f any enemy t~~t de-
s i re s to encroa.c h u p on t1K~ S ovic~c home l c>. n d . · 
He we nt · on to i mp l y strongly t hat t he So v i e t r·ii li tary ·did not 
l G. P r avda , July 8 , 1 9G l • 
17. KrasnaY9 Zv e zda , Oct obe r 10, 1 96 1. 
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b~ licvc the c urrent combat r r:-a d in c s s :ne -t this criter i a . The 
• TIN"n nty-Sccond Congress cnd.:.:d in wha t o.mountcd to a stale ma t e . 
The h ea vy i ndustria l l obby , the " me ta l-ca. t e rs " as Khrushche v 
called the m, and the mi li tary managed t o ho l d o ff the fu ll 
measure of trimming t hat Khrushch e v wanted to i mplement . 
Khrush che v ' s pol i cy vias not , h mveve r , comp l e t e l y repud i ated . 
Durin g 1 96 0 and 1 961 , the Sovie t Navy r ema in e d cu.rious ly 
a loof from the strategic d e b a te as it appe a r e d in the Sovie t 
p r e ss . By ea rly 1 9G2 , howe v e r , s o me nava l spo k c smcm b e ga n to 
air t h e ir .:;rr i e v a n c c s with t h e policy of r~ liance on subma :c incs 0 
In hi s r e port to th'3 Twe nty - Se cond Con g r c s c_; Khrushche v had 
comme nte d , " The '3ovi c t submar i n e f l e c t with atomic e ngin .:. s , 
arme d with b a llistic a nd homing mi ss i l e s , vigila ntly stands 
• d 
. ., , . " lR ga.ur _ ove r our socla li st (.._cnl 8 v e rne nt s ~ In an ar -t icle-: o sten-
sibly d e vo·t," c'l t o expounding o n t(lt. thc mr: of the submarine a s 
the "main str i king force " of the Sovie 'c NaV\_; , ~:;dmira l P rokofi e v 
commente d , "the i d e a of a one-sided a bsolutiz.ation of one or 
1 9 
anothe r type of force is a lie n to So v i e t n a va l t hought " . In 
order to l e ave no d oubt as to wh a t h e was r e f erring , h e quoted 
the above passage fro:n Khrushchc: '-' ' s spe: e cho 
I n f''J ay an !>.rmy spol.;:e ma n , Col. I . s ide l n il<ov , . \vri ting 
o n Sovie t military doctr ine , pre s n n t c d a forcefu l state ment of 
the combin e d c~ rms co!1cc pt . He o p e ned his a rticle wi~h a di s -
cus s i on o f Soviet military doctr j_nc in the prc,,;a_r pe r iod , i n 
wha t was cle a rly an attack on the polici e s of Khrushche v . 
• 
18 . Pra v d a , Octobe r 18 , 196 1 • 
1 9 . Krasna ya Zv e zda , Janua ry 13 , 1 962 . 
-36 -
"An enormous l oss to the de.fen s ive c apability of the country 
• and the milita ry prepar adness of the Army and the Navy" , h e 




While h e accorded to n uc l ea r mis s ile force s the primary p lace 
in mo de rn v7arfa re , h e r e j e c ·t ed the idea tha t f irepo'.-.'er cou ld 
r ep lace manpowe r a n d that the old forms of mili tary powe r could 
n o -;.-7 be dispense d ~,., i t h . 
The rtecis ive role o f nuclear mi ss ile force s in 
war does not l ess e n the s i gnif icance of o the r 
fo r ms of a r ms . A fin a l and d e cisive victo y 
o v e r i mperia list aqgre s sors c a n be achieve d 
only as a result of combined , we ll-coord i nated 
v.nd ,::J.ecisive move~nent.s of all fo r rns of armed 
forc e s and types of arms . Nuclear-mi ss ile wa~ 
::i;\,1~ b e
7
con d ucted l:?.Y:_1!.1ass 1 mul timill:Lon man 
arrcne s . -
"Thi s means " , h P- concludes , "that i t i s necessa ry e ve n in the 
fu ture to seriously p e rfect not only the .n e-;,,, , but even so to 
s peak , . 22 the old fo rms of the a.rrne d for c es and types o f arms ". 
This theme ~.vas shortly applied i n a na val context by 
retired Fleet. Admi ra l I . s . I sakov , who had COI71ma nded the 
Soviet. Navy during ~· 7 orJ.d \:!ar I I . Defending the r ole of the 
surface fleet , Isakov p o inted out , 
while the popu l at ion o f our pla n e t transports car-
goes b y sea route s and while there exists a me r-
-------------------------
20 . Kra sn~ya Ze vzda , May 11 , 1 962 . The i mplica tion 
h e r e r.1as tha t Kh rushche v was also deve lop i n g a per -
sona li'cy cult whi ch may have equa lly disastrous r esults 
o n Sovi e t mil itary strategy . 






chant fleet , no t hing exc ept a navy c a n g uaran tee 
its s a f e ty of movemen t a long sea routes . In c e r-
t a in condi tions sea comm1m ica t·ions c a n be defend -
e d by mi ss ile s , aricra ft a~d other 2~ean s . But you 
cannot d o \:tithout a surface fl ee t. -
1d riting in Kr asn a y a Zve z d a o n Sovie t Navy Day 1 Admiral F . v. 
Zozu lya 1 while giving pride of place to the s ub marine (which 
h e claimed Has c a p a ble of firing miss iles vJhile subme rge d ) 1 
was c arefu l to n o ·te Jchat " s u rfac e sh j_ps a l so c arry o u t an i m-
p o rtant service "
24 
Othe r n .-:1.va l spol<.esmem con tinued t o s peak 
fo r the cause of t he surface shi p , but Admira l Gorshkov 1 Soviet 
n ava l Co mcnander -in - Chief , -,"as no t among them. 
Dur i ng t h e aftermath o f ·the Cuban mi ss ile c r i s i s , Admi ral 
Go rshl<ov did C.escr i be the mi ss i o n o f the So v i e t Navy in vlha t 
a ppea r s t o be a n e, .. .r ·Hay • '"rh e So viet Navy" , h e s o. i d , "by the 
cho.ra c ter o f h er armament o f highl y rna neuve r ab l e f o rces a nd 
military c apab i l i t i es i s obliged t o be p r epared a t a ny moment 
and a t a ny p oint o f the g lobe to se c ure the prote ction of the 
interests of o u r s t a t e ". 2 5 Gors h l<ov noted tha t thi s formula 
app l ied espc-:c i c.. lly to the submar i ne fl ee t. Th e formu l a "pl-o-
23. Nede lya , no. 23 1 June 9 , 1 962 . 
24 . " Vsegda n a S traz h e " 1 !S_ras n a.ya Zvezda , July 2 9 1 196 2 . 
2 5 . Kr9-snay a Zvezda , Octobe r 31, 1 96 2. The sig nifican c e 
of the formu l a " p r 0te c t ion of the i n t e r es t s of o u r sta t e " 
as a description o f t h e role o f the So v i e t Navy is obs cu r e . 
~'i e s tern commentato r s fir s t no t iced the us e of this formula 
in the summer o f 1 967 1 but i t h as in f a c t b een a sta nda rd 
and r e c urring fo r mu l a f o r describ j_ ng the role o f the So v i e·t 
Na vy since at l eas t Oc t obe r , 1962 . If t he ph rase v-Tas used 
b e fore t h at time , it h as not b een d i sco ve r ed b y t h e a u thor. 
17h a t eve r i ts s i gnifican ce , its use by Gors hkov o n Na >JY Day , 
1 96 7 , d i d not r epresen t a n eH formu l at i on . 
• 
-3 8 -
tection of the state inte r es ts" is particularly inte r es ting 
beca u s e it h as not b een a pplied to a ny othe r arm of the Sovie t 
arme d forces , although in rece nt y ears · it has b e come the 
staridard v.Tay of de scribing the role of the Navy. 
The conce pt of "prote ction of state inte re s·t s " is clearly 
di s·tingui s h e d from the d e f e n se of the coun try a s such. vi ri t-
ing in 1 96 3, Admira l Gorshk ov sta ted, 
The Communist Party and the Sovie t government are 
displaying wise fore s i gh t , faking all me asures to 
insure tha t the armament a n d organization of our 
fleet corre spo!}_d to its growing role in the de-
f e n se lQbo~on~/ of the country, in ~ge prote ction 
LZashchit~/ of its state in te r ests . . 
He wen t on to s ho'tl that the Sovie t Nav_y wo u l d operate differ-
( ently t han it d i d du r i ng World Wa r II: 
~ Puring the last war, the actions o f the fle e t oc-
cure d b as ically in the r egion s close to shore and 
were conducte d mainly in operationa l and tactical 
inte r a c t ion vl i th the army. No"v , con s ide ring the 
inten tion of a ggressors and the p l a c e give n to 
the ir navi es in the pla n o f n uclea r attack on the 
socia li s t countries , vre mu s t b e p repar e d to an swer 
them Hi t h destruc 'cive s t rikes at nava l and s hore 
ob je ct~ ::v.es on the ·o;..,hole t err i tor y o f the TrTorld 
oce an. 7 
Eve n i n t h i s c on text Gorshl<:ov re ite r a t e d the fact tha t the 
ba s ic s t r i ke f o rce of the N :tvy h as b e come the nuclear pot.·le red 
subma rine equ i pped ".·lith mis siles . "The sole domination of the 
ocea n by the traditiona l s e a p oHer s ", h e said , "is ende d by : the 
26 . Krasna ya Zvezda , F e b r ua ry 5 1 1 963. 






creation of our n e\·7 Navy, equipped VJith aJcomic po•t7e r plants, 
missile t e chnology, and radioele ctronics" • 
From the public discussion of naval affairs early in 1963, 
it becomes clear that the d e cision had b een made to break loose 
from the confines of the region s close to shore \vhere the Navy 
had traditiona lly operate d. This was not a decision which could 
be immedi a t e ly i mpleme nted due to shortcomings in the train-
ing of Soviet nava l p e rsonnel. This decision seems to have 
b een based on the n e c ess ity of operating their ballistic-missile 
subma rines clos e to American shores, and the nece ssity of operat-
ing their defensive naval forces furthe r at sea than in the · past 
in orde r to counter the increased range o f VJestern naval wea-
pons. The western naval weapons of greatest concern were the 
fast carrie r strike force s and Pola ris submarine s • 
Sovie t military observe rs had been carefully follo•:i ing 
the strategic debate in the United States and were Hell a \va r e 
of the second strike concept and the place of Polaris in thi s 
conce pt .. 28Gorshk ov' s staJcement that "the hopes of the strate-
gists across the ocean tha t their commun ica tions, and even more 
their shores , \•.J ill be inaccess ible to our Navy in time of v;ar 
29 
have proved illus ory", s eems to imply a kind of a "second 
strike" role for the Soviet miss ile spbmarines . 
At the same time , Soviet nava l spokesmen \vere quick to 
claim that the Pola ri s submarine was by no means invulnerable. 
28. See , for example. !,ia jor Genera l 1-1 . Mils hte in, "On the 
Military Doctrine o f the USA" (0 voennoi dok trine s . Sh.A.), 
~~rasnaya Zvezda , February 5, . 1 96 3 • 
29 Krasnaya Zve?-da, February 5, 196 3. 
~ ·. 
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Wh en , ~ar ly in 1 963 , the Un i ted States -made c l a n s to r emove the 
• Thor and J u piter mi ss ile bases in Engla nd , I ta ly, and Turl<.ey , 
• 
• 
and r eplace them v1i th Pola ris s ubmarines i n the r1edi terranean , 
30 
the Ru ss i a n s f ollowed the d e v e lopments close l y . On the ques -
tion of the j_nvulnera.bili ty o f Polar i s , aviat i on t-1aj or Gene r a l 
s . Ruban p ointed out that such cla i ms h ad previous l y bee n made 
f o r the aircraft c a rrier , but these h ad t u rned out n ot to b e 
true . "Ou r nava l miss j_]_e -carry i n .J aviat.ion i s c apab l e of r en -
O.eri ng them d e strUCt i 'le bl0\·.7 S " 1 h e Hrote 1 °'itli thOUt entering 
'che i r z.one o f antia ir defen se . " 3 1 Defen se Liniste r A $ Ya. lvla li-
novsky , in a s peech co~~emorating t he 45th annive rsary of the 
So v i et armed forces 1 made the cla.i:m tha ·t "na val mi s si l e -
c a rrying· a nc1 a.nt i subJHr ine avia ~::. ion h 3.s becorne a very i mpor tant 
force . It h clS the capability o f h u nt ing d o-.m at sea and de s·troy-
ing· s ubrna rines as •.·;e ll as the 32 surface ships of t.he enemy e" 
Such state~ents as those by Ruba n and Ma l i n o vsky a l s o 
p oin Jc u p the fact t .hat spol<:es r,lo. n for oJche r arms of the Navy 
"\Jere not willing to g i ve u p to the submarine \·l i thou ·t a fight~ 
Although statemen ts cla i ming a great abi li ty o f a ircraft to 
counter atomic-p o•.-:ered sub::lCar i nes h v.ve n e ver c a ri·ied much con -
viction 1 Jche cl a i ms "l·ii th r e gard to the ir ability to counter 
c a rrie r task force s we re drama tica lly illustrated in the course 
o f 1 963 . During the y ea r , So vie t naval air units bega n on a 
routine basis to search out a nd fly o ver c arrier task force s 
30. "Pola ri s -id ol Pentago na ", Krasnaya Zv e:;:da 1 Feb . 15 1 1 96 3 • 
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deploy in g to b o th the S i x th and Seventh F l ee ts , in an a ttempt 
to demonstrate the vulne rabili t y of carrier forces3 3 to l a nd-
based nava l air. 
Admiral Corshl<ov cla i med that these operations wer e in -
c reas in g ly successful . "In a serie 's of i nstances our ships a nd 
n ava l aviation" , h e claimed , "have demonstrated operationa l and 
active actions as a r esult o f which some foreign g overnments 
b ecame convinced that the y could not con s i de r the ir a i rcraft 
carrie rs a!1d submar i nes "invisib l e " 1 "untouchab l e " 1 and i n the 
eve nt of >.·Jar " invCJ l nerab l e " in VJha tever areas the y may b e _ lo -
3 4 
cated ". Be i nforme d nava l pers o nne l _t1at they mu s t be c apable 
o f goinq •;.;h e rever the order s o f the f at11er l a n d sent them to 
c arry out the ir mi ss ions in support of the s t ate int~res ts of 
the Soviet Un ion and to r ema in the r e as lonq as neces sary. "lt"'or 
the Soviet Navy ", h e as s erted , "1 9G4 i s the y e2. r of the ro:utin e 
long 35 cruise ". 
In the meantime , the re were some in teresting s i gns that 
the poli tica l position o f t he N3.vy was improvin g ~ ·,:;h e n Admi ra l 
Gorshl<ov r,-1a s n amed Co~rnander- in -Chief o f the Sovie t navy , h e •:Jas 
at first only a c a n d i date r.1embe r of t he Central ColTttni t t ee o f 
the Communi s t Party , although his prede cessor h a d been a full 
membe r . He rema i ned i n this status at the Twenty-Firs t Party 
Con gress in 1 959 . P. t the '1\.;enty-Second Par ty Congress , however , 
both Corshkov and hi s First Deputy Commander- i n -Chief , Admira l 
33. Ne2:!._~Q!.~ Ti mes , J un e 5 , 196 3 • 
34. "Flot v bol ' shom p l avunii" , Krasna ya Zvezda , March 21 , 1964 . 
35. Ibid. 
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Vi t a lii F o k in, we r e e l ect e d to full membe r s hip in the Central 
• Co:nmi tte e o Cent r a l Committee memb e rsh ip , i n i t se l f , does no t 
conf er any part i cular po1.ve r on the memb e r , but e l ec 'cion doe s 
coincide v e ry clos e l y to the r ea l powe r situa tion within the 
party. To have t Ho full members on the Central Com.mittee in-
stead o f only on e candidate :ne mber ind ica t e d that the influence 
o f the So viet :t-l avy h a d i ncrea sed grea tly between t .he two party 
confe r e nce s . 
Wh en Ad mi r a l Fokin d i ed in J anuary , 1 964 , hi s succes s o r , 
Admi ra l Vl ad i mi r Afanas ievich Kasa tonov , a ppa rent l y d i d n ot 
a ssume F o k in ' s p l a c e o n t h e Ce n tra l Co :nmit·tee o Kasatonov i s , 
ho;veve r , a rr.embe r o f the Cen tra. J. Co mrni 1.:tee o f t he Co mmqnist 
Pa rty o f t h e Ukra i ne . At t h e Twen ty- rTh i r d Congress o f the CF SU 
• in Ap ril , l 9S6 , t '-·10 So v i et l'ldrrlira l s , zi,d mira l l-\me l ' ko , Commande r-
i n-Chief o f t h e So v i e t Pac if i c F l e e t , a nd Admi r a l Lobov , Corn -
ma nder-in-Chi e f o f t he Northern F l e e t , we r e e l ected to c an d i-
d a t e membe r shi p o f the Ce n t r a l .Committee . Th e only othe r mili -
t a ry off i ce r s whose p o s ition was impro~ed a t the Twenty- Third 
Congr e ss v1e r e the district commande rs o f five of the mo st i m-
portant milita ry d i stricts . 
Other indica tions of increa sed influe nce of the . avy i n-
elud e d the promotion of Gorshl(CJV to the rank o f F l eet Admira l 
in 1 96 2 , a r a nk which ha d not b een fi ll e d s i nce Ku znets ov's 
r et i rement in 1 9 56 . In 1 96 5 , Ad miral Kasatonov was also pro-
mo t ed to the rank of Fleet Admiral. 
Thi s incr e ased i nf l ue nce doe s no·t n e c essar ily me an , h o-"7 -
• eve r , tha t the Navy was r e c e iving a g r ea ·t e r a lloca t i on of r e-





i s 1 destroyer escort and l arger ) a ppears to h ave rea c hed a peal< 
some time i n 1 96 3 1 and to h ave dec lined s in ce the n as older units 
were retired from ~ervice faste r tha n the y were being r eplaced . 
1\t t.he same time 1 a c cording ·to esti:rnates by the Institute for 
S t rategic S tudies , the num.ber of personnel in the So viet Navy 
36 decl i n ed during 1 964 from abou t 500 1000 to about 465 , 000 . No ne-
t h e les s the dec line was not l a rge ~nd was accompa~ied by a sig-
nif icant modernizat ion of the fleet~ 
As for the mi litary budge t as a whole , Khrush che v 
h ad b~en increasing l y unab l e t o hold drn~n military spe nd i n g . 
Afte r hi s dec i s ion i n June , 1 96 1 1 to in c r ease mili tary s pend -
i n -J o ver 'chE~ budge t estima te 1 the o vert mili t e>.ry budge t increas-
e d stead ily each y ea r . 37 Early in 1 96 3 1 i t looked as if Khrush -
che v might b e J.osinq hi s ho l d on the mili·t a :cy and h e avy industry 
s egme n'cs o f t he econor:1y entire l y . I-Ie v-1a s , h or,.re ver , fina lly 
able to ob tain an expanded program f or the prod uction of c hem-
i c a l f erti lizers for a g-ricultu r e , a n d to cut the mi lita ry bud -
get by 6 0 0 million rubles . 
The budge t c u t led t h e military to r e new . the stra t eg ic 
36. See The .M i l j_ta:ry_ __ _13a J ance , 1 96 3-1 964 ( London : The Inst i -
tute for Strateg- ic St1 d ie s 1 l 96 3 ) a nd The I1ili ta rv Ba l ance l1 96 4.-
196~ (London : Th e In s titute for Strategic S tudies , 1 964 ). 
37 . There is a qreat deal of controversy o ver jus t ho'~' much 
t h e Ru ss i ans aci:ua lly do spend on defen s e . The publishe d 
fi gure seems rin icu lou s ly l o'.-7 for such a large mil i tary es -
tabli shment. t·io st · observers do agree 1 hm·Jeve r 1 t hat 'che pub-
lished f i gures at l east i n d ica t e trends in defense spend i ng . 
The publishec1 budget for d e f ense expenditures are as follo\,7S 
(in billions o f rubles ): 1 959 : 9 . 4; 1 960 : 9 . 3; 1 961 : l lo 6 ; 








debate. Colonel General Lomov renev1ed the argument in favor of 
a combined arms concept, stressing that victory in modern war-
fare requires "a multimillion man modern army". 38 The grmving 
irritation Khrushchev felt at the pressure being brought to bear 
on him by the military Has revea led in a speech h e made in Egypt. 
Speaking .to a group of Egyptian officers on May 18, he said: 
"I do not knoH hoiv it is in the U .l-io R., but · my esteemed friend 
the President would be able to tell me \vhe'cher a military p e r-
son ever tells him: 'Do not give us any more v.reapons, there 
39 
are enough of them.' For Hith us . this is not said". 
The military conservatives v;ere only one element Hith 
which Khrushchev had to contend to further his program of em-
phasis on consumer-related production. The more conservative 
among the civilian hierarchy ~Jere suspid_ous for othe r reason s 
of the diversion of r esources to light industry. Various faction s 
were becoming more and more dissatisfied with I.Zhrushchev 's 
leadership , in both domestic and foreign affairs. Abruptly in 
Octobe r of 1964 , Khrushchev was ousted as l eader of the Party 
and government and placed in retirement . Although the full de-
t a ils of Khrushchev's ouster are not . yet kno'.-Jn, it seems as 
though the military leaders did not play an i mportant part in 
his do,,vnfall. They appear to h a ve adop·ted a position rather of 
guarded neutrality. 
As far as the Navy is conce·rned , at no time did the naval 
leadership repudiate Khrushchev's program of primary reliance 
38. Krasnaya Zvezda , January 7 and 10, 1964 • 
39. Mo scow Radio) May 18 , 1964 . 
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on the submarine as the ma in "strik i ng . forc e " of the t<iavy. 
• The stra t e g ic de bu. t e t.ha 'c did appear during Khru s hchev ' s time 
Hith r eqarc3. to nava l affairs a mounte d to guarded as sertions 
by surface and avia tion office rs tha t the ir arms , too , h ad an 
i mp ortant role to play e Some conce ssions \ve re made in both of 
these dire ctions . Up throug-h 1 964 , about 18 guided missile 
destroyers v7ere const.r uctod . I n 1 964 , the Naval Infantry ( Soviet 
equiva l en t of the Mar i ne s ) was o r gan i zed aqa in , but this was 
li tt l e mo r e than a toJ~en g·es ture ~ About 3, 000 men we r e assig·n-
ed to _this force . The ove rflights of U. S . carr i e rs by So viet 
nava l aircraft Here probab l y a t tempts by advocates o f naval 
air to demons trate the c on t inued usefu l n ess o f manned a i r-
They seem to have b een p a r'cly successful in thi s • 
• In many r espe c 'cs , 1 964 ':las an i :npor tan t yea r o :E trans-i tion for t he So v i e 'c ~'Javy c Admiral Gorshkov ca lled it the "ye2.r 
o f the routine lon g· c ru i se " , and dur ir.. g the year the So v i e ·t 
Navy d i d begin t o appear mor e and more often on the hi gh 
se c=t s . Go rshl<:ov and most of the oth er sen ior nava l of f ice rs 
s eemed to a ccept Khrushche v ' s concept of the subma rine a s the 
most i mportan t arm of the Navy 1 a l though a feVI dissen ·t-.ers made 
t h e i r voices h eard . 
To judge from the published articles , s peeches , and inte r -
vie-:.·.;s o f Soviet nava l off ice r s 1 t h e p rima;.y c oncern of the Navy 
wa s to defe nd agair1 s t the t win threat of attack by American 
c a rrie r ta s k force or by Pola ri s submu rine . The Soviet Navy vias 
t ak ing to the hi gh seas in orde r to b e able to c a rry this defense 





tha ·t some naval s p okes:n.en joine d •.-Ji th the o the r conve ntional 
forc e s to o ppos e the defen s e budget c uts so ass i duous ly pur-
sued by Khrushchev . These officers , like the ir profess i onal 
brethren in other countri es , f e lt tha t the y v-7ere being given 
i nadequate too l s with which to fulfill an awesome r esponsibility. 
There is no evidence in the open r e cord >cha t Soviet nava l o f -
ficers advoca ted tha t t he Soviet l e adership pursue a more 




Ct-l.:'\P'l'E R T~JRSE : T~i2 SOVI.ST ~'1.AVf Al:!D POL I TICS A?'I'ER Ki1RUSHCHEV 
By t he time the n e•..J t riumvirate of Br ezhnev 1 Ko sygin , 
and P o dgorny took over r esponsibility for the cond uct o f Sovie t 
affa irs , the u sua l formula for des cribing the n21 Jcure of the 
So viet Navy had been modif i ed to inclucl.e an i mportant place 
fo r s 1r:Eace ships a n d naval avi a tion. i\ s the hor i z ons of the 
Navy be;:FH~ to broade n I so d i c1. ·t hose of the o ther services e 
I,la :!:' ~3i-:cl.1 Kiril 1'1oslw.le nko , t .. h e former Comrnande r-in--Chie f of the 
job i n ~pril , 1 96 2 1 probably d ue to hi s opp ositio n to the Cuban 
mj_ssile adve nt:ure) •.vrot ..e : 
Soviet military science dec i s i ve ly r e je c ts any ar -
bitrary fabricati on~: .o. Jch?.t one could , a.s i t w:.:>.re , 
ach i eve vic·tory by t.he e rn~::J l oyment of o n e or more 
n c,,.;· \<'ca pons . ':i:'"he rc c:t :ce no '>.reapon s •llhic~ possess suc h 
exceptiona l and all-powe rfu l qua li ties . 
L'~ Ct>.,7it .. lst.a.ndin s;· the p l eas of v c. rious ::nilita ry l eaders for a 
greater a llocat i on of r esource s , espe cia lly to conventiona l 
arms 1 the neH icadership tool<: severa l meas'Jre"' vih i ch seemed 
to further red'.Jce t he i ;nportanco of conventional forces. So1ne 
tirne l ate i n 1 964- , they abolished t he Ground F orces comma.nd as 
a. s eparo. t e ent i t.y and mer0ed i t vJ i th the General S taff . Th e y 
al s o con tinued the r eduction of t he So v i et armed forces \1hich 







· had begun under Khrushchev. This reduction fell ma inly on the 
Army. In December, Kosyg in announced a further reduction in 
3 
the defense budget for 1965 to a figuie of 12.8 billion rubles. 
All of thes e moves suggest strongly that the dissatis-
faction of the military played little or no· part in the ove r-
throw of Khrushchev. At any rate , if the n e\v leadership mved 
any debt of gratitude to the military, they \·Jere not repaying 
it • . 
In his s~eech on the anniversary of the October revolu-
tion, Brezhnev stressed the importance of contacts Hith the 
west and oppo sed the continuation of the arms race. "Ide are 
coming out for an end to the arms race ", he said, "for genera l 
and comp l ete disarmament, for r e lieving__j::;lle pe o u l es from the 
4 
ill.Q.lli)tiD_g_burd~n of mi].itary e~ditures." Brezhnev seemed 
to b e precludj_ng any adventures of the Cuban or Berlin variety, 
probably in an effort to reduce tension in Europe." This vTould 
allov1 a r eduction of Soviet armed forces in Eastern Europe and 
the ir r edeployment to the Far East. Podgorny's visit to Ankara 
in January 1 965 seems to fit in with this patt~rn. 
In Februa ry, 1965, A. N. 3h e lepin headed aparty dele-
gation to Mongolia . During his vi s it, h e acquainted the Mon-
golian pa r t y with Russia n pla ns for 1965, "including the ques;.... 
tion of better quality in production, · the increa se in the tempo 
2. In a MoscoVJ press conference in Februa ry 1 965 , Marshal 
V.D. So kolovsky cla i med that the Soviet armed forces had 
been r educed to 2,423,000 men . This is the number origina lly 
set by I(hrushche v in 1 96 0. Radio r·1oscmv , February 17,1965 • 
3. Pravda, De c e mber 10, 1964 . 





o f those branche s of- i ndu s t r y -llh i c h :-na k e consume r g oods ; and 
5 
v; i th t he p r ob l em o f d o v e l o p :Ln g aqricu l ture ." Sh e l epi n dre-:J the 
log ica l con s e q u ences f or Sovie t f o re i g n p ol icy , p oint i ng out 
tha t t h e succes s o f the p rog ram "d e man ds f avo r a ble externa l c on-
ditions " . " ·-· -!e n eed peace ", h e s a i d , "and i n ou r fore i gn p o licy 
He , as a l ways , s h a ll cons i ste nt l y and u n f l agg i n g l y f i ght for 
6 
t "i"1e r ea l i za t i on o f the princ i ple s o f peace ful coexis'ce n c e c " 
She l ep in ' s pos i t ion see ms to r epresent t he consens u s o f 
t he p oli t ica l l eac'l.er s h i p a 'c t h e be ~:r inn in g o f 1 S6 5 e ,;·:,. s t he 
Un i t e6 St a te s i n t e n s i f i ed i ts i n vo l v emen t i n Vi e tnam b y i n itia t -
i nsr t .he bon1b i ng o f ~"f orth Vi e tnam i n Febr '..W.ry , ho' ·Ie v e :c , the 
mili tary l eade r s hip op ened a new pha~e o f the str ate g ic debate . 
~,he old q u eE: t i ons o f t h e n a -t: u re of mo d ern ,_,;a rfare and t h e ex-
pe c ted dura tion o f wa r arose ane~ . 
I n !''larch , -Co lone l Lar i o n ov , a n !\rmy s p o };:e s man , v-7 ro'ce a n 
art i c l e attacking exc e s s i v e r e lia nce on mi s s ile forces . "A :non g 
mil i t a r y pe r s onne l " , h e ,,;ro t e , 
~{01_1 of ·tc rl hc:ur ai: o p l11lOi1 lii~e t f1i s : ' i11 Ct S\'l: if ~t ­
fl owi n g \'iar , v i c-tor y 't7il l b e achi e ved by one str il<:e 
o f the s trategi c rocket force s '. Th i s i s an e rro -
n e ou s op inion . In c:_ sid_f t - f l o 'id ng Ha l- , just a s i n 
a pro l on ged '\-ia r , vj_c i:ory o ve r t h e ene::ny ;.-: i ll b e a t-
t a i n ed by t h e c o:-r1b i ned e f f o r ts o f a ll forms of the 
a rmed f o r ces a nd kinds o f troop s .7 
La r i o nov noted tha t i n t he past wa r the F r e nch h ad r e lied on 
5 . Pravda , Fe bruary 6 , 1 965 • 
7 . "No voe o n .1 z hj_0. i prodo l z h i 'ee l ' n ost ' v o i na " , Kr e_ sna y a 
Zve~da , March 1 8 , 1 965 . 
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t he r'lagino·t line for defense and the United States and Gr ea t 
• 
Bri ta i n had relied upon having e nough-t i me to mobi lize v But 
nuclear vlar h u.s c l1anged that ., i:Ie noted that . the United States 
budge·t ind ica ted that the Penta :_:ron was b0.ild ing up the means 
f o r nu:;::lear \-Ta r o f the s~.,;lft-f lo·cv i n<~T kind , but also building 
u p forces f o r a prolonged war. Ee made a strong case that 
the Soviet Un ion should d o llkew i sc . 
Other military spokesme n s oon joined i n the c horus. 
Genera l Rotmistrov , Assi s t an t De f e nse Mi nister , c ame out 
firmly :tor the c o-:nb ined arrns concep·t , and oppo sed e conomi z inq 
o n defense. "The aggress iveness of i .per i o. lism, " he Hrote , 
" force s t he Co"L.'11.Unis ·<: Pu. rty an c~ the ".'Tho l e So viet peopl e to rai se 
c onstantly the m:Llitary mi ght of the Soviet home l and. , to de -
• v e loo t£1e nationa l economy and a ll o ther branches o f state con -
str-uction i n t he US S?. i n the LYteres t of r a ising its de:Eonse 
8 
capability ." ?his wa s clear ly intended as an adm:i.ni t ion to t.he 
Soviet p olitica l l eadership . 
A r ese rve Li eutenan t Colone l , G. Mi ft i ev , carr i ed the 
ar;ru:ne n'c even furthE': r . Niftiev ma inta ined that , even i n the 
event o f thermonuclear Ha.r , Etul·tir"i llion-man armi es u ill be 
necessary . Le pointed out tha t , even though the des tructive -
n ess per .:-an of mo c3.e rn l:.reapons i s v e r y high , thi s does not nee-
essarily l es sen the personne l r equ iremen t for the following 
r easons : 
1 . Sovie t military d octrine envisages gene r a l war cover -
• 







· ing large areas of the globe in thea·ter warfare ; 
2. Jvlodern weapons technology allm,7s fe1·mr men to effect 
more damage , but the use of nuclear arms will be accompanied by 
large losses of personnel Hhose replacement will be difficult. 
For this reason, the personnel on hand a ·t the beginning of the 
\var must be prepared to conduct active military operations , 
independent of mobilization measures; 
3. The. technical revolution has expanded the requirement 
for maintenance per.sonne l and thus reduced the relative -v?eight 
9 
of combat forces in the total number of military personnel. 
In sharp contrast to the dissident Army eleme nts, the 
Sovj_et n a val leadership showed every sign o f being satisfied 
with current policie s of the regime. In an intervie'~:T with a 
L=i:_teraturnava Gazet.a,_ correspondent, A..dmiral Gorshl<ov reaffirm-
ed Khrushchev's naval policy of shifting emphasis to submarines. 
"In our opinion" he declare d , "time has already nullified the 
significance of such m::1 jor ,,,arships as battleships and cruisers. 
aircraft carriers are also losing their importance. Mod e rn 
weapons make it possible to locate them quickly and to destroy 
10 
them before . the y can use their armament ." \'/hen asked ,, hat 
t ype of vessel nm·J lead s the fleet, he r eplied "Atomic sub-
11 
marine s! They are the basis of the mi ght o f out fleet ." 
9. · "Voina i lyudskie resursy" ('i'Jar and reserves of people ), 
Krasnaya Zvezd a , June 4 , 1965. 
10. Lite r aturna y a Gaze tq_ , May 6 , 1965. 
11. Ibid. This sta t e f"te nt s eems to make it cle a. r thai: a na-
val d es ire for more conventiona l arms playe d no part what-
soeve r in the ove rthrm,7 of Khru shchev . 
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The mciter i o.ls prepare d for present:.ation dur ing the Navy 
• Day c e l ebra-t ions of 1 96 5 -r_qent even further in procla i ming t he 
• 
• 
sa)cisfaction of the naval l.e<J.dership . F or the f i rst time 1 t h e 
grouing role o f the Navy was t:.iecl_ to the groHth of t he Sovie·t 
merc hc:m t marine. " The necessity of strengthening the naval 
mi ght of the USSR i s stipu l ated a l s o by the r apid deve lopment 
of our c a r g o and corn.mercj_al fleet , c:.nd the br?adenin~r of s 'cate 
, r: , , ~ 11 12 r],h ~ · 1ntere sts O l : our country on tne seas ana. oceans ., . e e o.1--
toria l WE"m t o n to say 1 '"l.'ha nl-c s to t h e atte ntion and concern of 
t he P u.:cty 1 the g o ?ernmen t 1 and the 'ilhole Soviet p e o p l e 1 o ur 
t-I avy ha s de veloped j_n full o.cco:cda nce ·~.-1 ith t!1~ 2 i ms c:md missions 
o f a great nava l po1·1e r c:md plays c::m i rr:porta nt rol e in t"he cl.e-
13 
f cnse c apabi lity of the father l anO. . " ~he article asserted 
that the S o v iet :·Jav_y hc:.s everything r equired j.n coordin2 t:Lon 
fa therlcmd and t he other s ocial ist coun t ries . Th us 1 by i mp l i -
c a ·tion 1 the o -ther servi ces rnu.st also have all tha t is requ ired . 
Thi s opinion was def ini te ly not shared by i\ r my s p ol-ces;n.en such 
a c• ~· Larionov 1 Rotmistrov 1 and Miftiev. 
During r;; a ·vy Day c e l ebrations 1 Soviet Nava l · sa.tisfaction 
. 1 4 
wi th the status quo was reaffirmed by Admira l Gr i shanov . A 
photog-raph of Sovie t mi ss i le submarines c:.ncl. destroyers ~v-as 
1 2 . "Na straz h e morsJcilch rube z h e i" ( On cruard ove r the sea 
defenses ) 1 Kr2._snc:tya ::-.:. ve :<.da 1 July 1 3 1 1 96 S c 
1 3 . Ibj_d . 
1 4 . "I·~a straz hG norskil<h rubezh e i otchiz.ny " 1 0ra. sfl_~~ 
Zve ;(.rJa 1 ,Ju.ly 7.4 1 1 955 . 
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printed ~,v ith the caption "formi dable submarines and surface 
• missile c arriers nml c onsU_ t ute the basi c strike force of the 
1 5 
fl ee t •••• " 
• 
• 
If the Sovi e t Ar my a nd Navy were not speaking with one 
voice o n mili t.ary ma tters , n e ithe r Has the p olitical leadership 
unified . Speaking in Bal<:u. in Hay , 1 96 5 , N. V. Podg·orny , the 
So v i e t head of state , said : 
There ·v?a s a time \·ihe n the Soviet peop l e d e lib e rate -
l y accc pte ('1_ c e rta in cll2.teria l r es tric·tions in the 
int.e r ests o f the pr i o rity deve lol~r:tent of h eavy in-
dustry a nd the strengthen in g o f our d e f e nse capabi li-
t y . Thi s ',la s f u. lly justified , b eca u se i t i s pre - · 
ci se J.y p roc\.J.c'c i on ':·Thicl1 i s t .he material b a sis for 
the g-ro~Ith of c u l t u re an d of tr1e \vc l fare o f our peo--
ple , o.no. a d e fence l ess socia list s·tat.e v.:~m ld have 
bee r! i n e vi ·t a.bly c r u s h e d by i mper i alis m. 1 ·-) 
P o c1gorny i mplied t ·ha ·t the se~ i deas are n o longer correct . In 
thi s regard , ne i-·Ia s echoing aln o s t e ;(a.ct l y the words of Khrush-
chev i n h i s speech of Janua ry 6 , 1 961 . 
Spea.Jdn 9· a f e ;,-r days J. u.·t er , i'-1 . ~~ . Su s lqv , viho h ad lor! g 
-
d emonstrated an ant i pathy 'co " goulash commun i s :rn " , s_9ol<e out in 
oppo s i t ion to Podgorny. Speakin g in Bulgaria , Suslov said : 
1 5 . 
16 . 
In cond i t i ons \-1i1ere i :npe:cic=t li s t poue r s pursue a n 
arms race and u n l eash mi li tary aggression i n vari-
ous parts of t he world , our party and go vern men t 
mu s "c main·ta i n the c.efense of t he country on the 
hi gh est. 1eve l ••.• All th i s , o f coti:c se , demands f rom 
the So vie t peopl e c ons i derab l e :;10. t e rial sacrifice s , 
expend i b1 r es o n defense of a s i gnificant portion 
I b i d ., Ju l y 2 5 I 1 965 • 






o f t h e nat iona l 1ncome . -
By mid - July , P r emi e r Kosyg-i.n , v1ho h ad previou s ly stra dd l e d 
t h e f enc e on t .he i ssue , c ame out aga inst " econo;n. i z. in g- on de -
18 
f e nse". 
The n e xt round of discussion was played out o n l': a·vy Day . 
On t h e occas ion of the t•,Je n t .ie t h ann iversary o f the d efea 'c of 
Ge r ma ny in ·•·orld ·.'ar I I , ea. c~."l of the f. o :1r S ov:L ~ ·c f l eets (B l .3. cl< . 
Sea , 3a l·t i c , I'i o rthern , anc3. Fa c i :E ic) via s a'i7a r dec1 the o rder of 
t he Red l3anne r fo r :L ts ex:o l oi t:s in ·t h.~. -t: ~ .. 12:.r Q ( l:- 1:-e viou s l y on J.y 
t he £)a l t i c r l ee t had ach i eved ·t h i s honor. , for c.c t ions in t .he 
Revo lu. tion ). On this anspi cio:J s occas ion the c 1.,1ards 1ile r c made 
by fou r r<1embe r s o:E the Pres i d ium: Xosyg :i. n , Podgorny , ::Z i r j_J.enlco , 
and Sh e l ep i n . Each took t he occa sion to e xpress h i s views on 
t h e q tJ o st :L on o f d efense . 
Speaking before t he office r s and the me n o f the Nort}~rn 
Flee·t , Sh e l e p :Ln t.alked a.bout. t h::o g r ea t cl.es f.:ruction of the l ast 
vlo.l' , em.J.:rne rat i ng- a lon~T li s t . o f cl.is r0.a l fi 9"...1 r e s , c on c l u c:t :Lng 
wi th. t he f a ct tha t 20 mi llion So v i et citi~en s oer ishe d i n thP 
" Thi n k , co;c:rade r~ , a bout t h e f>e f i gurcs 1 " ' . ~ n e SalCl o 
much l abo r , t ea r s , an6 b itterness o f t h e Sovie t peop l e i s t h e re 
behi nd t h em . I-loH mu ch p ov,re r a n d ma t e r i a l was r equ ired to re-
b u ild a ll o f t h i se " 1 9 I-ie wen t: on to say tha t i t had been r ebuilt 
i n a. short time , but h e h a.d made a. strong point a.bou'c t he t erri-
1 8 . I bid . 1 J u ly 1 :2 , l 965 c 
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ble destruct i veness o f a war which h ad been fou ght with con-
• ventional weapon s , and by imp lication , the even more t erri -
• 
• 
b l e destructiveness of a nuclear war . He extolled the deci-
sian o f the !'-1arch P l enum to i mpro ve the d evelopment of agr i -
c u lture and went o n to speak of othe r kinds o f production : 
At the present time , comrades , the CP SU Centra l 
Committee a nd the USS R Council of Mi nisters a re 
s e a rch in J f or a way for e v en greate r deve lop -
me n t of productive forces , i ncreas i ng the effec -
t . .c ., . ' . :"'! t , . ., . ..r.:: 1venes s o£ proaucc1on ana on nls oas 1 s a £ur -
ther r a i s i ng of t e standard of livin g o f t h e 
p e o p l e , for to the Ce nt,:ciJ.l_So~rn~it!:_ee a.nf to 'ci-1'2 
(:r o·~:.re ...- · nCD.e nt. the n~ i s not at this t i we a more i m-
porta nt t a sk t han to i~orove the lives of the 
Sovi~'c Qe o c l e • .!.0 
ClGa rly , She J.ep j.n had not ch-3. n g ecl. hi s p o s i t ion o f February 
givin g p riority to do.rnef:~t.ic 21 needs 5 
Podgorny had a l s o not rroved v e ry far from his previous 
. . . 
position , but he c h o se to p l a ce the ernphasis o n t.nity r ather 
than armament. ~-Ie rna inJca ined tha t the ·s·tren g t!1en ing o f the 
position of s ocia l ism a n d o f the nationa l -libe r a tion and 
T.-.;orlc i ng-clc..ss rnov c rne n'c s c1el;endec1 on the u nity of a ll these 
f .22T( . orces . . o syg1n , on t he othe r hand , pointed out tha t " ag -
gress i v e forces " h eaded by the Un i 'ced S tate s we r e conductin q 
·-------------
20. Ibid ., ( Emph as i s mine ) " 
21. In vim·T of these t·,w spee c hes o f She l ep i n i t i s d i ffi -
cult to understa nd hoH ?.o 'nan Kolkol,-licz and othe rs have i denti-
fi ed Sh e l ep in as j oinin ~r '.-Ti th Su s lov in 1 965 "in sidinJ wi t.h 
the mi li tary ' s po in t of view in emphas i z i ng the i mportan c e 
o f fu r ther s·trenqthenirq S o vj.et defenses ." See Roman KolJ( o-
w icz , The :=: ovi e t .. ~h li t~r:v c::md t.he CornmunisJc Pa rt;v (Pr i nceton , 





mi li t a ry p rovo c a t ions a ga i nst pca c e -lov in q peo p l e s . " In the se 
con d i t i on s ." h e a sserte d , " the~ Co Tmnun i st Par t .v , h e r Ce ntra l 
Comm i ttee , and the Sovie t Go ve r n men t con s i de r_ca r e fo r the 
s tren q t h e n ·i n a o f the def e n s i ve mi qht of the countr v i ts n r i -
marv d u t y . " 23 Ki r ile n k o , speak i n g- t o · t h e Pac i f i c F l ee t , made 
a s t a tement · s i mila r t o tha t o f Ko syg in. 
By ea r l y Au gus t , the d e ci s ion s eems t o h a v e been made 
aga i n s t econo mi z i ng o n defen se . The l e a d edi t o ria l in the 
Au gust i ssue of Ko:mrr.un i s t de c l a r ed., "In our t i mes equipp i n g the 
a r mec<. f o rces requires enorPlous resources . ?he Par -':.y c:mcl. the 
g o ve rnment ':,'ould r a ther d i r e ct t.hese r e sourc es t o peacef u l 
b r a nches o f the econ omy . But i n Jch e pre s e nt s i t .u a t i on , t o eco-
no~ize o n def ense would mea n to c o mpromi s e t he i n te r es t s of the 
S . . . , 2LL I - , o vle ,: s ta-ce . ·· n u ecerrlDe r , premi e r Kosyg i n announced the 
f i r s t i ncrea s e i n t he So viet de f e n se b u dge t i n t h r ee y ea rs to 
2 5 13 .2 b i ll i o n r u b l es . 
Nava l spokesmen cont i nu e d to e xpr e s s sat~sfact ion wi th 
t h e sta t e o f the Sovi et Na1.ry , a n d De fense 11i n iste r Ma l inovs ky ' s 
a ddr e ss to the 'I'>t,'enty- Third Co n g-res s o f t he CPS U ind i c a ted 
t h a 'c t he y h a d eve ry c u.u se t o b e p l e a sed . r'la l i n o vsky ga ve a n un -
prececlen·ted aYP.ount o f aJct e nt i on to t h e Na y-y in hi s speech o n 
So v i e t defen s e . He gave t o t h e s ub ma r i ne mi ss ile fl ee t the 
h onor o f standi n g " s i de by s i d e " vl i t h t h e s 'cr ateq i c rock e t f o r c e s , 
(Emph as is mi n e ) . 
2 4 . Ko rnrrun:i. s t , no . 1 2 , 1\u gu s t: , 1 96 5 • 
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26 
which had p r evious ly b een t he g l amour se r v i ce . Ma linov -
• sky a sserted t h a t t h e Ru ss i a n s h ad. r e c e i ved n e'il and. p owe rfu l 
•• 
• 
mi ss ile sh i ps a n d an i mproved an -ti s ubma r i ne capabil ity . He 
took t he occu s ion t o ann o unce t1:e co-:-np letion o f a subme r:;re d 
ci rcunm a viga t i on o f t h e g· l obe by a group o f So v i e t subna r i n e s 
27 
a few day s bef o r e the Con g r ess It was i n t h i s s ame spee c h 
t ha t h e announced t.he comp l et i on of the " Blue Be l t fo r De f e n se " 
\·lh i ch appa r e nt l y i s connected \:' i th aton-l.ic po;.Iered ::O"JDr:\O.rines 
28 
an(J :i_ n sor:-te ua.y 'tl i ·th t .J.·!e jus t. - co:D_p l e ·tc d circumna vi -}a tion. 
:Cn the rr.eo..n t i '-'<e , a 118\v round in 'che strategic debate !nd 
an art i c l e a t.t.ack :i_ n q t he madera t:.e v i e':iS of so~1e :mi li t.ary 
thin )~e :cs •·rho in r ecen·t years h ad bE'::en w :i.ll in~;- t o rely on nuc l ea r 
deterrence and t he rationali t y of ~e stern poli t i ca l 2 9 l eaders . 
Rybkin v ehement l y opp osed the i dea t h a t v i ctory i n a nuc l e ar -
mi s s ile •.-:ar '\va s i mpo ss i b l e , and advoc a t ed i ntens ive deve l o p -
rnent o f mili tary teci"-'10 l o gy , i :npro •Je.'nen'c o f t he mi1it.a r y a rt , 
26 . X)(III ~-; ' e zd Ko rn.,.nun i st i ches:<:oi 
( Sten o .::r r u.f i cl:es l<:i Otchct. ) ( lio s c m n 
k oi L i t:eratury 2v., l 9S6 ) , v . l , p . 
27. Ib i d . , p . 4 13 . 
Partti Sove tsko~o S o iu3a 
I zdate l ' stvo P o1i t iche s -
4-12 . 
2 8 . Ib i d ., p . 4 1 4 . In o rde r 'co p roperly an2. l y ze S o v i e t Nava l 
s tratcq:y a t t h i s p oin t i t : '7ould b e h e l pfu l to knm·r \·-ihe the:r: 
t h e a tomic subma r i n e s inv 0 l ?ed we r e mi ss ile -ca r ryin :;r o r a tta c k 
sub ;-n.a rines ( N-cl as s ) . A pho t o :Jrap h p ubli s h ed vl i th the pre ss 
cove r age s h ows one N- c l ass sub~a rine , but thi s i s far from 
c on c l us i ve evi o.ence . The r eport by a specia l c o rrespo ndent 
>·,;ra s cxtrc :-;1e ly vaqu e o n such de ·ta i l s . Se c KraE'~'1a:yQ_ Zvczd~ , 
April 3 , 5 , 8 , 10 , 1 3 , l S , 1 7 , 1 966 . 
2 9 . Colone l E . Rybl.:i n , " 0 sus chnost i mirov-oi r aketno-yadcrno i 
voj_ ny " ( On t h e Sssence o f ·:; orld ,_-; i ce 1'·1i ss i.le-:-l.'h1c l ea r ~ :ar ), 




· and the highest levels of mili i.:ary spending . In short, he 
vmnted a greater allocation of resources to d efense . Rybl<:in ' s 
article touched off a lively d e b a t e in letters to the editor, 
Hhich \·vas still going on in mid-1966. 30 
There ;,.1ere signs that the que s ti.on of military expenditures 
remo. ined a vexa tious one for the political leaders hip. At the 
'I\..renty-third Party Con gress in 2\pril, 1966, it was announce d 
that a new five - year plan was b e in g prepared and would shortly 
b e publishe d. The plan was not, hmvever, . presented to the Su-
preme Sovie t session h e ld in l'mgust. This \VOL1ld seem to incH-
cate that some is s u e of importa nce 1:1as holdin g u p the plan. It 
may h ave b een simply a problem of i mplementing the economic re-
forms and integ r at ing them into the pla n, but it seems likely 
that one of the i mport.ant issues was the question of military 
expenditure s . Early in June , 1 966 , the political leadership 
delive red a numb e r of e lection speeches vlhich we r e indicative 
of the poli tica.l difficulties the l eadership Has experiencing 
on the mili tary question at the time . Both Brezhnev and Kiri -
lenko delivered s peeches strongly inclined · tm1ar d increased 
defe nse measures . Kirilenko decla r ed , "The Central Committee 
of the Party and the Soviet. Government vie\·7 the strengthening 
o f the arme d forces existing for the defense of the unfold ing 
of socialism, for the protection of the peacefu l l a bor of the 
31 . : . 
Soviet people , as their most i mporta nt task ." The rest of · · 
30. See 1 for e x amp l e , I. Grudinin , "K voproc:u o sus cimos ti 
voiny " ( To the Question of the Essen c e o f <;Jar ), Krasna ya 
Zvez da , July 21, 196 6 • 







the l ev.de r s hip was ovenrhe l ming ly ma de r a t c on t he q ues tion 
of defen se . Ko s y g i n , Podgo rny , Su s lov , Sh e l epin , Mazurov , and 
Polyan sky a ll made mode r a t e s tatemen t s . 
It is parti c u l a rly in te r esting t ha Jc Su s lov , vlho h ad p r e -
vious ly b een i dentif i ed a s a ha r d - line r on defen se que stions 
e ven during the Khrushche v admini s t rat ion , h ad ma dera Jced hi s 
tone b y the su~ner o f 1 966 . Although he h ad not hing good to 
s a y about the -v;es ·t , h e d ic:3. not i den t i f y d e f e n se a s the mo s t 
imp ortant task of the p a rty and the bull<: of. h i s speech vTas · d ed-
32 ica t e d to the ques tion of Party democr acy. Sh e l epin chose to 
e mphas i ze t he measu res t a ken by the Party to i mprov e the lot 
of t he So v i et peop l e . Des c r i b ing measures t aken to i mprove 
the qua li ty o f c onsumer g oods and r a i se pr ices , h e sa i d , 
Th e Pa r ty and t he g o vern:nent are t aking a nd vrill 
con t i nue t o t ake i n t he future a ll measu res in 
orde r tnat our peop l e ea t better a n d d r ess b ett e r, 
h ave prosperity and a c h oice o f attr a c t i ve , go od 
q u a. li ty a nd r e l a tive ly i nexpe!l s i ve g oods and i n 
genera l live b e tter . Thi s i s t he main quest ion , 
i t , s o t o s peak , stands f irst i n t he o rde r of the 
day at a l l P l enums o f t he cc , CPSU , at mee tings 
o f the Po l itburo o f t he CC, CPSU , and in t he oov-
ernmen t .3 3 -
In hi s statemen·t o n the \vo r l d situatio n , h e des c r i b e d the mi s -
d eeds of the Uni ted St a t es i n Vi etnam , t h e Dominica n Re public , 
I 
a!ld e l se\vhere i n >vo rc1s 1t7hich •.,?ere be lliger e n t i n tone , b u t 
3 2 . Ibid . 
33. P r a_yda , J·une 3, 1 966 . She l e p i n i s \vo rth q u ot i n g a'c 
l ength , b e cause h e h3. s bee n i ncorr ectly i dent i f i ed b y a num-
b er o f '.'7e stern obse rvers as a _-Ia\·:.rl< o n defense matte r s . Here , 
as i n o the r speeches , h e quit~ clearly g i ves p riority t o t he 
i mprovement o f t he d omest ic e conomy vli t h cmphc.s i s on con -
sumer goods . 
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singu l a rly devoid of con t e n t. . " Th e Co~<Hmi s t Party o f tne 
• So v i e t Un i o n" , h e asse r ·:::_c: d , "Hill a l vays be true to i ts duty 
before t he frate :.:_·na l coun'cries of socia li sm , _ bef m:e i;ior·ld 
• 
• 
c o -:nsc1un i s m, and the n a tiona l-liber at ion -1-- ., 3 4 ~TIOVCTC\e n'- • Th ese 
hi gh s o u n d i ng wo r ds , but h e d o e s n o t e xp l a in i n concre t e terms 
•:1hat i::.hi s du ty is , and nm·-1hc~ re in his spee ch d o e s h e so mud1 as 
hin t at t he n e c essi ty fo r g r e ater ~efen se C]~pend iturc . 
statemGnt i s typ i c a l o f t he moderate statements i ssu ed by o the r 
p o l it i ca l l eader s a t the t i me . 
a n d the re s t o f t he P o l:i. tburo on t }le ques t:i.on of Dr i ori ties 
ml'i.Y i n f a ct !1av e ho.d .. i tt l e to d o H :L t.h d efen s e :Ttc'. ·i.:. t.ers q .i'\ t 
a b o u t t1e s a~e tir~ , a n e~i toria l a ppea red i n Pravda on t he 
-f t ' J 1 ' ' ] ~ - -. 3 5 perma nG:~. ce o _:: · ns c o . .. e c-c:tve .eac._en:. lllp . Th i s i s i3. c;ro oc1. i ncH -
c ?.t i on 'chai.:. ses e o f the col.le c·t:. :i.ve l e ader:=:; c1ir1 not: at 
time f e e l. a ssur e d o f the ir permane n ce . 'T.'h i s ma.y e / p l a in :3u.s -
lev ' s c cr .c e rn wi t h part y demo c racy in h i s e l ection s p eech. 
Re p o rts f r o :--o orC. i n c:u:· iJy r c J.iab l e s ourc e s r eac·:1e cJ. t he ·:-:es t o.'c 
the time t 1a t Ko s y ;· i n -;, -ra s plannin~j t o r es i g-n 1 o s t e n s ibly b e -
c ause h e wa s 3 6 U.red of fi ghtinq h a .r cl liners on d efen se . For 
"h a r d line r s " 1 one cou l d p robably r e a d " Br ezhne v ". _ 
Th e q ues tiori o f party democra cy continued to agi t a te t h e 
Par t y p r e ss for t h e r es t of t h_ y ear and c e rta i n mea sure s we r e 
t aken t o encour a g e · r e al debate \-·!i thin t h e pa r-ty co:n:r1 i t:tee s D.t 
34 . I b :L 0 . • 
3 5 • 
36 . Lond on T i me s , July 31 , 1 966 . 
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the l oca l l eve l o n aqen das su}::>:ni tted .to t h em by t he loca l 
• par·ty secre tary . 3 7 Th e successfu l i n t r.oduc tion o f r ea l deba t e 
a t t he l o ca l pci. r t y CO!Th! li t tee l eve l wou l d end t h e " rubbe r 
s t a mp " cha r a cter o f the c o m!rd.ttees , thus r edu cing t h e po':Je r 
o f the l occ. l party se c re t a ry and , thro u gh h i m, t h e p m ie r o f t h e 
Gene r a l Secre t a ry of the Party , name l y Leon i d Br e zhne v . Thi s 
mo ve wou l d al so h0.ve t he e f fc c ·t o f en l a r g·ing the deci s ion -
mak i ng e l i·te to j_nc1uc1e t he loca l corn.:-n i ttee mel"i"\bers 0 Those 
who fea r e d tha t the Genera l Se cre t a ry mi ght b e ab l e t o estab-
li sh h ege:-nony c.:; Stalin anci. }(hru s hc!!ev had d one before h i n1, 
"\·7ere ap:p21. rPntly ~-;illing to pc:. y this price. 
}\ s for i.:.he services , the ."\nny con'c i nued to c hafe a t 
party l eader s hip v..nd to a .. } i·ta t e for a more auto:.-1ornoui.> r .)lo i n 
• mi lita ry c:-_; ffair s . .ia j or - Gene r a l Zemslzo v '>ias ~')robab ly des -
• 
c r j_bing a \Iidcsp ::..- c;:~d feel i n g· in t.11e Sov ie ·t 1:\r:ttY v7hen he ':Jr_o t.e , 
" In r ecent years i n t h e f o re.i :;rn press the a t temp'c i s more a nd 
mo re o f'cen made to se~')arate )?Oli t ics from Ha.r , to sho',•i tha t , 
i f y o u p l ease , pol i t i ca l l eadershi p h as lost i ts ro l e i n con-
3 8 
t empo ra.ry Ha r. " 
As fo r the ~·~avy , t:h e j_:-e i s n o ind i cat ion that such s ent i -
me n ts we r e widesp r ead . On t he c ontr ary , t here is e vidence of 
in crec:ts in~J sa 'ci sfaction b y t .he NaV\.f \·:i th its s hare o f r esource 
3 7. See , for examp l e Sh ara i 1 s l e·tte r t o t h e e d i t or i n Pa rti i -
n a i a Zh i zn 1 , no . 1 , Janu ary , 1 966 , an~' P a. r t iiny i Komi t e t-Or -
ga n I-< ollel~ti v no0o Ru J(o voclstva " ( T'h e P a rty Co mmittee --an Organ 
o f Colle c t i ve Leac~.e r ship ) ,Partitna i a Zhi ;;:n 1 , :\: o .J. l , J \ m e , 1 966 , 
p . 3 • 
3 8 . V. Zemskov , " Va,~h:.-1y i F a kt.o r P c:ib e dy v Voi ne " ( The Impo r -
·tan'c Fa c t or o f Vi ctory i n ~- :ar ) , Kr as n av0. Zve.~da , J an . 5 , 1 96 7. 
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alloca tion . Nava l l eaders b egan increas in g ly t o expr ess r ea l 
• pr i de in the role o f the i.·iavy . F J ee t .1.-\dmira J. Kasatonov , F irst 
Depu ty Co mmc:m de r-in-Chie f o f the So v i e t Navy , \vh en as iced by 
ajourna list if the introdu c t ion 6 f in tercont i nenta l ballistic 
mi ss iles h ad no t . d e creased the role of t he n avy r eplied , " By 
On t he c ontrary , the Navy ' s role h a s increased , b e-
39 
c ause the mi ssi l e has a l so b e co:.1e i ts busic c. E nament. " He 
c-:ent on to assert thc..t t~1e Navy n o11 has everything n ecessary 
40 
to repe l any ag~ressor i n coordinat i on wi th the o ther servi ces . 
Kasa tonov l ater boc.stecl. tha 'c " ·the -;,·.,'11 i te and blue f la~y o f t:he 
1.1. l . 
all parts o f t:he 1.7orld ." -- .i\bout the sa:~e t ime h e o. s~;ertecl. , 
" Current:ly -vre deploy Gverything ne cessary for our Nav-_y- to be 
• t .he l eve l o f con t.e!r.pora ry 
. l.t 2 
r equ i:r_·e:nen ts G" -
I ""! Ute n1ean t .L12 , there ;,-;ere gruliing i ndica t j_ons that t !1c 
Sov i e t Navy was o ccupyinJ a more p r estigiou s p o s i t ion with in 
t .he milj_ tary hieraTchy c ~;hen .\d-!:n:Lra.l Fol<:in , F irs·t Gepu t.y 
Co::n:nande r - in-Chi ef of the l':: avy d i e d in 1 96 4 .. , _::\ cl.mira l Go rshkov ' s 
signa-ture to the o b ituary appeared d ire c 'c ly b e lmr t h e F irst 
Deput.y I-:i!d_s t ers of Def ense , ai1d a bove t.haJc o:C 2::a r s ha l Krylov , 
h ead o f t~e Strategic Rocke t F orces . 43 Th at thi s was n o a ccident 
3 9 . Ka.:o:<J.)<hstansl:::.aya P r avd<J. , J u l y 25 , 1 965 . 
42 . " Na 
1 9SG • 
• 
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'li·JaS c onfirme d U?On the dea t h o f Defense >li n i ste r :'-la l ino vs i<y 
• in 1 96 7 , \-The n Go rshlcov ' s na~ne a q a in ar)pea r ed abo ve t hat of 
• 
• 
Mars~:ta ]_ J.'lo s ka l e nko , T-vho h ad r e lievecl Kr y lov as Cow~-na nc1e r --in ·-
Chie f of the 4t1 Str ateqic ~ocket Forces . This would a ppe a r to 
confirm tha t the N"a\ry cur.?:en tly s t a n d s above Jc.he Stra tegic 
His s ile Forces in t11e mili ta ry hie r a rchy 0 
An exa~p le o f t h e i n cre a s i n g concern of t h e p olit i c a l 
l eadc! r s f o r n a v a l :uv.·tt.e r s ap~)e cc red i n 3 r e z hne v ' s spee c h Jco t .he 
Co n fere nce o f Euro;_x~ Ct.n Co:-x[)u ni s t. Parcies c"'- t Kar l ovy Vary , 
Cze c h o s l o v?.}( i i.". i n :~ _9 r i 1 , J 96 7 0 
t h2 Un i ted St atPs Gth F l~et : 
The r e i s n o jus tif ica~ ~on f o r the pe r~anent p~0 -
s ence o f t"11e '"'1i1 i t 2l.ry fle e t. o f 'che TT '3X:.. i n t he 
;da -'ce r s T,,7aS11i n~- the s llO ~("C: S o :Z 3ou t1lc~ r· n -Su.ro~~?G f' r~:1le 
q u es ·U_on i s .r a i sed as t .o ii h:::ti: oc:ls i s t here i ::..: f or 
t he f a ct t hat , 2 0 years a f t e r the e~d of t he Se -
c o tld i ~ o :-:-1('_ Iu r. ·tltc~ Gi::1 1? l cet of ·1:!1e rJ :.::~?~ sa.i ls t i1e 
>Ie cl i t c:; :c r .?..ll.Ca:J. '3ea , ,_l S i !1 ~.J nti 1 ita~}' J:>c1s e s , ~_JOl ... t s , 
and rep 1enish~cnt sta t i o ns i n a se rie s o f Ved i-
t e r r anean coun trie 3 . Th i s c arries wi th i tse l f a 
s e riou.s t.:t rea ~ to -tl12 i n de p e n den ce of a l l c o'l.El t rio s 
o n thi s shor P- c The t i i:1e has come f oj::- t h0 de;na n d 
to r emo ve t~1e G·t h F l ee t f ro .;;t the~ 1'ie d i t erra n e an ::Oea 
t n r e -o' l·--.rl ,_,.; J- 'r' .r-., ,, ·-~ ~ __ __, l _!- 5 - - 0 ...... l J. '-'· .. , ~- \.... .1 .L 1,..J . ..i....L VV..L .... # C ~ 
The re:~1oval o f t i1e Gth F l cc t f roill t he ~~IeeE te rra nea n by t.h i s 
tine Hou l d have h u.d t he ef f e c t o f trans f e r r in ] Naval h oqemo r•Y 
o f the a rea to ·the So v j_ e t i'Javy . 
The sou rce s of the inc r e ased presti g e o f the So v i e t N <::t v--y 
r_,;i t.h Jche p olit ica l l eade r s a r e obs c u re o In a n ega tive sen se , 
4 4·. l~ r c-ts n u.va Zye~da , ;-i p ril 1 , 1 96 7 • 
4 ~ 
-· 
P r a v da , ADril 2 5 , 1 96 7 . 
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it appea r s as t hough the Naval l eadership never cha llenged 
• the leadership and judgemen"c of the Poli tburo to the ex t e nt. tha t 
many Army l eacl_ers did. The consequent establis hment of fri e nd -
• 
ly r e lations wi th t h o se persons located at the cente rs of 
pm-ver may have helped t he NaV\J to achieve its aims in r ebuild-
ing the fleet. Th ese aims were, for the most part, moderate 
ones . The connection b e t Heen tre Navy's mi ssion and the grovl-
ing importan c~ of the Soviet Merchant Marine has already b een 
• - d 46 1\ ~- • 1 K } - • d • r • d 1 f h c1te - . .hClffiJ.ra ~ asatonov 121.8 1 ent1r: 1e t 1e pOi.;er o _ t e 
Soviet Navy Hith the "pmver o f our first class indu.s t ry ", indi-
c a ting the possibility t hat so;-ne ties with industr i a l managers 
' 1 1 ~ t .c ·, th .... - • · '-- · 4 7 r.c t' · · may nave 1e peel o J..Urtner e i'lavy s p o sJ."L .. lOn.- . .L nJ.s J. S s o, 
such ties \\rou l d probably be '"' i th the more glamorous and fashion -
able industrie s associa~ed wi th missile and s pace programs , 
such as electronics and the chemica l i ndus ·try . Such ties might 
als o go far to;.vard explaining the ovenii:1e lming miss ile orienta -
tion of the Soviet Navy of t he 1 960 ' s . 
By t he sumrner o f 1 96 7, Fleet Admiral Go rshJ<o v was able 
to _ describe t he Soviet Navy Hi th pride as follows : 
Tens o f ou r subma rines and surface ship s are con-
stantly located in var ious r egions of the oce ans 
and s e as , vrhere they vig·i1a ntly serve , s a fegua rd-
ing the state intere sts o f the homeland , prote cting 
the l abor o f the Soviet peo p 1e •••• 4B 
46 . See abo ve , p . 52 . 
47 . Kra s n a va Zve~da , July 31 , 1~66 • 
4 8 . P ravda , July 30 , 1 967. 
• 
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He a l s o po i nted out thv.t: the ~Tc.vy p l ayed an i mportant ro l e i n 
• "the stre n gthening of f:r-i e n r.ls}·lip o f our people with the peo-
• 
• 
p l es o f o 'cher c ountries " throu gh fr i end ly v isi t s to vu. riou s 
t LL9 - r 1 ., • , • f , h ·- 1 J sta es . - · ~-...asa ·tonov s oescr l lYC lon o ..:: -c ,e 1~o.vy s ro .. e \·TU.s more 
d i rect . "For t h e firs t time i n i ts h i s tory " , h e sa i d , "our 
Navy h as i n the f ul l sense c hange d in'co a long-ra n q e o ffens i ve 
arm of t.he armed forces . " 50 " Sh oulder to shoulc1e r with 'che S 'cra-
t e<:r i c n ocke ·t Forces , " h e vent o n. , " 'chc:: So viet l·lavy h3.s becocne 
. 51 Co r:1.m.a.n.d. . •· ;:.;:ere , 
cleo. J.:- ly speal<:in:-r o f t i;.e ~-~D.'TY 1 s nuclear Cle t erren·t .:md counte r-
force ro l.c . 
Kas2.tonov <·:en t on to de~'>cribc:; the N<xvy 1 s gTO'.'i i nq p oli·ti-
c::-t l role • ThP techn ica l rearma~ent o f t he Navy i n r e cent y ears , 
h e s 0. :Ld , h acJ. g i ven i:i1e ~ ·r avy 'c:'!e c apabilit.y of " f ulfilling 
mi ss ion s i n cl.istant. re:; i o!!s o f the \.Jorld ocean s \-.Jhj_c~1 earlie r 
'tie r e con s i c1erec1. t!.1.e zo!!e of d o:nina ·U .on by the nav j_es of the i m-
peria list po>vc r s ., " 5 2~~s exuc•<p l es of th i s kincl. of r:l i ssj_on , 
ci'cc:;Cl t he visi ts of t.~1e Sovie t . ~-i avy in the pre c c:;d :Ln :; t u o y ea rs 
to Bu lgaria , P oJ.a n ci , P.u.m<:tnia , Yu gos l avi a , Den mark , S\Jedcn , Nor-
vmy , Finla.nc1 , F.ru.nce , E ti1iop i c.'. , the u.:.1.H , Syria , anCI . .Z·I l ge ria . • 
" Ship vi s its " , 11e obse>. rved , "f:acilit.ate ·the deve lop:nen·t and 
stren .:; t hen in;- of fri end ly r e l a tions b e t •.'.'een t:1e Sovie'c peo p l e 
4 9 . Ibid . 
:;o . "Ha Bo e voi Vakhte ", Kra~naya Zv e?:da , ,J u.ly 3 0 , 1 0G 7 • 
5 2 . _Ib:i.cl . 
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and the pe o p l es o f fore i gn countries , t hey stren gt~en the 
• aut.hority and i nf luence of our home l a nd in the i nt.e rnationa l 
a r e n a . "
53 This stateme nt cleo .. rly ind icate s that ·the Soviet 
N·aval l e<:x1ers a n C::. p roba b l y t h e p oli·tical l ead(:O r sh i p c_ r e be s:r in-
ning to think in t e r ms of the poli t i ca l in f lue nce which can b e 
achieved by the u se of a mobi l e fl eet . Kasa tonov ' s a rticle i s 
al s o i nteres·U.n.; , i n that h e i dent.if :Les the u sefc.1 l ncss of the 
Nc.V.'/ j_n ter:11s of i ·t!"; uti lj_zo. 'cion i:1 · t:L 'ne o f all-out. n u cle21 r 
an(. of U1e politi ca l inf lue~ce .. • 1.. , -•.1l1lCt1 COUJ.C r esu lt 
from i ts use i n time o f peace . he does not exa~ine t ho crrent 
spec'cr1.1.:-n. o:E l.IO :O;s :L})le rrr iJ:L t.ary u.ses of the _.a v y i n bet•Jee n t.h~se 
In othe r wor ds , a d i scuss ion of the poisible 
• t i o n " or ta]\:i n.:_::. 92.rt i n l i mi tec:t v1ars hc..s yet t.o appear i n the 
So viet military pre ss . I f a rliseussion o f these as pects o f 
n et val poHGr has t.al,en p l ace in the Sovi e t Un ion , j_ t has . not ye'c 
en t ered t. e public debate o n stiate9y ~ 
• 
CH!\.P TE R FOUR : SOVIET NP,Vl\ L OPERA'TIONS 
( . 
• One of the b e s t f ounda tions for any prediction of the 
\vay a h uma n organ i zation i s lil<.e l y to a ct in the futu re is 
an e xamina tion o f j_ t s ac t j_on s in hi s tory . Thi s i s not a l"~:Jays 
a r e l i able gu i de , as o u r in te lligenc e expe rts d i s c o ve r ed at t he 
time o f t he Cuban Mi ssile c r i s i s , but i t i s u sually t h e b es t 
guide ava ilab l e . Until v e ry r e c e n t ly , a n e2{amina tion of the 
hi s tory o f tne So v i e t Na vy 'l.vould h a v e l ed to the c onclus ion 
tha t it Has unlil<:e ly to p l a y an i mportan t role i n inte rnationa l 
politics in t he f u t u r e . Such a cor! elus ion ~,vould no long-er b e 
a Sctfe one • 
~\ell in t o the de c a cl.e o f the 1 96 0 ' s , So v i et n'3. va l ope r a -
• t ions v1ere conf i n e d for t h e mo s t part to des i g nated fleet 
o p e r a tin 0 a r ea s , or " polygo ns " , located c lose t o sho re . Le n g t hy 
••  
. c ruises t .o d i s tan t 'lt,7aters 'l.ve r e the exc eption , r a the r tha n t he 
rule , and So v i et seame n se l d o:n saw a fore i gn p or t . In 1 96 1 , 
f o r e x ampl e , t h e gu i ded mi ss ile cruiser Dz erzhinsk.~i t ravel l e d 
a tota l o f 13 , 0 00 mi l e s , a f eat fo r \'lh :i.ch the c onuna nd i ng off i -
c er v·ias v e ry proud . 1 By comp a r i son , i t wou l d no t be unusua l for 
a n i\mer i c a n n a v a l v e sse l to t rave l thi s d i sta n c e in t 'I.-JO months . 
As a c onsequence o f the limi ted o p e rating exp er i enc e o f 
the So v i et ::J a ,ry , j_t wou l cl b e d i ff i c u l t .to e va l uate it at 
1 . "Ral<e tchil<i Kr e i se r a Dz e r z h i n s };:.ii" , Krasna v a Zvezda , 






the be:_:rinn:i.n :; of t he decade c.s a co:up l e tely c ombat - r eady or --
gani~c.o. t:Lon . Since l engthy crui ses v?ere r a r e and unv.ccustomed 
ven·tures , each cruis e \'lets p l anned carE.::fully and meticu lou~3 ly to 
t he smallest det<'.J.il . 2 The very unusua l nature of such cru i ses 
l ed to 'chorough prepar ation. Thi s situation undoubted ly had 
some g·ood p oints , because it l ed to t he m<:•x i mum utj_ li ~~: ation of 
each cruise for tra ining benefits . On the other h and , much 
o f such tra ining was was t ed b e cause i t was not sufficiently 
r cpe t:L-l:i ve . 
The aver·a~:e sprC!cia lis·t in t11e So v i et t-~ avy cl.evotecJ. c:tbou·t 
one c>o.y e ach ·1ceJ( ·to -::.rainj.n7 in hi s speci a lty . l-"lissiJ.e s _:x; --
cial:Lsts , an elite g roup in the L'!a-vy , ;,,;ere ~Ji vo n the ext:ca -
or0.inary s u.:ct of 'ci-JO clays a. ':leek for 'c:cain:i.ng in their special -· 
..., 
ty. -' It -,:o'.lJ. c'l. be diff ic'.1 l t to ·co:npare 'chis Hith 'che situation 
in the u . . s . Na'F.i , but if 'chis i r'.c l u.c:les " o~-;_ --"che -job " training , 
i t doc~ s not seem to be e. 0 1.1q h to achieve a hi ~sh l eve l o f pro-
ficiency . 'T'he re s t of the 'cime i s presumably 'caken u p v?i th 
clean ing· ancl. pre::::erva tion , ~renera l mili 'ccny training , ancl. poli-
tical indoctrina tion . The l atter absorbs an extraordina.ry a mount 
of each seu.man ' s time and cco.u s e:; , . ;idespread resentment. , especia l-
ly a mon0· the office r specia li s t s -v,Tho Hould rather put the time 
to v~1at from the i r st~ndpoint wou l d be more product i ve use. 
The consequ ence of this limi ted read iness for Na va l 
----- ----------------- --
2 . "Dol ' shomy p o J(hody - bol ' shayu. pod:;:rotovl-:a : (F or a lon g 
crui se - g rea t prepara tion ) , Krasna ya Zvezda , May ?2 , 1967 . 
3. " RaJ<:e'cchiJ<:j_ F lo 'c.a " 
n ~Y5::_ Zve7c':et , I'·l0.rch 10 , 
U·!i ss ilemen of the Fleet ) , Kras-
1 062 . 
-69-
ope r a tions i n distu.nt wate rs were dramatica lly demon s t ra t ed 
• 
i n Oc'co. ec , 1 962 , d urin g the Cuban r-I i ss ile c r i s i s . It i s not 
knovm vihct:he r t he Soviet l eaders seriously considered " . senctlng 
a surface ship escort. ,., i th 'che So v i et CC!. r~JO ships carrying 
missiJ.es to Cubil in orc!.er to cha llen ~re the Amer ica n qu.arantine ., 
If this p o ss ibili t:y v1as conside red , hm·reve r , i t mu st. h a v e b een 
quick l y d i s~is sed . A Nava l force ~ ccustomed to met iculous 
planninq and preparation for tra inin~ c ru i ses could hardly b e 
ex:;:)cc·tec-:. i:o r cs]_::>oncl. so re:,;::>i.dly to :-neet an o pera t ion 21.l req uire -
men·t o 
to t he c~uet rantine by ~s ing hi s sub:'1ar i nes to s inJ( an ~\.mc r j. can 
ship i f a So v i et shi ~::> 
Un f o rtuD.:=t t .c J.y f o:c X:hr ushche -, the E:: ub:0c'.rL1e i s a. part.icu -
• l a rly inappropr iau~ •.-.:eapon t.o u se for a ci. i screte D .. pplica -t: ion o f 
:\ surfu.cecl su"b:"i'.·::l rine i s c:-xt:.re:ne J .. y vu.J..ncr.:::ble <1nCl. 
defense l ess . h. sub:.-ne r ~rcd submu.r :L ne i s inv i s i b l e and therefore 
u se l c~;s for t:.he p' .. 1.r p o se o:.f de n:o nstr.a t .in ::7 c orrur it.ment t o a 
course o f act i on . If the So v iet l eader s h ad v1u.nted to raise 
t h e v. n-ce i n the 0ame o f confrcn 'ca tion off t:.he coas t o f Cuba , 
c:t s qu.acl. r on of st1.:>: fc1 .. c e e scort;; acco'n~anyin ::-r t .he Soviet carq o 
ships \-Tou l O. 1;.cc ve b een mor e c :ffecti ve . · The evidence ind icates 
tho. J-.. t:r1is 0 9t:. ion ·,.;c:~s cJ.or;ecJ. to the So viet deci s ion rtl.ake r s due 
to the l ack o f r eadiness of the Sovi et surface fleet . 
Thi s d e monstration of the s hortcomings o f the s urface 
4 . Ro :;e r Hil s ma n , 1o .i'·l_ove g. Fat ion ( Ga rden CiJcy , N .Y. : 
Doub J.. ec1uy anc1 Co::n_9a.ny , 1 96 7 ) , p . 2 14 • 
• 
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l'~ avy ~- us·t ha v e stren 0 thr3ncd the hand o f tho s e fo-;:- v1ho~e~ Admiral 
• Isalcov h a.d s p oken 'Vlhen ho. sa icl. , "Hhi J. e t h e :r.e ex i s·ts a :nercha nt 
f l eet , nothing except a military n a.vy can gua r ant.ee i ·ts sc.1.fety 
o f movement a lon g sea rou tes " , and for thi s purp o se "you 
d . , L ~ ~] ,S ., d . J G " 1 ' c aD_,_Q_()_t o u l·tnou ·c. a surr ace r .eet • A nura _ or stLcov s state --
ment in the HV.ke of the mis s ile cr i sj_s tha t . " The Sovie t Navy 
i s ob l:L~-rec'l. by t he c ha ra.cte r of j_ ts arm.a;nen t of h:L ghly ma. n e u -
verable force QDd mili tary weapons to be prepa r ed a t any mo-
2'. ny p oint o;J. g lobe ·to sec·o.:co the d e f e ns e 
ma rine fore~ , h~;ever • 
• 
p o:ct. , "The Co~-~lr,t'Uc1 i ~::; ·t Party ancl. ·the · So v i e ·t ~rovernTGEm t a.re d i s --
p l 2yi n -7 'J isc fore sj_gh~: , ~ :::•. \:in :,:r a J. l peasu.rcs to i n'"urc th~.t- the 
ing r ole i n the defen s e o f t ho country , 5.n the };)ro 'c.e c tion of 
-i n'· e rer•·'-c• ,7 n o--•r..ur,r ~- ...... L.. - .:.....:. L.u • _ ... , , ._.,.. ~: _:.; I h e indica~ed t ha t t he ma in 
effort i n thi s cl.:L r e c·tion 'J2.s diro. ctecl. to the o.nd of bet·ter e -
quip~::Ji rq t!1e r:avy to :) l ay an i mpo r ·tan·c .1:ole in 2.11 - out n u c l ear 
':Ja r c "P r.oce ed in~ f:corn t he p o s i'c:!.ons of our :r1ilitary doc ·trine , 
ancl. Soviet. t~aval t~10',l~_ri1·t , " -h e sa id , "unified vie~ils o n thP ro l e 
s . 23 , J u:1 e 9 , 1 962 . 




ancl. p l<.cc e of the n avy i n 
h ave b een worke~ , f3 out ~ 
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::! • J._ 0 conn. J_ Llons of_nuc1ea r-~:Lss ile wa r 
S o me i ndica ·t: i on of i-·7ha t Go rshlcov h a d i n mind \·Jas g iven 
i n l1c.rch , "l.\7h e n a group o f four S oviet n J.vo.. l Tu.- 95 a i rc r aft 
rr.acle an o-verf li -:=;ht. o ver the Uni ted St ates a j_ rcre:c ft carrier 
9 
Con_§teJJ,.a t.:!:_()il: GOO mi l es s o uthr.·Jest o f Ivl i d1.-•72.y e I n J une , s i x 
S o v i et n J. v a l Tu-1 6 Badg·er aircraft. f l e'/' nea r the a i rcraft. 
c arr i er Ran .::re:c 3 3 0 miles e as-t o f J a pan a s s h e s·toarncd tm1a.rd 
the On i·t e d. S tates . 
1 0 
I Jc \12!::~ to beco:·ne stancl_c,_rd procedure 
afi.-:r.r t.hi s for _ ,, ~~1eric2n o.ircraft. c:=J.:cc j_ers t n tr2.ns:i.·:: to the 
S j_xth a n C:!. ::;evc-:nt~r: F J eets to be su.bjected ·to over:C 1iqhts b y 
cr:LberJ. by u. So,.r i c·:: n c.va. l off icer v. s early as r-:ay , 1 9G l. Cct D -
~J lnerability of 
C "' r ri r-r .:..::-, s 1r -i''orc·"'S noJ· ,, J- e. ,.-1 011.,_ t'~-1r>t C.-\...._ __ _ _. . l...C .. .... J· . ·- '-· I .::- . LJ. l-_.... .. -·'- _l r:..l rn.ode rn rad io i nte11i -
gcnc e can l ocate a ship ' s p o s ition to within 5-6 perce nt o f the 
ran 0e . " ~"7 i ~.:h t.!-1i s a.ccuracy , " h e co~clment.ecl , "i t i s p o ss i b l e t o 
d i rect submarines and shore - b ased a irc raft to i nte rcept t h e 
11 
ta s J< forc e o ' l 
i nfra red t e chno l o gy , hydroa. cou s t i c a.nc1 rad io d.irec·t i on - f ind in g , 
h e c1cd D.e c1 , uould mc>.J<:e :?ossible a strike aga i n st a c a rr i e r 
--------- -·---- -----
8 . I b id . 
11 . V. Lan 1 "Pereot.senJca i:sennos·tei" ( P.ceva lua tion of ·t he 
c o st ) 1 Krasnaya ~ ve~~a , May 24 , 1 96 1 . 
• I 
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t ask fo rce of s uff icient a c cura c y to a t l e as t s erious ly r e -
• 
duce i ts co171b2 t. r eCJ.cb.ne:=:s . 
'l'ha Jc th0.sc opc r a·t i o e1s \"?e r e i nt.ended i n p art to d emon -
stra t e the v u l n e r a bi l ity o f a i rcra ft carr i e r s unde r nuc l ea r 
wa rfare c ond i tions i s r e vea l e d i n s u ch s t atement s a s thRt o f 
l'ldm i r a l Go r s h Jcov \·7ho said , " I n a serie s o f i n s t a nces ou r sh i p s 
and n ava l -a via tion h a v e derno ns tra t e d e xamp l e s of ope r a tiona l 
a n d a c t i ve · ct i ons , as a r esul t of which s o me fore i gn g o vern -
ments bcca~e convinced that t hey could not con s ider the ir 
12 
o f '""a r . " !·!ore to the point , hm1ever , "~:Jas t.ha t these o pc :ca tions 
served as a gra~:Jhic i. llu.st:cat i on o f the · v a. lid i Jcy of i:he claj_,ns 
• mi ss ile - cc-1. rry i n;; cl_viat:ion is capab l e of render i nc; tnern Lca.rr i er 
task f o~ccesy· cJos ·truct.ive }:>lous ':iithou-c. entcrin:~r t':Je i:c- z on8 
• 
13 
o f cLntia ir cl.e:Een::;e' ' . 
At t h e sa~e ti~e , th~se ope r at i ons a l so strengthe ned t he 
c ase o·( Khn1shc~1ev uga i nst the const:::-u c t: i on of surface vesseJs . 
He t.old i·Ia r o l ci ~i il son , l eader o f t he Bri t :Ls h Labo r ? arty , d u r -
i n g a 1 '16 3 vi E' i t th<:J.t t he So v i e t Un i o n "'1as n o l onge r bui l cling 
surface \•7ctrshi ps beca1.1se o f the ir vu l nerability t o rn i -·s i1e 
1 LJ. 
atta. c k . Th i s 21.ppea rs t.o ha.v~ repr esented \vi shfu l Jchink i n g on 
Khrus11ci1ev ' s pa r t , bc c a1.1Se U1o2 surface s h i p p r ogra:-!1 con ti n u ec1 
i n t h o So v i et Union . However , t h e modes t c h a r a c te r of the 
1 2. "F la t v b ol ' shorn p1 c... van ii " , Krasnaya. ~_j ve7.da , I-:arch 2 1 , 1 96£, . 
1 3 . I' 'ia j or -Gen<~ ra l ( aviat i on ) :~ . ~uban , "lJad ol<:eu.nsk i mi g l ubi -
n arn:L" ( Ov,_.r the oc0.an c1epths ) , lC:casnava ~~vP~c1a. , ,June 5 , J. SG 3 . 
14 . New Yo rk T i~e s , June 1 1 , 1 96 3 . 
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bu ild in~r progr a.rn may i n cJ.ica te 'c ,1at Khrushchev '•laS a ble t o ho l d 
• t h3 J. j_n e aga in s t a more a rnb i ·ti o1..r· p rogra '-:t. 
As the u . s . P ola ri s p roq r am pro~eeded , n ava l of f i c e r s 
be ga n express in ~ more and. mo r e conce rn for the ant i s ub1r.a rine 
Th i s conce rn wa s r e fl e c ted i n the cha n q in g pa tte rn 
o f surface s hip operations , as we ll as submarine o perations . 
Not l ong after t he Un i ted States be ~an deploy i n? P o l ar i s s ub -
roar i nes i n the :1ed i torranec.n ils J\. .p:Lt.er miss :Lles t·Te r ~ \<i i th-
appea r morP f r equ e ntly in t~at sea . 3y t he sum~e r of 1 964 , 
15 
So v i ei: n avc. .. ' u:<:i.ts ,_,;ere a fre.::-.ruent. sL;ht i n t .he i-lecl.iterranean . 
Often Sovi et nava l u.n i ts '~'ou ld stean s i cl.c by sic'l.e Hi t.h ~:,'":lej:-ican 
t ask forces for days at a t i~e • 
• I n the Pac i f i c , beg i nnini i n rn i d - l 96A , So v i et n ava l 
r.i'}!ese s;-na ll ta.sJ-c f o r-ces ':.·ie r e qu i ·te o :C t e n en -
gaqed i n e x e rc i ses 0. s s o c i a ·t ec1. '·'' i 1:}1 c.n t i s u b:"Di'l.r :Lne \;iar:f are . 
Th ey began to t ake n J.ace o n a r egu l a r bas i s n o t long af t e r 
a Polar i s subma rine fac ili t y was opened on Gu am ( a t t he e as t -
ern E::d9·c o f t:he P h :Lli9p ine 3""2. ) anc-:. P olar i s su.brnar j_ ne s v1e r e in -
trad uced i nto t he Fa r ~ast . Th E;se o perat i on s He r e folloT".red 
qu i t e close Jy by )\n.l..er:i. c an n ava l u n it.s . Vice Admira l D. K. 
Yaro s h evic11 , ChiE~f o f S t a f f o f ·the Sovie 1: Paci f ic F l ee t , ad-
rni t t ed t hat du ring t hese o per ations s o me Sovie t s u bma rin e s 
h a d S'.1rfaced n P.a r U . s . ships in t he Phi 1 i pp inc Sea "wh e n t£--,ey 
. I 
• 
l or.:. Ll. 
-- -" ..._, - . 
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h ac'l. fini s h e d the ir exe rci se s " 1 but d e nied tl12 t the y >.ve re 
• force d to surfa c e b e c ause of l\me r ican a nti s ubma r ine profj_-
cicm cy ( a~; .:;dmi ra.l £1ay.-Jard 1 Co mmander of l\me rican ,:int i sub-
l G 
ma rine ;: arfc.re Forces 1 Pa.c i f ic 1 h ad cla i med ) . It was not 
wi ·thoui: reason t ha.t . i\d:mira l Go rshkov c a lled 1 964 "the y ea r 
of the r ou t i ne lon g- cru i se " . 
Anothe r form o; S o viet nava l powe r which ha d lon g bee n 
familar to -~er i can nav~ l forces a l s o increase~ its l eve l 
Th ese ves s e l s 'Je r e CJ.t fir s t. b u.il t o n i:he c oove :r.t.cd hull s of 
sJcancla:r-0. o cean -going fj_ s hing tra 'J7l c r c'i.es i q n 1 but h o.ve never 
ma.de anv p r c=: ten c P. a Jc b e i n ,J fi shin g bo::t t .s . Th e ir confi :~ru ra --
• tion i s qui te d i ffe r e nt fro~ s t a n 0 ard fishi ng trawl e r s b u ilt 
on the s ame h 11ll , i n th3. t ·t r ,e y c 2 r r y a l ar.'}e a rray o f ele c-
t ronic equip~~nt a nd spe cia li~ed a nte nn as . Th e y fly the en -
si gn of t11e Sovie i: ci ava l Ilydro:;rap h ic Service and cla i ,..o t o b e 
In rece nt y ea rs , t hey are often 
found in the c om9any of .;.me r j_ca n c a rri e r tas}( forc e s . They are 
also loc a ·ted }?e r ma n c ntly on station n ea r thP. P o l ctr i s base at 
Guam , Holy Loch , and Charle ston , and s ince 196 4 o ne has been 
con tinua lly o n station a t "P oint Yankee " obs ervi n:::r U . S . 
o p e ration s off t he coa st of Vi e t Na m. The United S tates has 
r e cip rocated with a s i mila r s u rve illa nce effort. 
/\1 1 o f this a c i: ivi ty by a n a vy accustorn2 cl. to l enqthy 
• 
l C II ::Je l<l CJ.'n::-1 l• del' c.:+-vl' f-el ' no ;:: ·t ' " , TT · a r "' r:J V "' 7. C>'7-'J- ' ·f 1 ') ~~ • '"- • __ '"' " ~ ~ ~ _ l '- l c · 1 •2.L_~Vc'~~~ 1 ! ' <Cl Y _ - ' 1 




had fini shed the ir exe rci ses", but d e nied tha t the y were 
forced to surfa c e b e cause o f American anti s ubmarine profi-
ciency ( a s }-\dmira. l Hayvm r d , Commande r of Ame rica n }\ntisub-
16 
marine v7arfare Forces , . Pacific , h a d claimed ) • It \-las not 
\·J i thout reas on tha.·t Admiral Gorshkov ca lled 1964 "the year 
of the rou'cine long cruise ". 
Anothe r form o f Soviet na val pov1e r which had lon g bee n 
fami J.a r to Ame rica n nava l forces a lso increased i ts l eve l 
o f activity dur in g 1 964 . This is the group of inte lligence-
gathe rinq ve sse l s usua lly de s cribed as inte lligence "traHlers ". 
These vessels were a t first built on the conve rted hulls of 
standard ocean-going fi s hing tra vller design 1 but have never 
made any pretenc e at being fis h ing boats . Th e ir configur a -
tion i s quite d i f f e r e nt ·from standard fishin g trawlers b u ilt 
on the same h u ll, in tha t t hey c arry a l a r ge a rray of elec-
troni c equipment a nd spec i a lized antennas . They fly the en -
sign o f the Sov i e t Naval Hydro graphic Se rvice and cla i m to be 
"hydrographic vesse l s "• In r e c e n t y ea rs , t hey are of ten 
found in the company of America n carr i e r ta sk forces . The y are 
al s o loca t ed permanently on station nea r the Pola ris ba se at 
Guam , Holy Loch , and Charles ton, and since 1964 one has b e en 
continually on station at "Point Yankee " observinq u. s . 
o pe r a tion s off the coast of Viet Na m. The United States has 
r eciproca ted with a simila r survei llance e ffort . 
All o f thi s a ctivity by a navy unaccustome d to l e n g thy 
16 . "Reklama i deistvi t e l•nos t ' ", Kra s11.aya Zvezda. 1 Nay 1 3 1 
1965 . 
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o pe r at ions a t sea was no t unde rtake n without dif f iculty , 
• There are r epeated r eports j_n the milita ry press o f short -
comings in the operationa l r ead iness of fleet units. In o ne 
examp l e , a ship was no t ified o n l y a few days i n advance t hat 
it was to t ake part in a mis s ion far from shore o f imp orta nce 
to the traihing p l a n. Despite strenuous efforts by the com-
ma ndin g of f ice r to tra in hi s crew ade qua t e ly for the o pe ration , 
-v;rhen the sh i p arr i v ed o n stat ion it •.-ms discovered tha t th(~ 
shi ~.) ' s spec i a li sts ':Je r e not able to receive the requ i red t a r -
CJ.a t a , and th:; ooera t j_on •,ms unso. tisfactory o onu s for 
t he failure in this case ,,.,2s p l a c ed on the staff for no t allo\·i -
ing the sni:o SUff i c i en'c ti 't1e for preparation ~ \ ·i i t.hout kD Ovl --
in ; the Cle·ta ils , i t. -:ould be diff icult to e va l u a t e t)1e incir::lent , 
• but it s ee r.1.s t.o 9Taphica lly cJ.er:tonstr a t e 'che 0enera l l a d e of 
• 
r e.?J'l iness of t .he Soviet :::a vy a.-t 'chat: t i Tr.e . 
These cl.i ff ioJ 1 tie s have by no :-nea ns been overcome. L> 
r ecent artic l e co:11p l a in sd that <11hereas in forme r times the 
Soviet: 1-!avy opera.ted close to shore a n d se l clow. \·Jen t o n long 
voyaq2s , the ve ry un;Jsua 1 nature of t hese l onq voyage s l eO. 
to t horough prepa ration . NoH t hat. such voyages are corn . ..-non , 
i nsufficie nt attention i s pa i d to pre - voyage p r eparation. 1 8 
Ot he r artj_cles co:cr.p 1a in of the failure of nava l commande r s 
to c a r ry out th2 t rain in g o 1a n \Jhen the y are dep loyecl. on O )) -
17. "Uspel<h p o l:::hod2 g o ·tovH:sia '-' b a20- " ( Success of a cruise 
i s p r epanxl. at t 11e base ) , Krasnay a Zvezda , Apr il 1 8 , 1 96 3. 
1 8 . "Bol ' sho1ny p ol-ch o cl.y - bol ' s h a ya p odgotovka ", Kro.sna.ya 





era·t iona l . . 19 - . m l SS lons . Lt l S apparent from theE:e a rticles that 
the So v i e·t Havy has not yet been ent i re l y successfu l i n 
b a l ancing training w ith o pe r at iona l r equ i r ements . T'his pro b -
l em VJas in tensified by the dec i s ion l a s'c y ea r to reduce the 
period of ob liga ted s e rvice o f draftees i n a ll s e rvices by o ne 
y ea r . Admira l Kasatonov des crib e d t he problem succinctly 
\vhe n he observed , " The p e riod of service of pe r sonne l h as 
20 
shor-tened , but thr:; mil itary p r eparedness must i mprove ." 
~ great d e al of attention has been give n in recent y ears 
to t.h2 p :r.o:-:J l c ;n of j_ n crea sing t>1e mo!:;~ ili ty a nd r e lia.bility of 
the sub:r.arine force . :G v e n thou~rh the subma rin e ·>ia s toute d 
t.4. s t 1le "main st ik in ~r fo;cce " of the 0lavy , So-vi e·t sub:na rines 
h a d lon g b een plagued wi th reliabi li t~ p roble ms . 0:-~ occ a sion , 
i t beca~e n e ces s ary t o tow disabled subma rine s back to port 
~ . 2 1 
r or r spa l r3 . That s i ;nifJ.cant prog ress i'ias be i n ; mac'l.e in 
thi s d ire c ·tion ·"'•as i ndica ted by the 1 96 2 c ru i se o f the Len in skii 
22 
~~ o:11 ~_or_no l e ts , a n early H class subma.r:Lne , i:o ·the north po l e . 
Anothe r mi l estone wa s t he 1 95 7 subme r ged circumnavi gation o f 
the g lobe by a grou p of Soviet submarines . Defen se Ministe r 
Ma linovsl<: ii announced at t .h e 'I\v-enty - Thiro. P arty Con g r es s tha t 
the number of len ,Jt h y cruises by Soviet sub:na rines had i n creas -
1 9 . Captain ( l s t ~anl<:) V. i\1amchi t z , "Bo evayu ucheba v p okhode " 
Uhlitary trainj_ng on c ru i se ) , Kra snay a Zv~_zda , .j-anuary 2 7,1 968 . 
20 . Flee t Admi ra l V . Kasaton ov , "i\i a morsl<ikh pros.torakh- vakh-
ta z orkaya " ( On the sea s pa c es - a vi g i l an-t wa tch ), Ko rrumm i s t 
Vooru.:->:1]-ennvkh S i_L No . 3 , F ebruary , 1 9S8 . 
21. d eH Yo:(Is_T i mes , r·1iay 2 9 , 1 963 , p . 8 • 
22. Krasnava Zvezda , J anuary 20 , 196 3. 
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ed in r ecent y ea r s by five times . 23 l-<.dr:niru.l Cors}!l(OV con-
• t c:mds t~~Jat the se o !:-;e r ations by Sovie t. subma rines are the bes ·t 
demonst.rat i on of nthe hi g"h qua li·ty o f the ir mechani sms and sys -
• 
• 
t erns , the f i ne tra ini~g o f the i r seamen , t he c apabili ty to f ul-
fil compl ex mi ssion s i n pro.cticc. lly any region o f the \'lorld 
o ceans . 0
24 
As a c orrolla ry to U1e Soviet. I:1 aV\_/ ' s inc:ceased opera -
tionul activity , n~va l uni ts began to call more frequ ent ly at 
fo re i gn ports . · In t he "yea.r of t ·he routine lon :; cruise " , l 9SLL , · 
the 2-ovict l-: a,.T:\1 macl.e c a J.J.s a'c ports j_n F oland , i~as t Ge r m0.ny 1 
d en , Holland , Syriu , and ~ .._, . . ;- . 25 ,:.u1l09J.a. , among o ~he r. s . In the n ext 
t hree y ea r s 1 FJ~ance 1 ".::ho Un i ·ten A:;~ab ~€'~pub lic , a.nc1 A l ger i e. '.?ere 
26 
a dded to "<:.he l ist ~ 
The increas in ~r frequency of Naval vi s i ts to po.rt.s in 
ln Septe~bcr 1 1 965 1 a gro up 
of de s troyers and submarines called at Por t Sa id . I n l'·!arcc1 1 
1 966 1 five more ships , i ncludin J" a gu i cl.ed mi ss ile . c .r.uiser and 
t , · ..:l , "" t u · '" · d -'= ~ • ~ • • 2 7 In wo suoma r1nes , uoc~cu a- ~or~ ~a J. £or a r 1 ve-aa y VlSlt. 
J"uly , egyp-tian n 3. v a l units vj_si ted Sevastopol ' o n the B l ac}( 
Sea , and in Au :-:; 'St. five Sovie t n a val vesse l s c a lled at A l ex-
23 . XXIII S ' ez.d Komrnunist i chc>s!wi 
( ~tenqJro.fic0es1d_i Ot._chc tJ (~'LOSCOI J: 
v . I I p . L1: 1 3 . 
Partii Sov tskocro Soiuza 
Politizoat , ·Tv. ·, 1 966 ), 
2t:c . s . G. Gorsh]<:ov , "~Jash rnoquchii ok:eu.nsl<: ii flot ", P ravda , 
J'u ly 30 , 1 9 ::) 7. 
25. Fravda , .Ju ly 24 , 1 965 • 
26 . Krasnava ~,~ve zde1. , J uly 30 , 1 96 7. 
27 . New York: Time~ , April 5 , ].966 . 
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five So v i e t ve sse l s , 
• includ in g bvo sub:t1a r i ne s u.nd a gu ided rrd. ss ile destroyer vi s it-
. 2 q 
ed Al g iers. - Each o f these visits included three or four com-
ba tan ·t ships acco:npanied by o ne or t•.vo support ships . 
This increased activity in the lied i terranean Has accompa-
nied by rumors tra t the Russ i ans we r e maJd.ng an effort to es 'cab -
J.i sh bases i n Br:Jypt a nd poss ibly in Al qe ria . Such rumors have 
bee n a recurren t. t >1e:>1e ever s ince the Russia ns be ::rc:m p l aying· a 
more c.ct. i ve :cole i n '~:mr J. C:. affa i rs as e a rly as 1 955 . Ru mors 
ti:-.1e 1 e.nd Here l u. t .er 'heard in connec 'c ion \·Ti t .h thG Jra. nt:Ln~_:r o f 
aid to Indones i a a n d Ct ba • . Such p r ed ic t ion s have yet to be 
bor n e out .• In t he r.!editerranea.n , the So v i e t i'~ av::v !Hs b ee n r e -
• l yin :::r o n ancli.ora.::re a r eas in in t e rnc:t tiona l ,.;ate rs fo."C r ep l en i sh-
::1cn t o f fue l l'tn:1 · p:r: r:)visions , a.s '7o l1 c:ts for minor· :!:"Cpc.i rs . 
So me supper '.: opera t:ions , ho>:ie ver , are faci li ·tel ted by the u se o:E 
port f a c:Lli ties ~ I-1: i-JOuld h Rve to be sa i d :tha t the p rivilege 
o f c a llin g a t Egyptian and Al ge ria n p or·ts probably eased the 
t aslc o f supporting tne t en to t wenty ship s of the Me d iterrane an 
s q u Rdron , but the f a ci litie s provi ded are c6ns ide r ab ly l ess tha n 
would b e provi ded by a nava l b ase . 
~hen the Ar ab-Is rae li c r i sis of 1 967 increase d i n inte n s i-
ty 1 the Soviet Union s e nt. t e n addit iona l naval v e s se l s throu;;h 
the Dardanne lles to augment the force of fifteen or twenty ves -
• 
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se l s a l re0.Cl.y i n the " 1. 30 ,. 2 eGl t erranean . ~s c r i s j_ s c pen ed , 
• the So,_d.et squadro n dep l oyed i n t he 1·1ecl.itc r:can ean i n cluded on ly 
one cruise r . E ven af t:.e r thi s forc e ,,.,a.s a u g:-n.ented , ho11ev e r , i t 
still conf ronted a vast ly s u perior Ameri c a n S i x t h F l ee t i n clud -
in .:; three a ~.:tuck aircra ft carrie r s anc'l. a numb e r of cruisers . 
From thi s s t a n dpoint , the Sovie t n a va l u nits raised more of a 
diploma tic t h <: m a milita ry p roblem . 'This action did , h m·re v e r , 
ma rl< v. i·Ja Jcershed of s o rts i n t he u se of So v j_et n a v a l po\·Te r . 
F o r the fir s t tima , So v i Gt naval u n i ts ~~re used to demon s trate 
f acl- t}1a t only o.f~:e:c i t T;:o.s q u.i te c lear that the Un i ted :S 'cates 
' .. 'as no-t -::roin~; to co·:nG to the a i d o f I'sr0.e l and ai':'t.er j_ t vias 
•  
c l ea r 'chu. 'c I s~ r2. e 1. ;Jc.ls not goj_n~-r t o c:J.dvance beyo:1d 3uez d i d 
o f nava l vis i ts for the purp ose o f de~onstrat in0 ~ ov iet com~it-
:.'nent to :~gyj._-:Jt t .o ok p l ace i n Oc tobe:c f ollO':-;r i n-J 'che s i n l-c i n ;r o f 
the I sraeli c1estroyor B l_o. ~cl~ by Eqypt:i.an b o 2. t s armed \:l ith t he 
?.uss i a n S t yx . . , 3 2 ·c , . . ml SS l_e . . n t n l s c ase , t ne So v i e t p r esenc e may 
we ll h a v e avertGcl a n attack on Su ez by I srae li forces . 
Wh e t he r So v i e t p oli t ica l l eade r s antic i pa t e d t he poss i-
ble p oli t ica l r esul ts o f the ir increase d ope r a tiona J. activi ty 
in the Mcdi terr~nean i s not clea r . Gors h k ov a n d othe r n a v a l 
30 . r:ie'.-1 York l:'i r.,es , I-!ay 3 1, 1 96 7. 
• 
3 2 . Ibj,cl .• , Octobe r 2 S , 1 96 7 • 
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S_?O~<cs r:::e n had stre!:;scd tlle uti li ty of " frien cUy n v i s its to 
• 
o t h e r c ountr i es s i nce at l east 1 965 • I ·t v1a s only after the 
Ar a b-Israeli Jar of 1 96 7 , ho• ..Jever , th0.t Admira l Kasatonov de -
scr i bed these a cti v i ·t i e c in Jce r ms i ndicu. t in q "''- sha r p a -v1a r eness 
of the p oli tical u ses of t he f l e e t . Writing for the mi li t a ry 
p r ess on Nav::y- Day , 1 96 7 , h e sa i d : "ship visits f a cili ta 'ce the 
deve l opment and s·trc~ngthening of friexUy r e l ations bet\,ieen the 
So v i e t peop l e and the peop l es of fore i gn couhtrie s , and thev 
• 
_st.ren .:> the n t .ho aut ho d _ ty_<3 n cl j_nf luenc<~ QL_our hom2 \_g. n{l_ i n ___ thE?_ 
33 




33~ Krasnaya Zvc 7. 0.a_ , J u ly 30 , l 9G 7. ( " }J. · · · ) 
_ '-"m_l? c s J .. s ;:nne • 
CH.!\.P 1'.c. . F I Vj~ : S OVIET Ni\VAL po;mR - 1\N EVALUATION 
• Sovie-t nava l l eade rs cla i m to h a ve put Jco a n end the 
sole domina tion of the ocean s of the world by the traditiona l 
nava l p ovre rs 1 most i rnportantly by the Unit.ed States . The r e is 
c ertainly a · g r ea t deal o f evi d e nce to support this contention. 
F o r t.he fir s t time in his -t ory, the Sovie t Union h cs b e come a 
r ec:tl sea p oive r . The s i qnif i c a nce o f this p o'.'7e r 1 ho•.-reve r , 
varies greatly with vari ous t ypes o f encounter at sea . Al-
Jchou~'(h the Soviet Navy i s undoubtedly pm1erfu l i n many re spe ci:s , 
i Jc suffers from serious shortcomi ngs o 
T _,_, .- ' ' 1 .r- t ' t d. • ' 
-n ~ ne r1rs~ p_a c e 1 £ro m -ne s a n poln~ of the d.es i qn of 
i ts sh i ps , the So v j_e t Na vy i s not a_ b a l anced force by compa r i -
• son 'I'LL th \·Jes-te r n na vies G The mo s t s i ~·nif i cant rna t e ria l shor'c-
c omi ng of the SoviRt f orce i s its l a ck of an aircraft carrier 
c ap0.b :Ll i t.y 0 Th e aircraft c a rri e r in the h ands o f \·7es-te rn 
n a v i es has p rove:! to be an extreme l y fl exible 1·1eapons syste:n . 
I\ n c=tircraf t c arrier i s essen t .i a lly a highly mobile 1 fu lly equ i p -
p od modern a irfield c apable o f l a unch in q aircraf t with a stra-
t egic nuc l ea r c apab ili-ty , supe rson ic interceptors a nd attack 
aircraft , as ·.re ll as a n t:Ls u bma rine a ircraftQ Su c h a Heapon is 
c apa ble o f r ea c t ing rapi d l y and effective ly to mee t the v.1hole 
s pe c trurr. of poss i b l e u ses o f n c.va l p O'ile r , from the shmving o f 
'che f l ag for dipJ.o;na tic purpo ses , thr ou gh limited d emor1 stra -
tion s o f for c e · and limi t:ecl_ Harfare to strategic nuclear wa :r:- .. 
It i s capab l e of pro v i d i n g close air supp or t for troops located 
• - 81-
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far b e yo,.d hostile shores . I·ts c apab ili ty o f esta.bli s hing 
• locu. l air s u periori ty i s incJ. i spens i b l e for the purp o ses of 
facili·tat i ng any amphibious a tta ck U~')On a hostile shore . 
At the s ame time , de spite repea t ed Sovie t cla i ms of the 
vulne r a bility o f c arr i e r tasl~ forces 1 an attack a ircraft 
carr i e r has a highly advanced and powe rful c apability of pro-
t ectin g itse lf aga ins t air attack by hostile forces c For de-
fens e aga i nst subma rines 1 i t depends on t he ;.~,.s:·; capabili t.y of 
i t s escort vess0 l s , as He ll as u p on i i::s o-,.m s peed a.nd maneu.ver ·-
ability. Soviet conf i dence ih the i r a bil ity to detect and de -
str oy carr i er task fo rces seems to r e l y h eav ily on the u se of 
radio i nte lligence and r adi o d i r ection - find i ng , as d i s cussed 
. ., . I I • • J 1 '"1 . 1n Ca?tRln ~an s ar~l c .e . ~ 1l S conf i Cie n:::e may be ~rematurc . 
• Un6er Ha.r·timc c ond i tj_ons i t i s unlike ly tho. i: a carrier t a s k 
force wou l d be ~s i nd i scr i minate i n i t s emi ss ion o f r adio 
si :-;n a l s as i t i s i n t i mes of pea c e ., ":'h e y a l s o p l a ce a grea t 
0.ea J. o f r e liun c e on the fa.ct t ha t: ti1E:y c an l a u nch a n a i rborne 
:·n:L ss :Lle ag2.ins t. a carrie r fro'n b eyo nd the ca.rr i er ' s a ir de -
fen se z o ne . It i s d i ff icu l t to i magine ho•.-J the y will a c hieve 
suff icient c erta i nty o f i dent ification from this distanc e to 
ena b l e the1n t o l aunch a homing mi ss ile. 
The l a ck o f an a i.rcraft carr i e r i n the Sovie t ~'J avy still 
prevents t h em from es t a blishing loca l a i r super iority beyond 
inte rceptor r an ge from any . a irbase s on l and which mi ght be 
made ava ila b 1e to them o 'I'hi s limita 'cion p r e cludes t.he realis-
• 
l. See abovc 1 p . 710 
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tic cont:emp12t ion of amphi~') ious o pcrc;_t: ;j.on s a.qainst a hostile 
• 
shore • 'This i s o ne r eas o n '\vhy i t seer<!S at thi s point unlikely 
tha t the ~c':.Jo h e licopter c a rriers r e cent l y comrni ssioned in the 
So v i et Navy are i nte nded for u se as amphib ious assau l t carriers~ 
Another factor ~.ihich supports th i s scep·ticj_s!n i s tho.t. three 
. 2 
such ships ( a third i s r eported l y unde r constr uct ion ) would 
s eem to be an inord inc>,te l y l arge nt,.rnber to s u pport the limi ted 
force of 6 1 000 n aVel ]_ infantry noi.'l in exi s·tence. 
The r easons for the r eorgan i zat ion o f the nava l i n f antry 
in 1964 arc obscure . 'l'he fo rce i s too small to be of cmy c- i g· -
nificance i n providing the So viet Union with a c 2p2c i ty to 
l eap-f rog 'cheir l and perirnct.er anci. p roj e ct. i::~re ir po>:Ter .abroa.d 
by 'c1 e us e o f a!-:!phi b iou_ s 't.'la rfar<:: ~ r·.:u ch ~,rca ter r esou :cc es ':lOiJ. lcl. 
• h ave to b e inves t ed :Ln bot:h e q uipment and personne l 1 j_ncludin9 
t.he es·ta.b lishtlent: of a fi:xed- \·Tin? a irc.-ca.f·t carrier c apa'b ili'cy 
• 
i n o rder t o rcc.1. l~_ze any se r:Lou.s capc:~ city fm:- amphibious assault 
b eyond cont i guous '>7a ters ~ It i ~ p o ss ible that ope r a tions could 
be u ndertaken in t}re eastern Hed i t erranean usin g a.irbases in . 
B~JYpt 1 b u t the co11 tinued ava ilabi lity of such bases rests on 
a v ery tenuou s p olitica l bas is ~ 
Soviet mili tary doctrine a s expr essed i n various s ources 
c a lls for 'che eve n-tua l OCC'llpc tion o f enemy home t e rritory in 
order to con ~ olidatn victory in th0 nve nt o f a world wa r~ 3 Al-
2 . Nev Yo r k TimGs 1 February 14 1 1 968 . 
3. Sec , fo r examp le 1 v. D . Sokolo'JSki i (ed . ) 1 _E> ovie 'c >l ili-





though t.hc pu.blh~h::;cl_ d i sctlss ion of ho''' thi s mi g ht. be done i s 
sketchy a t b e st , it rna.y be tha t the ST'la ll n ava l infantry force 
reor gc:mized in 1 964 and the rnoacst amphibious lift capab iU. ·ty 
in existe nce in the Soviet fle e t i s a tribute to t h is doctrine . 
Arn;?hib i ous tra.in in g in river and lake crossing techniques i s 
a l so p rovided the Soviet Ar my , and mu ch o f Jche equ i pment and 
tra i ning of Jche na va l a.mphibious forces and nava l i nfantry 
"~:.7 ou. l c1 b e app l:Lcab l e to 'chi s en6 . Eo-;,·re ver , as ha.s a lreo. c1y b 0e n 
point~d out , the concept of a~~hib iou s operat ions against hostile 
bility o f establi shi ng loca l a ir superiority i s a su i cidal o ne . 
For th i s re e:1.son , :L t seems most like ly fro-m a r a t.ion c-1. 1 stand-
po j_ n·t tha~c t he n avc. l i nfc.n ·t.n j_ s j_nte nded for <:'.':nphi b i qus ope r a -
tions in c onjunction ,,_, ith t"-ec:d~cr \·Jarfare i n Euro9e and ;,s i a J 
:i.n c:u:ea.s con·t i ;ruo1.1.s to t he S ovi e-~ Un ion in Ux: event o£' ':Jc:. r , 
r <-1. t h o r t}1a;L for any a!:',phib iou.s CJ.ssau l ts b eyonc!. the oceans 0 
S oviet naval a n d poli tica l l eaders cont i nue t o descr i be 
the ma i n st:d.J<:in~r for-ce of t h e Sovie t Na.V"I.J as the nuclea r -
po':7E:~nx1 subrr:r:t rine o L;_ g· l;:~.nce at ·:cable I shov7S t ha t 1 ~:li thout. 
a doub-!:: , the suh'na rine loo :r1s l r.r~re in Sovie t p l a ns . The diff:L -
c u l ty \·lith t ire submar i ne fro 'Tl the stand~)oint of a flex:i.b J. s 
u se o f naval poHe r , i s t h;:tt the subma rine i s u se le ss i n time 
of pea c e or in time of n on - bel ligeren t cri s i s . This p oint 
should h ave b een clearly de;nonstra ted by t.he eve nts of the 
Cuban ~iss iJ. e cri s i s . Ye t , str&ngely enou gh , the r eaction of 
n asal l eade r s follo;-,Tin g the cri s i s \,las to giv e even rnore a tt.en-
tion to ·the dcvc lop'11Cn t o f t .h2 subma rine . c -~ rit :Lng in 1 96-(, 
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o n e nava l o f f i c er obse rve d t .h a t the So v i e t Navy at the p r e s en t 
• st0.9e h v.d beco:ne " ma inly a s ubrr.a rine fleet , t "he bas j_ s o f \vhich 
i s t h e a tomi c s ub ma. rj_n e , armed wi th mi s s i le s and torped o e s wi t h 
nuclear -vm r heads " 4 rie a ttr i buted t he d omi n a nt p os i t i on o f t h e 
• 
• 
sub marine t o i ts c a p a bili ty o f operating s u ccessfu lly a ga in s t 
a ircraft c a rrie r s and mi s r::: i1e -ca r ry ing s u rfa c e s hip s , e n e my 
s u b marines , and shore t a. r ge t s ., These i d ea s o n the u sefu l n ess 
o f the subma r i ne h a ve r e c u rred Hith monotonous r e gu l a rity i n 
the So v i e t mi l ita r y p ress . I t i s c l e a r fro::n such p u. s sa g·es ·th a t 
the conte:n_l) l i!. t ed role of t he subTr.a. rine c c.n o n l y b e :fu l f illed 
i n time o f \7et r ~ In f a ct , i t i s di ff icu l t t o think of any 
scenario s"ho J:"t of g·enera l ~.,7a r ei t .h e r of the :·: o r 1d ~Yar I I v 3.r:Le -
t y , o r 21. 1 1 - ou t nuc l oa. r \-lct r 1 in ·,-1h i ch Jch e subm2r ine ~ ...  Jou.l d h a ve 
any use fu l r ole . 
F o 1lov in cr I\h rus h c hev ' s s peech o f J a nua1:y , 1 96 1 , some 
n ava l spoke smen , s uch 2s Adm iru. l Isa k o v , defe nde d t h e ro l e 
of the s urface sh i p aga i n s t i t s mo s t extr e me d e t r a c tors , a n d 
o t hers defe n d ed t he ro l e o f t h e a i rcra f ·t in nave. l a ffa irs . 
Afte r about 1 963 , the s e vo i ces o f mild d i ssen t were l a r ge l y 
q 1..1.ie t . It wo u l d appea r tha. t t h e ir ob j e c t ions h a d b een sa t i s -
f a ctorily me t by con tinu in ~r to cons true -c. ne''' sh :i_ p s a n d mi ss ile -
armed c-. i :ccra.ft c Th e pres tige of b oth s u r f a c e s h i ps a nd v. i r -
c r aft i n c rease a f t er 1 9G 3 , b u t i n e a ch c a.se 'che i mpor tcm t. 
r ole a c know l edged ~m s t he r ole o f counte ring Ame r i c an nuclear 
4 . Cap ta in ( 2nd Ra nk ) A. V. Ba s ov i n Bo evoi Put ' Sove t s k o o o 
Voenno - J·1o rsko qo Flgta ( l·io s c m·n Voen i z dc::~l96 4 f:l)-:-'--=--"-
5 9 8 • 
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attack, or "counterforce", and it was stated that the reason 
they novr could pla y an i mportant role in modern conditions \·las 
• that they now also carried missiles . 
Beginning in 19.63 , and even more sharply in 1964, the 
Soviet Navy b egan to break out of the confines of the conti-
uous seas and operations areas and to move into the open ocean 
space s. As one naval vlriter put it, 
During the Great Fatherland ';iar LC'lorld · .. var I_!/ 
fleet ac·tions took place basically in the areas 
·close to shore and i•7e re conducted for the most 
part in operationa l and tactical cooperation with 
the Ar my . Now , taking into account the intentions 
of the imperialist aggressors, and the place given 
to the ir navie s in the plan of nuclear aggression 
against the sociu.list countries , the Soviet Navy 
must be prepared to ans\-rer thern with crushing 
blo-::.vs at nava l obje5tives on the entire territory 
of the ~·J orld ocean. . . 
( 
• Thus, according to the Soviet account , the r eason for moving 
the fleet out into the open sea was for purpcse of defending 
aga inst •destern nava l forces in the event of a nuclear attack 
on the Soviet Union . Events of 1963 and 1 964 ,,,ould seem to 
b ea r this out . The naval air arm b egan · in 1963 to make 
rou tine overf Lights of United States carrie r forces in tran s it 
to the S i xth and sc~venth fle e ts. Early in 1964, after the 
United States began deploying Polar i s submarines to t1•e Medi -
- . . . 
t erranean Sea , the Soviet NavY' began deploying units to the 
' area . Much of this effort v.rould appear to be directed to·v1ard 
deve loping an anti sub narine v7a rfare c apability in order to 
c ounter American Polaris f orces , and a great deal of the Soviet 
• 5e Ibid ., p . 596. 
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effort in the ~~dite rranean ha s a l s o been g i ven to follrn1in g 
• t h e movemen t s and op e r ations o f Amer icc:m u. ircraft carriers ~ 
In a sense , t h e increased r ange of n a val ·v1eapons such 
a s Polaris and carr i er av j_a tion force d t he Soviet Na vy j_nto 
this ro l e . If the range of opposin g naval "''eapon s direc'cec1 
a gainst shore t a r gets increased , then the Sovie t Navy had to 
mo v e out o f the c onf ines o f contiguous '.·Jat.ers in orde r to meet 
the t hreat at sea i nstead o f r e l ying o n air and missile de -
fen~~ e . In u.nother sense , t his i s a. stranse deve l opment. 
Khrushchev in 1 960 adopted a oosture somewhat simila r to the 
"nc:cssive re'caliation " doc-trine of ·the Un i 'ced St a tes in the 
EisenhO'•l .r e rao Hi s ezp l a. ncl.i::. ion \ T'S that the i mper i a list 
po~:JGrs 'i·.roull. n ever att.acl<.: 'ch2 So viet. Un i on no•.v becau se the 
• l atter ha.d such a corr~and :Ln g l ead in nuc l ear strategic p oHe r 0 
In other \·;or-6.s , he v.!<.ts r ely i ng on cl.et:.errcnce to avoid a nu-
clear '.-7ar . Tt -v.ras j ust a t .th:Ls time , ho\·lever , that the Navy 
b egan to find a rea l defens ive ro l e fo r i tse lf i n the e vent 
of nuclear attack . 
This defens i ve e ffor-t v!as dire c ted aga i nst c a rrier strj_ke 
fo::cces c. ::J.d. Pola.ris submar ines . The Polar is three::. t \·,7as a n o'tl 
o n e but the c a rrj_er threa t had long exi sted. , and t h e Sovi et 
Na ·vy had done li ttle o f an effect:i. ve n a ·ture j_n the 1 950 ' s to 
c ounte r it. N o':7 , j ust i·7he n t he c a r rier' s s·tr a t egic role \vas 
b eginnin g t o d e cline , the Na~r began to d eve lop effective means 
to counter it. ll,. partial exp l anat ion for this si:ate o f affairs 
is t o b e founcl. in the time l ag b et'l.·:een a chan.::re j_n t he military 





plications by the other side. This time l ag , COU l:::> led Hi th 
the time required to construct nevr weapons systems often means 
tha t the b :o s ides are facing each other with imbalanced 
forces. But this does not entirely explain the f;;tilure of the 
Soviet Navy in the 1950's to develop the operational experience 
necessary to meet the carrier threat on the high seas. 
As v-1e have seen, the political fortunes of the Soviet 
NavY \'lere on the rise in the mid-1960's. It \vould be tempt-
ing, in retro~pect, to identify the Cuban missile crisis as the 
great Viatershed in the development of the Soviet Navy. Such 
a conclusion \-70uld not b e entirely correct. The submarine 
fleet had achieved great prestige by 1961. Speaking at the 
Tv;enty-Second Party Cong r ess in 1961, Khrushchev commented, 
The cons truction of the Soviet submarine fleet 
~s proceeding successfully. Our enemies are 
building a submarine fleet armed \•Ti th ballistic 
missiles. We are arming our fleet with both 
ballistic and homing missiles. Conditions oblige 
us to d o this~ Our enemies in the o pposing 
military blocs are preparing to bombard the 
territory of our country as vle ll as the socialist 
countries from submarines. 'i·-l e are prepared to 
answer them , firing at ~heir targets 6n the sea 
as well as on the land. 
In Ivlay , 196 2 , Khru.shchev visited Leningrad and spol<e to the 
shipbu·;_ l ders and seamen of the Ba ltic Fleet on the high quality 
of the new ships. "In the _past", h e said, "we have often crit-
icized our military comrades for deficiencies in the develop·..;. 
6. N . s. Khrushche v, Otchet Tseritral•noq o Komiteta K~SS 
S 'ezdy KP SS , (Report of the Central Co:-runi t:tee o f the CPSU 
to the Congress of the CPSU), U·1oscoH : Politizdat, 1 96 1) 
p. 43. 
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ment o f the · l'~avy , and d e:rnandc d t h 0.·c i t -be i :mpr oved o 1\nd 
• thj_ s cri tj_cj_sm v1as n o t in vain. 'ilh a t ·I have seen Lher_g/ is 
the kind o f ships t ha t fully a n s•/.re r the mode rn d e v e lopment 
• 
• 
of the Na.vy a n d the mode r n d eve lopment of milita. ry s cie nce and 
7 
t e clmoloqy ~" Khrush c h e v ' s J uly vi s it to the n orthe r n F l ee t 
vlh e re h e obse r ved tra ining exerci se s , includ ing the subme r ged 
firi ng o f a b a llistic mi ss ile , p ro"·-i de('l. furthe r confirma.-tion 
o f the i n c reased i nte r est by poli t i ca l l eaders i n the p o ten t i a l 
. 'I'he Cu:02.n rniss i.l e crisis , ~s >·7e h o. VP. n.lso see n , d i d not 
b rin g v.bout a reeva J.c1a tion of t 1<e role of the sub~na rine or 
i:he potenti<~ l:i. i.:ies of t he ~ -1a vy a s a r:1eans o :!: p t ·o _i ect in ·~f So v iet 
po\·ier a.nd in:c luence abro2.d u nc1cr circl_Fns-c.ances o f confron ·ta-
tion shor-t of '.':a r 0 
to qrea~e r e ff orts to ac~icvc o p9rationa l r cnd in0ss an~ a 
hi .::;~.1e r Ic10Di.li.ty o 'l'hesc mGar,;u r c;s ':Tore at. i i r st. Cl.ire c ·t ed a ·t 
t he pro'b l e rn o f defense i D nuclev.r \1a r . aga i nst: t he nava l nu. --
c l ear at·te,cJ<: forces of t .he 1,.7Gst. t=~.:cn n0.v:Les .. Th e y hD. ve b een 
p a rtia l ly succ~ssfu l in thi s v e n tu r e , b u t a r e s till defic i ent 
i s i n the area of mob j_li. ty th3.t the post-·2uban So v i et -/ 
rJa.vy :L~:.:; mo s t c l ct:t:c l y cl.:i_s ·C. i n;ru :Lshab l e from 'chat of the p r e -
Cuba per i od . I t a ppears that as a resul t of the ir grea t e r mo-
bili.ty the So v i et l eade r s di s cove r ed almo s t by c hance the 
politica l u s e fu l ness of a mobile fl ee t unde r ci rcumstan c es 
7. P r_£:v<ln. , l'lc y 1 1 , 1 962 ., 
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short. o f ':la:c . In i:he p0.s·t t•,.;ro or t .hree y ea r s , vis its by 
• ~; ovi e·t Nc:tva l vesse ls to :foreign p ort.s have been used f or o !-J -
vious l y politica l p urp o ses . Such use of the fl ee t h as b een · 
mo s t in ten se in the Ba l tic and Mediterranean Seas . It may b e 
tha t the b e neficia l results of the Soviet na.va l deploy ment 
to the Mediterranean in conn e ction with the Ar a b-Israe li cri s is 
o f 196 7 exc eeded the anti cipation o f the Sovie ·t. p olit.ica l l ead-
e r s themse l ves . There i s no ind icat ion tha t such u se of the 
Navy- '•las s e riously con~ce;-n;:.) lated by t-:ne l eade r s hip in t .he 
c c.. rl j_e .r lJc :cioc'. . --:h e the r such use •.-1c. s conte :·,,_p l <ttcd. o.r no-t: , 
the :=,ovict E c:'.VY in l 9S2 a nd 1 963 "~:-Ta s not i n a s uffic i e nt l y 
hi g h cond i c ion of O?e rational r e adine ss· to e xe cu t e sud1 
• 
Thus it. ctppe ;:1.rs 'cha.-t the Sovie t policy of u t. ili ?: i ng i ·C.s 
navo.l fo:cccs to j_nf luencP eve n t. s i n t11P Eastern J ;e<J.i tcrrane a:t 
in t£1e sum':l.1e i: of 1 967 \ las 0.n o <tcon~e of the in t e ract ion of t he 
c r i s i s s i tua'cion a.nd t .1e option of u s ing mobile nava l po<·Ier 
f o r thi s pu.rpos e , · ra·the :c t ha::J a p ol:Lcy i;7hici1 hao. long been 
p l v.nned a nd for ;,·/h ich the grol.md~,,7 or}<:: h a d been carefu lly la id ~ 
~ - ~hen the Sovie t g·overnment 'das faced in 1-'ICJ.y -v.r i ·th the n e c ess ity 
of d e monstra ting its solidarity wi t h the Arab countries rathe r 
tha n l osin g its poli~ica l inf l uence i n the area , the o p tion 
o f a nava l c'l.emonstra.-tion app ea:cec1 to be a liv e one . It h c:td t he / 
advan'ca .. ~Je of b e ing h i ghly visib l e •:li.thout be ing· p rovoca tive o r 
dan0e rous , 'dhe:ceas a de!-:> loyme~1t o f Soviet tro o9s to Eqy p tian 
s oil '.l ou l d h a v e b e en both provoc a t.i v e and dan gerous . 'l'h e man -
• 
n er i n Hhich i:he der:"\onstra tion ·;as cor:tducted indicates ·tha t 
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t he Ru ss i ans Tl"lere c aref1J. lly avo i cl. i nq a da.n ge rous c onf r o nta -
• tion wH :.h the Un i ·ted St a t es or eve n Hith Is r ae l. 
• 
• 
Th e poli t ica l role of the Soviet Navy in the s trugg l e 
o v e r al l oca tion of resou r c e s j_n the Sovie t Union r ema ins s ome -
Hha t obs cure . Pa r t icipa tion by n a v a l office r s i n the str a -
t egic debate both b efore and af t e r the f a ll o f Khrushche v h a s 
b een min ima l~ Early in the decade , a. fe··d s p o lcesmen expr essed 
cl.i ssa ti s ·.co.ct ion •.-Ji th ·the preeminent pos i'cion o f the subma rine 
\·-Then i t ap~0arocl. as if thi ~-; po li. cy might l oad t o the 2.J. mo s t. 
to·::al ecli:ose o·t- t he sul~face n<:, vy and naval c:, v iiJ. tion. S ince 
almost a un i versa l ex?ress ion of deep satisfact i o n b y n a va l 
l ec:de rs '.J j_th the j_!:' s !nre of the re s ource a l loca. tion . A pure ly 
ra 'ciona 1 exp J. <::tn2 tion of the g rCMing influe nce of t he tiavy in 
t e r ms of th'~ ~r lo"b<:l l st~categ i c balance , c.s ', ie h ave seen , is not 
c. s u ffici en'c m:o lc.no.·t i on f or !11c:n y feat.ures o f the c urren ·t 
struc ture of t he ~'i cnry .. 
In o rde r to achieve such a r e l a U .ve l y comp l ete sa ti s -
f a c t ion o f i ts d e s ires 1 the Navy mus 'c have b e en ab l e to form 
a lliance s wi th other influenti~l e l eme nts i n the So v i et politi -
c a l arena .. It i s n o t clear j ust who these e l ements a re 1 b ut 
c e rta i n probabl e cand i dates s t and ou t from the evi dence . On e 
s u c h e l e;-!'en t i s ~che s-roHi ng So v i et He r e han t I·la rine . Thi s fl ee t 
h as underqone extreme ly r ap i d g r m·!t h sin ce 1 9')3 , g 1:-o•.v in ~; from 
1, 3 92 , 000 t o n s i n 1 953 to 7, 455 , 00 in 1 965 . 8 I n recen t years 
8 c L . ··• • I'·ic.rt i n , The Sea. i n r·J:odern :'".:> t _pJ.te.::ry ( London: 






Jche as s ocia tion b e t He c n t1-te me rchant a nc:. n u.va. l fl eets h a s 
() 
b een quite c l early rnade . -' Anothe r c l c rhe n ·t Hhich h a s probabl y 
supporJcc d t h e Navy ' s position i s tha t o f the ma n a ger i a l 
group asso ciate d with the mi ss ile and electroni c indu s tr i es . 
J'!lo st i mp o r tant , perhaps, h a s bee n the notabl y good re l a t ionship 
b et•,;e e n the Na.vy and the Party in r e c en t years . Nearly 90 per-
c e nt of t h e pe r s o nne l of the Nu. vy be l onq e it:he r to the Pa.r ·ty or 
1 0 
t .o ·the Ko:cnso:nol 0 Un l ike ·the 1\. r ::-ay , t he Navy has not c!1a lle n ged 
the l co.c.1crship of the Pa:r: ty ., · : i thin the Jcoo 1 f~clcl.e :csh ip o f ·the 
Par ty there i s i nsuff ic ient evic!.(~n ce t o ascer-ta i n j ust \:iho a r e 
t he Navy ' s patrons~ 
There i s a n otabl e l a c k o~ d i s c uss ion i n the Sovie t mili-
ta r y press of t h e poss i bi l ity o f Soviet f orces tak inq part 
i n II locn l \:a.rs !I e 'I'hi s i s no·t s u r p Tj_s in g , sin c e t he So v i et 
l ee:•.dcrsi-d.p h:::ts n eve r resc i ncl.ed t .he f o :cmu l o. ·i: ion o f l(hrushc hev 
tha t s u c h ~ars a r e to b e a vo i ded b e c a u se of the dan qe r of es c a -
l et t ion to ;;ene r a l nuclear Har . · 'I'h e r e. i s s o~n.e f ea. r in the Uni teC:. v" 
St a t es tha t r e c ent c!.cve l op?'"len ts i n Jche So v :Le t ~:!a,ry ind :i.ca.t_e 
tha t the y " p l a n to pu t themse l ves i n a. pos i t ion \~The re 'chr:.;y 
could , if ne ce ssu.r~.l , l a n d foi·cc s ·to s u ppm_-t. f r i e n d ly gove .. n :uf:-!nts 
again s ·t attempt ed cgup s d ' e tat as the u . s . A. and Brita in did 
11 
f:o r the Leba nese and J o rdania n r e gin<e s a decade ago ." .. ;::;.1-
thoug h such fears are l egi t ima t e , the y are pr6bably great l y 
exaggerated . The r e i s l ittle evi den c e to support the e x iste nce 
---- - ----------------- --------------
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York T i mc;s , l"e brua ry 2~ , 1 968 . 
- 93-
o f [;uch a p l an . If the Eu ssj_cln n<':lv<:tl or p o l itica. J. l eade r s 
\·Jere p l anning for the pos s ibility of such ope r at ion s , i t seems 
u n l ikely tha t the que stion of l i mited war would be as litt l e 
discussed in the mi l itary press as it. curre nt l y i s . 
The danger of So viet "adve ntur i sm " , i f there i s s uch a 
danger , i s not from care fu l ly p l anned and exe c uted act ions in 
supp or-t o f client go vernFents , but r a the r from p o ss i b l e mi s -
c alculations as to the danger i nvolve d in an act ion . :; i th the 
poss ible except i on of the Cuban mis s ile crisis , the Russians 
rw.,-'e a h w.ys b2Em carefu l t o avoic!. a direct. confrontat ion of 
the United S t ates at sea . :i i th a ll o f the • ... (""' • J-:L ncrec.l.seu .. ,ov.J. e L. 
n a ·va l a c tiv j_'cy , i ncludi ng vi s its to fore i :_:~n por-ts , it seems 
significa!lt ti•a·t nv.v a l excurs i ons in the Pacif i c have b een 
• to the Philiop i ne 
C' 
. .:;,eiJ. I an cl. not ·to the South China Sea . No 
Soviet nc:,va l f:>hi.p has vi s ib::;d a ~-~ort.h Vi E: ~.::.namese port. s in c e the 
ou tbreaJ( o f '•7 c:tr in the nort:h~ Z\ lthou::/h n ava l l eade r s h a v e 
given sor,~c atten-;:ion to t1lc p o l i·tico.l u ses Qf n c:tva l po·.-;er i n 
t he l ast year , their attention still sec:ms to b e directe d a t 
t he peacet i me occa s ions for s uch use . F or the for seea.b l e f u -
'cure , i t seems un li i<::e l~:l t."hc:t'c t he Soviet go vernmen ·t uill uti-
l i 2e i t s g rmiin .:::r sea arsena.l to support politica l action i n 
oppos i'cion to v.rhu t is }Je rce ive d by them to b e a n i rnportant 
n ationa l inte r es t o f the Unite d States . Wh ateve r the t erm 
"defense of t h e sta t.e i n'cerests " me ans t o the l eaders of the 
So v i e t Union , it c a n be s a i d with r easonabl e assura nce tha t 
i t. doe s n ot mean t aking u ny undue ri s k of wa r with the United 
• 
Sti1tes . 'L'h:i.s h as s o far b een' true e ven i n the c ase o f so- c a ll -
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ed ' \ ·.Ja r s o f nationa l-liberation ". Khrus hchc v a nd hi s succe ssors 
• h a v e ta l ke (, loudly abou·t supporting na tiona.l-l i berc?.tion v_rars , 
b ut vrh en t hese p r onouncemen ts have b een pu t t o the tes t , 
the y h ave b een c a r eful to r ender ass i s t ance in forms which d o 
no t risk t h e unp r edictable r esu l t o f a wi den ing war. 
r.-.!h a t , the n , i s 'che sign i f i canc e o f t he ~rrm·.r ing role o f 
t h e So v i et lJaV'.J f o r t he future ? It i s ah1ays rash t o make 
p r edictions , but on the b a s is o f the evidence examine d h e re , 
i. ·t s e Grns pos sibl e to sugc;o s t. tha t i·i: i s most like:.y ·thcl.t: the 
1 u s s i an nava l stra t.e g ists vJ ill con t inue to c once ntra t e o n the 
C'e'J"' l o·pmeni- o·F n~vri ] T,Te=-> J"'On"' -.;l' t'J.-. "•7'rla t l· 's ec·cen{- l' a l ly a " co-,nJ- _ l .~ ._.. •• - _ .. •• _ .- ~- <-'- - - • \·, Ct...~.... ·' • , ;> \ . J l V C e> .:::> • - ._ ·• -- • L~ l.. 
erforce " :cole , whe ·ther i n ~\ S .I o r anti-carrie:c opera t :Lons. As 
presently conceived , the current reviva l of the naval i nfantry 
• a n d increu.secl. c-tmph.ibious c apu.bi li ty also seems ·to b e desi .:;rn ecl. 
:Eor use i n -;enera l ;;-.1arfare conditions 0 <nile sene r a l war 
Hill pro}Jably con·tinue to be the pr i mary concern of the So v iet 
Navy as 1·7e l l as ·the rest o f the ir a r med forces , the i ncreased 
mobi lity and readiness of the Sovie t fleet h as already r eaped 
some p o l i tica l divide nds i n t he Mi dd l e East and poss i b ly off 
Korea j_n the Pueblo incident . "\s the op tion s of usin;;:- nava l 
po":7c r for p oli t i ca l 2 nc.ls b e come more apparent and bet·te r u nder -
sto od by both n a va l and p o l it i ca l l eaders , the pos~ibi lity 
o f t h e Navy b e ing u sed for t.hese purposes \·J il l increase . I t 
i s h e r e t ha 'c the s ituat ion . i s frau.gl1t \-T i tr: t h e most dan ge r , 
b ecause the Cuba n mi ssi l e c r i s i s demonstrated , a mong other 
t hings , tha ·t no rna t'cc r hor..r c a utious t h e So vie t l eaders h a.ve 
• 
b een i n the past , a.nd no me>.tte r ho1 .. 1 conscious the y arc o f the 
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"ba l <mce of . forces " , they can and d o mq.ke mistake s about 
• \·!ha t the Un i tes States uil l perc e ive as a vi~:a l n a. tiona l 
i nte rest . In t he f u t,ure , the poss i bj_ J_i ·ties for such misca l-
cula tion s on the high s eas wiJl increase . 
On the v-ihole , the Soviet Navy i s a poten t force , s e cond 
only to t he United Sta t es Navy . It i s , however , for various 
r easons ~et fort~ h e re , a poor se c ond . In the e v e nt of gener a l 
vJar 
1 
it c o1J.ld i nflict c ost l y da':na~:e to Un i t.ed 3i:at.es force s 1 
It i s p oorly prepa r8d and 
e q uipped for limitccJ. o r loca l i:,~arfare ., It h o.s becm~2 1 hm1-
eve r , mo:ce v.ct:j_ve recen t1y a.s c:m instru ment. of oo li tica l i n-
f lue nce . Thi s i s the area c:.Jr:cen·tly subjec-t t o the most 
u nce rta i nties and whe r e the p o ss i b ility o f a direct Soviet-
• American confron·tc:.tion i s most e1.pparent 1 a l t h ough such a c on -
f~:-o_J.t.Cl.t:ion \·Jou l cl '~lC_y like Jy n~su lt not from a c a l cct.lluted 
move 1 bu)c rathG:c froht a :::t i sca l cu.l21-t:.ion. It i s for 
, -
SUCL1 an 






• e • '?Z:.~.BLE I 
GRO:'I T.H OF T~ill SOVIET NAVf FROM 1960 to l 9G 7 1 
! Shio 'Noe . j l9§_Q__L_ 1 96 1 & FJG2 l 1C1G3~· 19G/.1, f 1CJ6G I 1 96 7 (3) 
i Submarines 4S3 j 420 t12S ' /.) .. 1.1 .. 5 L- 23 3 9 3 3 80 
Conventj_ona.1 L1.50 1 11,20 410 •
1 
4 2G t.,07 3 53 3 57 
s~~B 10(2) 1 ]_8(2 ) 29 (2) , 20 [ 20 . 35 35(2) 
SSG j 20(?.) I 14 (2) 2 
. JY\.1.c 1car S(2) . 6 (2) 1 16 I 20. 1 15 . 40 SO ! s:-=::m r~ 10 s 13 ( 2)1 13 (2) 
I :3.SGN ·--· ---- - . _:~- I 4- . 2 lS ( 2) I 25 ( 2) 
! Cruisers 2 8 25 ~ 20 ( 3) 23 22 21 1 8 
1[ ~:i ve rcHov c lass 17 17 11H 3) 1 5 1 4 1 4 1 2 ,___O~l=c'l .. c r d.a sscs }_l_ 8 (2) G(3 ) 8 ! ,'3 7 6 ~ Dc~'troycrs . 1 11-9 160 - 16Ll, \ J. G4 T 153 1 4- 7 130 
Kr esta - cJ_c.ss" I · I · I I 5 ( 2 ) 
l 4 (2) K yn.C.a - c J.v. s s '~ 
IS rupny - cl2. ss''' 
2 2 4 4 
8 
Kasl1in -c lass~ 
Ki l d in - c las s 
5 
6 ( 2) 
8 I a 10 8 
9 
5 5 I 6 II ~ (2) 1 6 
,-, ' 40(2 ) 1 40 I 40 40 30 3 0(2) 3 0 
1 a11~n -c lass 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1\.otl:i..n - cla.ss 
Skory- clas s 7 5 7 5 75 · 75 7 ~ 65 5 5 (2) ' 
OJ.o(~ r c J.o.sses 33(2) ' 33(2) 3 3 · 33 2 9 t 2 7 0(2 ) 
! Es corts ( oc0.0.n) 1 03 92 99 (_)C) 99 90 92 
~:L:: c> cort.s .( c q_<".stal ) 208 20:-1 30G 3lG 2SG 300 ( 3 ) 27 0 
: MinC?s~,;cepcrs (ocean ) 1 84- ;' 210 27 0 2s1T 241 2 40 1 50 
i.c·i :i.ncsT.,TeeDn:rs ( Cou.stn. l) L-.0() J 2 0\l. l-j'300 ·250 I ~)00 l 2 t1.0 1 c;o j c r is s i l e p a 'c r 0 l E O rt t s l 11 () ( 2 ) I 50 7 0 1 0 0 
st Patrol a on.ts J OCO i 1000 1010 1noo 1 P00 37 0 400 
· L2 :1. cl.in::r Si1iDs ~/,-'· -~- -J.(~. (}'\3 l,~(?)_ c__ 1 211(4) 
l . ::: stirr.v. tcs from ':- eyr~_E:_}.o·t~.::o nt:.c:tschcnl:.J\JC~l for ·t~-K~ yea r o f pub lico. tio n u nless o ·t hcrHis e 
indi cated . 
') 
"-· . ::~s timo. te f rom ,Janes ? ·i qht_:i n cr Shios 
3 . J::stj_'l.,_ate f rom Ins'c itut·") f o r ~> tratc~g:i.c :::>tudies : The .J'-~ ilii:a.rv .Calo.n c e 
4 . I<art i n , The Sea in ~·1oc}0. rn S t:.r::2.tc~y , p . 179 0 
, ... The s e cl2.sses are c:1.escribed in t he >ovie-t n rcss v.s "missile cruisers " . 
~ 
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C:::-1"\ Rl\CT1::EISTIC:3 . OF :-30VIET S UDVJi"\l:Z INE~i BU ILT S I NCE 1i-7 iJI I 
!Years built l D ispla c emen·t 
I 19() 1 - ? 110 
I 1 '?6L1:- ·? R 
3.500/4 000 
11, 500/5500 
I 1 962 - 6 3 I 2 Ll-000 / 5000 
Spc:o. _J 
2"i ') _, 
(, 
25 ,..., () 
6 
2S J-·'- s 11 
- ·- '- '-- · ~ 
,:eapons !Cruising 
Ra n:::re 
Sa r k Ba llis t i c mis siles* 
toroeclo b .1bes 
Shaddoc~ cruise miss iles 
' , t ' 
·co rD0C•.O . \lDP-S l 
Sha~ d ock cruise missiles 
·torDed o tubes I :\'"1' , ,, 
. : ~..._,_a ss 1 96 0 - ? lf! 20 / 30 
-- -- . -- - 3500 / 1!000 -j-=::.: I 6 tor o P.do t'-'!:Y"' s ~~--------------4----------~ 
Con·ve n tiona l 
G Class 1 958 - ? 25 :?2 50/ 2 7 00 17/ 1 6 3 Sa r k Ba llistic missiles 22 , 000 
.r l 1 10 To.J;:D P. C~C> tubes . 1 
J Z Conve r - 1 9') 3 - ? 10 1 2000 / 2500 1 8 /1 5 j 2 Sar1<: 0 alJj_s tic missile s J 13 , 000 
·I _ s i on ! I G ~L'orn e-do tube:::> ____, 
,J C1;=,cc I l Qh2 - '7 2 I l 0 00 /2 ?nn 1 "' /13 Li (-: >'1 ;:=\Q"'"'o ·...-. 1' cr ' l' co r-. !"':""1-iC."Sl' 1r-.c: c. ,::;, C) .L . ' - .. • -- •. ' . - - -- '-- - ... I . . -- . c. ' .: '--• ·'· . \,, ~ y:: "' -'- ~ 1..0 ~ 
! ~ T o rnP rto b1b es 
1 5 , 000 
If/ Con':'e r - l_ 9r; J. - G:: 1 2 ! 1300 / lAOO Fi/l<L I ;._ '-:; h a6doc\ . c __ rui s '3 :nissiles 
, s:Lo n __j i r, To:t~D C' r o -c_,Jbes , 
J : ; Co;;:re r - l Of.:\9 - GC: 2 ,. ll!J0/1'-::.()(} - 17 /l "i ·I 1 ~r 2 :3h0 d c'l oc~( missiles -+~-1-3-,-0-0_0_-' -lj 
j Slon A TornP~ O b1~es 
13 I 00·0 
·l F C l ass I lq;g _ ? ?c; ! 7000/7::;0() ~~1-CS I JiJ-~I'o.co~"c~o 1.-.nbe s 20 OCVI w Class - j l 9 Sl - ' >J]_O ! __ 1_5!')0. / ?q()(} 1,..7 _1"'_' I r: '(or_n0~J.I2-.:t_ ,_1b ce ~:; 'n i nes 2 0 on_o 
'L~}_C }.2.ss 1 J.CJ<; g _:;:;:l~ J H?O /lG O(I Jn/J.S I r-. Torncc'to t '.J' X'S 13 OQ_Q__ 
' \.-J C la ss I l ClC:,Q- 31::;c:; ! lJJIO /J_t; (l(') . 17 / l'~ j_ _ _iiu_J-_'OY.T. '.C ~ c' ·. o t_:::i_:..·_}x~s r;oines 13 onn 
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C.r .. J.i se r-
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